Olay Tv'de Katıldığım CAATSA Yaptırımları Konulu Canlı Yayın

 

11 Aralık 2020 tarihinde Olay Tv'de katıldığım "Erhan Yılmaz ile 23. Saat" programında Türkiye-ABD ve Türkiye-AB ilişkilerine dair güncel gelişmeleri değerlendirdim. Aşağıda bu programı bulabilirsiniz.

ABD'nin Türkiye'ye Yönelik CAATSA Yaptırımları Kesinleşti: Joe Biden Dönemine Olumsuz Başlangıç

 

Giriş

ABD Kongresi’nin üst meclisi olan ABD Senatosu, ABD Temsilciler Meclisi’nden 2/3 çoğunluktan fazla bir destekle geçen ve Türkiye’ye yönelik yaptırımları da içeren Ulusal Savunma Yetkilendirme Yasa tasarısını (NDAA-National Defense Authorization Act) 79’a karşı 11 oyla onayladı.[1] Yasa tasarısı her iki Meclis’ten de 2/3 üzerinde oyla geçtiği için, 45. ABD Başkanı Donald Trump’ın yasayı veto etme yetkisi bulunmuyor. Başkan Trump, daha önce yasayı veto ederek Türkiye karşıtı yaptırımları engellemeyi başarmıştı. Ancak bu defa, Başkan Trump’ın 30 günlük süre zarfında Türkiye’ye yönelik olarak ABD’nin uygulayacağı yaptırımları seçmesi/belirlemesi gerekiyor. Bu gelişme, kuşkusuz, Kasım ayında seçilen ve Ocak ayında göreve başlayacak olan 46. ABD Başkanı Joe Biden ve ekibinin Türkiye ile ilişkiler konusuna krizle başlamalarını garantileyen ve işlerini zora sokan bir gelişme oldu. Bu yazıda, ABD’nin CAATSA yaptırımlarının ne olduğunu, neden böyle bir uygulamanın Türkiye’ye karşı gündeme getirildiğini ve bunun Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri açısından olası sonuçlarını değerlendireceğim.

CAATSA Yaptırımları Nedir?

Kısaca CAATSA olarak bilinen “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”, yani “ABD’nin Hasımlarıyla Yaptırımlar Yoluyla Mücadele Yasası”, 27 Temmuz 2017 tarihinde ABD Temsilciler Meclisi’nin ardından ABD Senatosu tarafından da onaylanan ve Başkan Trump’ın imzasıyla 2 Ağustos 2017 tarihinde yürürlüğe girmiş bir yasadır. Yasa, 20. yüzyılın Soğuk Savaş dönemi mantığını yansıtmakta ve ABD’nin hasım olarak gördüğünü ilan ettiği İran İslam Cumhuriyeti, Rusya Federasyonu ve Kore Demokratik Halk Cumhuriyeti (Kuzey Kore) ile çeşitli düzeylerde işbirliği yapan ülkeleri cezalandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Cumhuriyetçi bir Başkan ve Senato ağırlığında geçen yasa -ki yasayı veren kişi de Cumhuriyetçi temsilci Edward Royce’dur-, üç ülkeyi ABD’nin temel hasmı olarak işaret etmektedir: İran, Rusya ve Kuzey Kore. Yasanın hedefleri şu şekilde belirtilmektedir:[2]

1. İran’ın istikrar bozucu etkileriyle mücadele,
2. Rusya’nın Avrupa ve Avrasya’daki etkisini kısıtlama,
3. Kuzey Kore nükleer programı ve füze denemeleriyle mücadele.

Yasa, ilk geçtiği günden itibaren ABD’nin müttefiklerinden de ciddi eleştiriler almıştır. Örneğin, Fransa Dışişleri Bakanlığı, yasanın geçmesinin ardından yaptığı açıklamada, bu yasanın uluslararası hukuka uygun olmadığını ilan etmiştir.[3] Avrupa Birliği’nin bir diğer lider ülkesi olan Almanya da, dönemin Ekonomik İşler ve Enerji Bakanı SPD’li Brigitte Zypries aracılığıyla, bu yasanın hukuka uygun olmadığını ve AB’nin bu konuda birlikte hareket etmesi gerektiğini açıklamıştır.[4] Dönemin Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanı Jean-Claude Juncker de, yasanın AB’nin enerji çıkarlarına aykırı olduğunu belirterek, ABD’nin tek taraflı hareketlerinin Avrupa çıkarlarına zarar verdiğini vurgulamıştır.[5] AB’nin yasaya tepki göstermesinin nedeni ise, Rusya ile yürütülen ve neredeyse tamamlanan Kuzey Akım 2 projesine Almanya’dan Wintershall ve Uniper, İngiliz-Hollanda ortaklığı olan Royal Dutch Shell, Avusturya menşeli OMV ve Fransa menşeli Engie şirketlerinin de ortak olması ve bu projenin AB enerji güvenliği açısından stratejik bir atılım olmasıdır.

Yasa nedeniyle Rusya ile yakın ilişkileri olan başka bazı ülkeler de rahatsız olmuşlardır. Örneğin, 2017 yılı Temmuz ayında henüz CAATSA yasalaşmadan önce Rusya’dan S-400 hava savunma sistemini satın alan Türkiye, uluslararası kamuoyunda bu yasa nedeniyle cezalandırılabilecek ülkeler arasında ilk sırada belirtilmiştir. Aynı şekilde, 2018 yılı içerisinde Rusya’dan S-400 sistemi satın alan Hindistan da, ABD yaptırımlarının hedefi olma riskindedir. Rusya ile çeşitli alanlarda işbirlikleri olan Endonezya da yasa nedeniyle hedef haline gelebilecek bir diğer ülke durumundadır. Bu ülkeler, AB ülkelerine benzer şekilde, ABD yaptırımlarına karşı çıkmaktadırlar.

Yasanın ABD’nin stratejik hedefleri açısından da ne derece faydalı olduğu tartışmalıdır. Örneğin, Nikkei Asia için bu konuda bir değerlendirme yapan Ian Storey, bu yasa nedeniyle Asyalı ülkelerin yoğun bir şekilde Rusya yerine Çin’le askeri işbirliklerine yönelebileceklerini ve ABD’nin bu yasayla istemeden en büyük rakibi olan Çin’i güçlendirebileceğini yazmıştır.[6]

Türkiye Neden Yasa Kapsamında Cezalandırılmak İsteniyor?

Türkiye’nin yasa kapsamında yaptırımlara konu olmasının sebebi, Ulusal Savunma Yetkilendirme Yasası'nın 1255 numaralı bölümünde belirtilmiştir. Buna göre:[7]

• Türkiye’nin ortak üreticilerinden biri olduğu F-35 savaş uçakları ve bunun parçalarının Türkiye’ye transferi engellenmiştir.
• Türkiye’nin F-35 savaş uçaklarını kendisinin üretebilmesi için gerekli olan entelektüel mülkiyet, teknik bilgi ve materyal desteğinin transferi yasaklanmıştır.
• Bu durumun önlenebilmesi için, yasada birtakım istisnai durumlar da sunulmuştur. Bunlar; Türkiye’nin Rusya’dan S-400 satın almaması (ki zaten bu yasa çıkmadan önce Türkiye alımı kesinleştirmişti) ve Türkiye Rusya’dan daha önce S-400 hava savunma sistemi satın aldı ise, bunları elden çıkarması ve bir daha S-400 almayacağını dair ABD’ye güvence vermesidir.

Ancak Türkiye hükümeti, bu istisna seçeneklerini kullanmayı tercih etmemiş ve 2019 yılı içerisinde S-400’lerin Rusya’dan teslimatının tamamlanmasının[8] ve tüm ödemelerin yapılmasının[9] ardından, ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Mike Pompeo’nun 2019 yılı içerisinde Türkiye’yi S-400’leri aktive etmemesi konusundaki uyarısına karşın, -ki halen bile S-400’ler aktive edilmemiştir-, 2020 yılı içerisinde Sinop’ta yapılan deneme çalışmaları[10] sonrasında, ABD Kongresi, Başkan Trump’ın vetosunu da aşacak şekilde -ki Trump birkaç gün önce yasayı yine veto edeceğini açıklamıştı[11]- 2/3 çoğunluğun üzerinde bir destekle yasayı onaylamıştır. Böylelikle, Türkiye’ye yönelik CAATSA yaptırımlarının uygulanması kesinleşmiştir.

ABD ve Türkiye’nin Bu Konudaki Farklı Argümanları

İki ülkenin bu konuda farklı argümanları bulunmaktadır. ABD, bu konuda şu görüşleri ön plana çıkarmaktadır:

1. NATO üyeleri dururken Rusya’dan hava savunma sistemi alınması müttefiklik ruhuna aykırıdır.
2. S-400 hava savunma sistemi, F-35 uçaklarına dair gizli bilgilerin Rusya’ya iletilmesine yol açabilir.[12]
3. Ayrıca yasanın Kongre’den büyük bir farkla geçtiği ve her iki parti tarafından da neredeyse tamamen desteklendiği düşünülürse, Türkiye’nin Doğu Akdeniz’de İsrail, Kıbrıs ve Yunanistan gibi ülkelerle yaşadığı rekabet ve Güney Kafkasya’daki Azerbaycan yanlısı tutumunun, ABD’deki Rum-Yunan, Yahudi ve Ermeni lobileri tarafından aleyhine kullanıldığı sonucuna da ulaşabiliriz. Bu durum, Türkiye’nin ABD’deki lobi zafiyetine de işaret etmektedir ki, Türkiye, kısa süre önce yeni Washington Büyükelçisi olarak AK Parti eski milletvekili ve Tokyo Büyükelçisi Murat Mercan'ı atamıştır.[13]

Türkiye’nin argümanları ise şöyle sıralanabilir:

1. Türkiye’nin Rusya’dan S-400 alımı Temmuz 2017’de gerçekleşti, CAATSA yasası Ağustos 2017’de geçti. Yasalar geriye dönük işleyemez.
2. Türkiye, ABD’den defalarca Patriot hava savunma sistemini almak istedi, ancak Obama yönetimi buna izin vermedi (ki bu konuda Başkan Trump da Türkiye’yi haklı gördüğünü açıkça ifade etmiştir).[14] Hatta 2015 yılında Suriye’den Türkiye’ye bombalar atılırken, Türkiye’de NATO misyonu kapsamında görev yapan Patriot bataryaları bile geri çekildi.[15]
3. NATO içerisinde Yunanistan, Slovakya ve Bulgaristan gibi ülkelerde de Rus yapımı S-300 sistemi var.[16] Bunlar sorun yaratmıyor da Türkiye’nin S-400’ü mü yaratıyor?
4. Türkiye, S-400’leri genel savunma mimarisine entegre etmeyecek, Milli Savunma Bakanı Hulusi Akar’ın ifadesiyle ABD ile S-400’ler konusundaki güvenlik kaygıları görüşülecek ve bu konuda ortak bir çalışma grubu da oluşturulabilir.[17]

Yaptırım Seçenekleri Neler?

Yasanın ABD Kongresi’nin geçmesinin ardından, son 40 günlük Başkanlığını sürdüren Donald Trump’ın, 30 gün içerisinde 12 maddelik yaptırımlar listesi içerisinden Türkiye’ye yönelik 5 yaptırımı seçmesi gerekiyor.[18] 12 maddelik yaptırımlar listesi ise şöyle:[19]

1. Yaptırım kapsamına alınan kişi ve kurumlara ABD İhracat-İthalat Bankaları kredi desteği verilmemesi,
2. ABD’nin mal ve hizmet ihracatını durdurması,
3. ABD mali kurumlarından büyük miktarda kredi tedarik edilememesi. 12 aylık bir süre içinde toplamı 10 milyon doları bulan kredilerin tedarik edilmesinin yasaklanması,
4. Dünya Bankası ve Uluslararası Para Fonu (IMF) gibi uluslararası mali kurumlardan kredilerin bloke edilmesi,
5. ABD hükümeti fonlarına sahip olan ya da ABD’nin doğrudan iş yaptığı mali kurumlara yaptırım uygulanması,
6. Yaptırım kapsamına alınan kişi ve kurumlarla ABD mal ve hizmetlerine ilişkin sözleşme yapılmaması,
7. Döviz üzerinden işlem yapılmasının yasaklanması,
8. ABD’nin yetki alanına giren banka ödemeleri ve para transferlerinin yaptırım kapsamına alınması,
9. Yaptırım kapsamına alınan kişi ya da kurumların ABD topraklarında gayrimenkul edinmesiyle ilgili işlemlerin yasaklanması,
10. ABD’deki kişi ve kurumların yaptırım uygulanan kişi ve kurumlarla sermaye veya borç alışverişi ya da yatırım yapmasının yasaklanması,
11. Yaptırım kapsamına alınan kişi ya da kurumlarla bağlantılı kurumsal yetkililere vize yasağı getirilmesi,
12. Yaptırım kapsamına alınan kişi ya da kurumların üst düzey görevlilerine yaptırım uygulanması.

Reuters haber ajansı, üst düzey yetkililere dayandırdığı haberinde, yaptırımlar kapsamında Türkiye Savunma Sanayi Başkanlığı Başkanı İsmail Demir’in kişisel olarak hedef alınabileceğini (daha önce Halkbank davasında da ABD yargısı bu şekilde kişisel cezalandırma yolunu tercih etmişti) belirtiyor.[20] ABD’de yaşayan Türk asıllı uzman Soner Çagaptay da, Twitter üzerinden yazdığı bir mesajda yaptırımların çok da ağır olmayabileceğinin sinyalini veriyor.[21] Bu durum belki büyük bir krizi önleyebilecekse de, ikili ilişkilerin Joe Biden göreve başlamadan ağır bir hasar alacağı kuşku götürmez bir gerçek. ABD uzmanı Türk akademisyen Soli Özel de, Trump ile Erdoğan arasında bu konuda oluşan anlayış ve dengenin (S-400’lerin aktive edilmemesi karşılığında Türkiye’ye yaptırım uygulanmaması) Sinop’ta yapılan denemeler sonrasında bozulduğunu, ancak yaptırımların çok ağır olmayabileceğini ve Biden yönetiminin Türkiye ile ilişkilere olumsuz bir başlangıç yapmak istemeyeceğini belirtiyor.[22]

Sonuç: Biden Dönemine Kötü Başlangıç

CAATSA yaptırımları sonrasında, kuşkusuz, 46. ABD Başkanı Joe Biden döneminde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine oldukça kötü bir başlangıç yapılacaktır. Türkiye’de muhalefetin de bu konuda ABD yanlısı olmadığı düşünüldüğünde[23], ABD’nin Türkiye kamuoyundaki algısı anlamında -son aylarda Fransa’ya olduğu gibi- oldukça olumsuz bir döneme girileceği düşünülebilir. Bu ise, ne yazık ki, Türkiye ile ilişkileri düzeltmek isteyen yeni Başkan Joe Biden ve onun Dışişleri Bakanı olacak Antony Blinken’ın işini zorlaştıracaktır. Yine de, diplomasi ve geleneksel ABD müttefiklerine önem verme çizgisinde olan Biden ve Demokrat yönetimin, bu yasanın Avrupalı müttefiklerden de tepki çektiğini düşünerek, ilişkileri düzeltmek için bazı adımlar atması mümkündür. Bu konuda bazı önemli tespitler şöyle yapılabilir:

• CAATSA yasası, ABD’yi uluslararası bir mahkeme statüsüne koyan meşruiyeti tartışmalı bir yasal metindir. Nitekim ABD günümüz uluslararası düzeninde halen tek süpergüç olsa da, diğer ülkelerin ticaret politikalarını belirleme hakkına sahip değildir. Bu, uluslararası hukuka ve devletlerin egemenliği ve eşitliği ilkesine de aykırıdır. Hatta bu yasa, geleneksel Amerikan müttefiklerini bile ABD’den tamamen uzaklaştırma potansiyeline sahiptir. Öyle ki, daha şimdiden Washington’dan -Berlin Büyükelçisi Robin Quinville aracılığıyla- Almanya ve diğer Avrupalı ülkelere Kuzey Akım 2 projesinin durdurulması yönünde uyarı ve tehditler gelmektedir.[24] Bu, neredeyse tamamlanmış bir proje için kabul edilebilir bir durum değildir ve ABD ile Avrupalı müttefiklerin de Biden döneminde ilişkilerinin bozulmasına yol açabilir.
• Türkiye’nin S-400 tercihi, daha önce de yaptığım analizlerde belirttiğim üzere[25], tartışmalı ve risklidir. Buna karşın, bu konuda karar alındı ve uygulandı ise, artık geri adım atılmamalıdır. Zira bu konuda taviz verilirse, ilerleyen yıllarda CAATSA yasası kapsamında Türk Akımı ve Akkuyu Nükleer Santrali gibi Rusya ile gerçekleştirilen başka projeler de Türkiye aleyhine kullanılabilir. Bu nedenle, Türkiye ve Avrupalı ülkelerin bu yasanın iptali konusunda ABD karşısında ortak hareket etmeleri gerekmektedir.
• Rusya’ya karşı sert olması beklenen Biden yönetimi, Suriye, Güney Kafkasya ve Ukrayna gibi ülke/bölgelerde barış ve istikrar için Rusya’nın da desteğinin gerektiğini görerek, sağduyulu hareket etmelidir. Günümüz dünyası, kesinlikle Soğuk Savaş dönemi dünyası değildir ve Rusya, Vladimir Putin’in zaman zaman sergilediği aşırılıklarına karşın, uluslararası sisteme entegre edilebilecek bir devlettir. Dahası, Rusya’nın, Türkiye’nin ve Avrupa’nın enerji güvenliği konusunda kritik rolleri bulunmaktadır.
• ABD Başkanı Joe Biden ve ekibi, CAATSA konusunda temkinli davranmalı ve Kongre’nin onayladığı yaptırımları engellemenin yollarını aramalıdır. Orta ve uzun vadede ise bu yasanın iptali doğru olan karar olacaktır.
• Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri, pozitif beklentilerin aksine, kötü ve zor bir döneme girmektedir. Nitekim Türkiye, bu karar sonrasında milli savunma sanayi imkânları konusundaki çalışmaları ve Rusya ile askeri işbirliğini yoğunlaştırabilir. Bu bağlamda F-35'ler yerine Rus savaş uçaklarının alınması ilk gündem maddesi olacaktır. Bu ise, kuşkusuz, Türk-Amerikan ittifakını içinden çıkılmaz zorluklara ve kopma noktasına taşıyabilir.

Doç. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

 

[1] Hürriyet (2020), “ABD'den Türkiye'ye S-400 yaptırımı”, 11.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/abdden-turkiyeye-s-400-yaptirimi-41686506.

[2] U.S. Department of Treasury, “Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act”, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/countering-americas-adversaries-through-sanctions-act.

[3] Reuters (2017), “France says U.S. sanctions on Iran, Russia look illegal”, 26.07.2017, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-france-idUSKBN1AB1MS.

[4] Josh Lowe (2017), “New Russia Sanctions 'Illegal' Says Germany, Urging Europe to Retaliate Against U.S.”, Newsweek, 31.07.2017, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-russia-sanctions-vladimir-putin-644160.

[5] Clark Mindock (2017), “Europe 'stands ready to act' if US sanctions on Russia affect its oil and gas supplies”, The Independent, 26.07.2017, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-russia-sanctions-latest-europe-ready-act-jean-claude-juncker-energy-security-america-first-a7861851.html.

[6] Ian Storey (2018), “US assault on Russian arms exports could misfire in Asia”, Nikkei Asia, 21.11.2018, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/US-assault-on-Russian-arms-exports-could-misfire-in-Asia.

[7] Congress.gov, “H.R.2500 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020”, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500/text.

[8] DW Türkçe (2019), “MSB: S-400’de ikinci sevkiyat tamamlandı”, 15.09.2019, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.dw.com/tr/msb-s-400de-ikinci-sevkiyat-tamamland%C4%B1/a-50438042.

[9] Nerdun Hacıoğlu (2020), “Rusya: S-400’ler için ödeme tamamlandı”, Hürriyet, 08.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/rusya-s-400ler-icin-odeme-tamamlandi-41682544.

[10] BBC Türkçe (2020), “S-400: Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Sinop'ta S-400 denemeleri yapıldığını doğruladı”, 23.10.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-54664164.

[11] DW Türkçe (2020), “Trump: Savunma bütçesi tasarısını veto edeceğim”, 08.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.dw.com/tr/trump-savunma-b%C3%BCt%C3%A7esi-tasar%C4%B1s%C4%B1n%C4%B1-veto-edece%C4%9Fim/a-55874025.

[12] Örneğin, ABD Savunma Bakanlığı (Pentagon) yetkilisi Katie Wheelbarger, bu konuda şu ifadeleri kullanmaktadır: “S-400 bir bilgisayar. F-35 bir bilgisayar. Kendi bilgisayarınızı rakibinizin bilgisayarına bağlamazsınız. [Türkiye’nin S-400 alması halinde] Yapılan şey bu olacak.” Bakınız; Sertaç Aktan (2019), “Türkiye'nin S-400 alması F-35 teknolojisini ve NATO güvenliğini tehlikeye sokuyor mu?”, Euronews, 15.07.2019, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://tr.euronews.com/2019/07/15/turkiye-nin-s-400-almasi-f-35-teknolojisini-ve-nato-guvenligini-nasil-tehlikeye-sokuyor.

[13] Yıldız Yazıcıoğlu (2020), “AKP'li Murat Mercan Washington Büyükelçisi Olacak”, Amerika’nın Sesi, 03.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/akpli-murat-mercan-washington-buyukelcisi-olacak/5692126.html.

[14] NTV (2019), “’Obama Türkiye'nin Patriot almasına izin vermedi, Türkiye'ye adil davranılmadı’ (Erdoğan-Trump görüşmesi)”, 29.06.2019, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.ntv.com.tr/video/dunya/obama-turkiyenin-patriot-almasina-izin-vermedi-turkiyeye-adil-davranilmadi,XELgO3WbakigAy0KZWzwDg.

[15] BBC Türkçe (2015), “ABD ve Almanya Türkiye'deki Patriot füzelerini çekiyor”, 17.08.2015, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/08/150817_patriot_fuzeleri_abd_almanya.

[16] Mehmet Alaca (2019), “Russian S-300s used by 3 NATO member countries”, AA, 11.04.2019, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/russian-s-300s-used-by-3-nato-member-countries/1449436.

[17] DW Türkçe (2020), “Akar: S-400'ler konusunda ABD ile görüşmeye hazırız”, 12.11.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.dw.com/tr/akar-s-400ler-konusunda-abd-ile-g%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9Fmeye-haz%C4%B1r%C4%B1z/a-55572995.

[18] Karoun Demirjian & Ellen Nakashima & Karen DeYoung (2020), “Trump administration to impose long-awaited sanctions on Turkey over Russian missile defense system”, The Washington Post, 10.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-administration-to-impose-long-awaited-sanctions-on-turkey-over-russian-missile-defense-system/2020/12/10/c266682c-3b15-11eb-bc68-96af0daae728_story.html.

[19] Amerika’nın Sesi (2020), “CAATSA'da Hangi Yaptırım Maddeleri Bulunuyor?”, 11.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.amerikaninsesi.com/a/caatsa-kapsaminda-hangi-yaptirim-maddeleri-yer-aliyor/5696005.html.

[20] Humeyra Pamuk & Phil Stewart (2020), “Exclusive: U.S. set to sanction Turkey over Russian defense system – sources”, Reuters, 10.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-turkey-sanctions-exclusive-int-idUSKBN28K2TZ.

[21] Bakınız; https://twitter.com/SonerCagaptay/status/1337484358668660739.

[22] “Türkiye'ye S-400 yaptırımları: Trump mı uygulayacak Biden mı? | Işın Eliçin'in konuğu Soli Özel”, Medyascope, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_hXFlM6Qcc.

[23] CHP Genel Başkanı Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu bu konuda şunları söylemiştir; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVYDU2UuYfI.

[24] DW Türkçe (2020), “ABD'den Almanya'ya: Kuzey Akım 2’yi durdurun”, 05.12.2020, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: https://www.dw.com/tr/abdden-almanyaya-kuzey-ak%C4%B1m-2yi-durdurun/a-55832940.

[25] Ozan Örmeci (2019), “Türkiye’nin S-400 Tercihinin Analizi: Teknik Açıdan Üstün, Ancak Siyaseten Riskli”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, 13.07.2019, Erişim Tarihi: 12.12.2020, Erişim Adresi: http://politikaakademisi.org/2019/07/13/turkiyenin-s-400-tercihinin-analizi-teknik-acidan-ustun-ancak-siyaseten-riskli/.

Interview with American Political Scientist Dr. Matthew Weiss

 

Matthew Weiss is a full-time Political Science Instructor at the College of Southern Nevada (USA), which is based in Las Vegas. Previously, he was an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Affairs and Security Studies at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, where he taught classes for both the undergraduate minor and the Masters of Public Affairs program in Global Security Studies. From 2011-2012, he served as a post-doctoral research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California Davis (USA) in 2011. Dr. Weiss has published articles in a variety of journals concerning Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-Kurdish relations, water scarcity and conflict in Yemen, and cooperation and conflict over international river basins. His primary research and teaching interests center around international relations, Middle East politics, American government and non-traditional security issues.

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: Dr. Weiss, thank you for your time. I want to start with a question on the elections. Democratic Party candidate and former Vice President Joe Biden elected as the 46^th President of the United States. Joe Biden became the U.S. President elected with the most votes in the whole American history by having more than 81 million votes. In the meantime, his opponent and Republican Party candidate Donald Trump also garnered more than 74 million votes. How can we explain these elections by looking at Presidential and Congress results? Do you think public polls conducted and published before the elections failed at understanding the power of Trump?

Dr. Matthew Weiss: It’s fair to say that Joe Biden won a strong mandate from the American voters, especially as reflected by the fact that he won 7 million voters more than Donald Trump did in the nationwide popular vote tally. However, that it was not an outright landslide, as many observers predicted, and that the Republicans far exceeded pollsters’ expectations in national and state-level races, demonstrates that the political center of gravity in the U.S. in many respects tilts center-right.

The outcome does not indicate a sharp pendulum swing to the left as much as a repudiation of Trump’s mismanagement of the pandemic and the economic disaster that it wrought. It wouldn’t even be accurate to suggest that Trumpism as an ideology has been decisively discredited. Over 70 % of Republican voters identify with Trump’s claim that the election was not free and fair despite there being no credible evidence of fraud, and Trump still commands the allegiance of tens of millions of followers on Twitter. Even so, though it is arguably far too premature to speculate on what will happen in 2024, I am not of the opinion that Trump will run for president again. Even if the political brand he embodies remains intact, I believe that Donald Trump’s future political fortunes have significantly declined as a result of his election loss and it is far more likely that he will anoint someone else, perhaps his daughter Ivanka, or one of his acolytes in Congress, to run in his stead in 2024.       

It is important to note at the outset that election outcomes and margins of victory are arguably more difficult to predict and pin down in the United States than in perhaps any other democratic country due to the idiosyncrasies of the Electoral College for choosing the president, coupled with plurality, winner-take-all rules. American presidents are elected by an anachronistic system named the “Electoral College” whereby victory goes not to the candidate who wins the most votes nationwide, but rather to who racks up enough states in their winning column to get over the threshold of 270 electoral votes. Regardless of whether they win by a razor-thin margin or in a landslide, whichever presidential candidate wins the most popular votes in a given state (e.g., California, New York, Texas, Florida, etc.) receives, according to a winner-take-all formula, all of the available electoral votes for that state, whereas the opposing candidate walks away with none. It is the extreme opposite of a proportional scheme or system for allocating votes.

Therefore, even though this represents a hypothetical, extreme scenario, it is theoretically possible for a candidate to get to the “magic number” of 270 electoral votes by winning only by a single vote in the 11 states that are the most populous and hence richest in electoral votes, without winning a single vote in any of the other 39 states (or the District of Columbia, where the capital is based). Under this scenario, a winning presidential candidate need only win approximately 27 % of the nationwide popular vote. And as we have seen, 2000 and 2016 represented two recent elections where the winner of the Electoral College and hence the presidency (Republican candidates George W. Bush and Donald Trump respectively) lost the popular vote to their Democratic Party rivals.

This quirky system has two perverse implications that make pre-election polling a hazardous enterprise at best. First, presidential candidates expend an inordinate amount of time, resources, and energies on a few key “swing states” or “battleground states” where there are relatively equal numbers of Democratic and Republican-leaning voters and the outcome hangs in the balance. In these states, the presidential candidates compete the most fiercely as minor changes in voter turnout in favor of one or the other political party can be enough to put them over the top.

Secondly, national-level predictions of the popular vote margins between the two major party presidential candidates matter little. It is only the state-by-state breakdown that carries any importance in the final analysis. Problematically, however, state-level polls are notoriously under-funded relative to national-level polls despite the fact that the former are of far greater consequence for the ultimate outcome of the presidential race.  

As for the specifics of the 2020 race, pre-election polls were certainly far more accurate in 2020 than they were in 2016 in one crucial respect. Namely, whereas in 2020, the majority of the swing state polls far overestimated the magnitude by which the Democratic presidential candidate and now President-elect Joe Biden would prevail, in 2016, pre-election polls for the most part erred in predicting both the magnitude and the direction of the outcome. In other words, in 2016, almost across the board they erroneously forecasted that the Democratic presidential nominee, Hillary Clinton, would win in the key swing states in the weeks leading up to the election, and we all know how that turned out (an exception should be made for some of the polling sites and organizations that took the average of several major polls into account, such as “RealClearPolitics”, and correctly identified a tightening race in the final week or so of the 2016 campaign).

To some extent, the pre-election polls from this election cycle did significantly underestimate the residual strength of Donald Trump. However, more importantly, they significantly underestimated the strength and resilience of the Republican Party and their candidates on the whole. Defying the predictions of the pollsters, Republicans significantly overperformed the polls in contests for seats in the House of Representative, one of the two chambers of the national U.S. legislature (i.e., Congress). Instead of expanding their majority, as the majority of the polls predicted, Republicans actually netted about nine or ten seats and chipped away at the Democratic majority. Likewise, in the Senate (the other chamber of Congress), most of the Republican Senators who were said to be the most vulnerable held on to their seats. As such, the Democrats’ prospects of wresting majority control from the Republicans have dimmed (note: two looming runoff elections in the U.S. state of Georgia, which are a must-win for Democrats, will determine the final balance). Also, Republicans clearly dominated the Democrats in terms of either gaining or maintaining control over the majority of state legislatures. 

In short, Biden’s victory is somewhat of an anomaly, as Republicans clearly remain in the drivers’ seat in national, state and local representative bodies. What accounts for the staggering disconnect in outcomes? For one, there is abundant evidence from exit polling and post-election analyses that in a sharp departure from recent election cycles, “split-ticket voting” was fairly common among the many white independent and suburban voters who tipped the scales in Biden’s favor. These pivotal demographics, who soured on Trump due to his character deficits and perceived inept management of the COVID-19 pandemic, paradoxically voted Republican for Congressional and state-level races. In other words, Biden did not benefit from the same “down-ballot” effect that many winning presidential candidates have enjoyed in past elections. It was far from a Democratic sweep, in other words. 

Apparently, for many of the key constituencies that put Biden over the top, their decision represented less of an affirmative embrace of Biden and his policy agenda than a calculated decision to “punish’ Trump at the polls. They felt alienated enough by Trump to move decisively against him but wary enough of Biden and the liberal segments of the Democratic Party that they decided to box him in by handing control of Congress over to the Republican Party.            

In many respects, Biden’s success hinged on an unstable coalition of independents, moderates, residents of the suburbs, middle-class and white college-educated voters who have been known to vacillate between the two parties over time and cannot necessarily be counted on to deliver for him in 2024. As stated above, many of these voters were motivated by a shared animus towards Trump more than anything else.

True, Biden won decisively among all of the traditional Democratic constituencies, including women and various minority groups, particular African-American and Hispanic voters. However, in what was a surprise to many observers, Trump actually gained support among many of these minority groups, especially Black and Hispanic men, relative to his first run in 2016, while Biden outperformed Hillary Clinton in 2016 by 8 percentage points among white men. These defections are difficult to reconcile with the conventional wisdom that Trump’s appeals to white privilege and strident opposition to the movement for racial justice uniformly alienate minority voters. The slight erosion of support among minority group indicates a vulnerability that Democrats will need to address over the short-to-medium term.

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: What can we expect from Joe Biden-Kamala Harris term in the next 4 years? What will be the most important issues and themes in the new era?

Dr. Matthew Weiss: It may be more appropriate to ask what we can expect from President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris in the next 4 months, because the defining challenge of their presidency will be to fashion effective policies and measures in the short run to address the COVID-19 pandemic and reduce, if not reverse the mighty economic blow the pandemic has dealt to the American economy. Here we are talking about an economic crisis, the likes of which have not been encountered since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and a public health crisis which some say is the worst to befall America in its entire history as a nation!

As of this writing, the unemployment rate has fallen to 6.7 % in the U.S, but the skyrocketing increase in COVID-19 infections, which shows no sign of abating any time. Soon, and the renewed shutdowns and curfews is likely to take a significant economic toll and raises the specter of a so-called double dip recession. At the same time, absent swift and decisive action by Congress, which is hamstrung by partisan gridlock, to pass a second large economic stimulus package, tens of millions of struggling Americans are peering into the abyss as extended unemployment benefits and a federal moratorium on foreclosures and evictions are set to expire. Also at risk is the Paycheck Protection Program, a federal loan program designed to generate incentives for small businesses to keep their workers on the payroll, which was part of the original stimulus package. The fact that upwards of 54 million Americans are reported to be facing food insecurity in the richest country in the world is prime evidence of the dire straits in which the most vulnerable Americans find themselves.

Therefore, curbing the spread of COVID-19 and reviving the economy will undoubtedly be the defining priorities of a Biden-Harris Administration and it seems likely that Biden and Harris will rise to the occasion when they take the helm in January 2021. Reports suggest that a comprehensive plan of attack for combatting the pandemic are taking shape. Among the more innovative proposals that are circulating are the creation of a “Nationwide Pandemic Dashboard”, akin to what exists in South Korea, to display transmission rates of the virus in regions across the country, free COVID-19 tests, a concerted strategy to trace the contacts of those who have tested positive for COVID-19 and isolate or quarantine those who have been determined to have been exposed, and the creation of a task force to address the Coronavirus’ disproportionate effect on people of color.

Moreover, Biden has sent many signals that he will take scientific “best practices” seriously in a way that Trump has not, as evidenced by Biden’s call for a 100-day nationwide mask mandate as the centerpiece of his mitigation strategy and the fact that he has assembled top-flight infectious disease experts to make up a COVID-19 advisory board.

Further afield, Biden and Harris have unveiled ambitious plans for tackling climate change domestically and internationally, the credibility of which is bolstered by the fact that as a Senator from California, Kamala Harris was a co-sponsor of the Green New Deal, a far-reaching plan to transform the 21^st century American economy away from fossil fuels and create millions of jobs in the renewable energy sectors. It also goes without saying that Biden will pick up where President Barack Obama left off and bring the U.S. back into the Paris Agreement on Day 1 of his presidency.   

It is also quite conceivable that Biden and Harris will make major strides in addressing racial justice and police brutality against African-Americans, an issue which burst into public view again last summer in a wave of demonstrations that engulfed major cities in the U.S. following a slew of police killings of unarmed black men. Harris’ profile as the first African-American Vice President, coupled with her past experience as a District Attorney for the city of San Francisco and as Attorney General for the State of California, where she dealt with such issues on a daily basis, places her in an ideal position to advocate for police reform and sweeping racial justice measures.

The primary limiting factors to achievements the policy areas mentioned above are Biden’s gradualist instincts and the obstacles presented by a potential Republican-controlled Senate. Regarding the first, even though Biden has long been known as a centrist and not one who has distinguished himself as a progressive trail-blazing reformer, the urgent needs of the moment, especially those presented by the acute, multidimensional COVID-19 crisis, could well push him towards being a greater agent of transformation than his profile and background would suggest. The scope and ambition of his plans for jumpstarting economic recovery and suppressing the pandemic suggest that he has correctly read the mood and expectations of much of the American public for bold action on these fronts and he is prepared to go big. The closest historical parallel is arguably President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) who presided over an unprecedented expansion of the federal government’s role in provision of social welfare programs and services at the height of the Great Depression. There was nothing about FDR’s aristocratic, patrician background that predisposed him to being a great liberal reformer, but the man and the moment melded in such a way that it ushered in some historic economic relief measures and programs, such as social security, that are still with us today. Biden may well follow the same trajectory.  

As for the other constraint, should Republicans win one or both Senate runoff elections in Georgia next month and hold on to their majority in the Senate, Biden, much like Obama, will likely have to resort to executive orders rather than depend on Congress to fulfill his policy wish list. Much can still be accomplished, but executive orders can easily be reversed as soon as the presidency falls into the hands of the opposing party. Obama’s legacy was practically overturned in its entirety when Trump entered office, and Biden will likely experience the same fate unless he can garner support from Congress and translate his priorities into legislation that stand a chance of surviving multiple election cycles.  

In terms of foreign policy, the expectations of every knowledgeable observer, and mine are no different, is that Biden will return the U.S. to the international fold and will clearly and unambiguously repudiate the “America First”, neo-isolationist posture that Trump personified. Biden will surely go to great lengths to restore frayed ties and revive alliance relations with first and foremost, NATO, and other fellow democratic countries (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, among many others) that Trump estranged through his unilateralist approach and lack of interest in eliciting the input of traditional allies and partners before making consequential foreign policy decisions. Multilateralism and adherence to the rules and institutions of the liberal international order were the lodestars that Biden followed throughout his long career as a Senator and later as Vice President under Obama, and there is little reason to expect his approach will differ as President.      

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: For the Turkish audience and Turkish social scientists who do not know too much about Joe Biden, what are his strong political views and what he represents in the U.S. Politics and Democratic Party?

Dr. Matthew Weiss: Given that I already addressed where Biden fits in the domestic political equation, it may be most helpful here to elaborate on Biden’s experience in and approach to foreign policy and international relations. It suffices to say that Biden will be entering office with the most impressive foreign policy credentials of any president-elect since George H.W. Bush in 1989. Biden spent many years as the majority leader or ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate and played a key role in many of President Obama’s foreign policy initiatives as Vice President. In fact, one of the primary reasons that he was chosen by Obama to be his vice president was due to the need to balance out Obama’s lack of foreign policy experience at the time.

This is not to say that Biden always made the right judgement calls on foreign policy issues. Many of his critics judge him to have been on the wrong side of history, and deservedly so, for voting for the Authorization for the Use of Military Force resolution against Iraq in 2002, which set the stage for the ill-conceived U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush. He also lent ammunition to the false pretenses for going to war against Iraq by playing up the discredited allegations surrounding Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.

Nonetheless, on several prominent international issues that dominated the Obama Administration’s time in office, Biden staked out moderate, sensible, well-reasoned positions, and did not shy away from going against the grain of what a majority of Obama’s leading foreign policy advisers were recommending. One key example was the review of Afghanistan policy conducted early in Obama’s first term in which he and his advisers debated the force posture and focus of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan going forward. In sharp contrast to the other members of Obama’s foreign policy brain trust, Biden advocated for a lighter footprint (i.e., fewer “boots on the ground”) and an overhaul of the overall U.S. strategy from an expansive, open-ended nation building quest to a narrower counter-terrorism strategy involving a combination of special operations forces and greater reliance on drones and other surveillance and targeting technologies. He also argued that the Taliban did not pose an existential threat to the U.S. and that efforts should instead be focused on defeating the remnants of al-Qaeda. 

For the most part, Biden lost this debate as Obama decided to heed the advice of his generals and surge 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, but he did draw in part on Biden’s recommendations concerning the scaling back of the mission in Afghanistan and the de-emphasis on nation-building. In many respects, the subsequent course of the war, which revealed the futility of defeating the Taliban and its independence from al- Qaeda, along with its amenability to negotiations with the U.S, proved Biden right.

Along with his extensive experience in foreign policy being an asset, Biden will bring into office a seasoned team of advisers who have worked with him for decades. Antony Blinken, who Biden has chosen to be his Secretary of State, is said to be so intimately familiar with Biden’s worldview and ways of thinking that he can complete his sentences. Naturally, some of the foreign policy officials and advisers that Biden assembles will have divergent views. At times these disagreements may be fractious. However, it is highly unlikely that these differences of opinion will devolve into the type of chaos that routinely flares up in the Trump’s White House. It is reasonable to expect that a Biden-Harris Administration will present a far more coherent foreign policy picture to foreign leaders and audiences than has been the case under Trump. Trump has a penchant for personalizing foreign policy and staging ill-timed interventions in the actions and decisions of his foreign policy officials and at times, deliberately undercutting them.

While Biden will certainly seek to put his own stamp on American foreign policy initiatives and in doing so, may overrule, at times, the recommendations of his inner circle, more often than not, he will lead by consensus, and will, in stark contrast to Trump, be mindful of the need to send a consistent message to allies and adversaries alike.     

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: What would be the most important issues in Turkish-American relations in the new era? Do you think the lack of personal ties and friendship between President Trump and President Erdoğan will negatively affect U.S.-Turkish relations? What will be the most problematic issues in bilateral relations in Biden presidency? 

Dr. Matthew Weiss: Joe Biden’s ascent to the presidency brings the possibility of both cooperation and discord in Turkish-American relations depending upon the problem set. The strongest assets that Biden brings to the table are his deep reservoir of foreign policy experience and extensive dealings with foreign leaders. 

In some respects, the warm relationship between President Trump and President Erdoğan, albeit one that was more transactional than it was motivated by genuine friendship, acted as a brake against the further deterioration of Turkish-American relations. Therefore, the defeat of Trump, who in many respects shielded Erdoğan from accountability for actions that he took that ran counter to vital American interests, such as the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, which is incompatible with NATO’s defenses, is a source of significant concern in Ankara.  

However, as much as the personal Trump-Erdoğan connection may have shaved the rough edges off an otherwise rocky bilateral relationship, Trump’s thoroughly improvised and ham-handed approach to foreign policy, born of his lack of foreign policy experience, and in my view, utter inability and unwillingness to learn the art of diplomacy on the job, created additional sources of tension and discord with Turkey to a degree that often goes unacknowledged. The foreign policy approach that Trump pursued, which was not grounded in any overarching principles or doctrine apart from the narrow, self-serving criteria of what personally benefitted Trump, often generated more problems with Turkey and other allies than it resolved.  

A prime example of this is the degree to which Trump sought to cater to the appetites and whims of other Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE (United Arab Emirates), who rank among Turkey’s greatest rivals in the region. From turning a blind eye to the Saudi government-orchestrated murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi and Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s ruthless consolidation of power, to initially backing the same monarchies and Egypt in their dispute with Qatar and Turkey (a stance from which he later abruptly changed course) to approving arms sales to the tune of tens of billions of dollars to the Saudis and Emiratis, Trump has consistently, if unwittingly, intervened in the intra-Suni conflict in ways that run roughshod over Turkey’s vital interests. This is not to mention Trump’s unprecedented indulgence of Israel’s annexationist drive to expand illegal Jewish-only settlements in the Occupied Palestinians Territories, coupled with its complete disregard for Palestinian rights, which has drawn sharp condemnation from Turkey, whose regional image is bound up with its advocacy of the Palestinian cause.

From this standpoint, Biden, with his superior foreign policy experience, may serve at least some of Turkey’s core interests better than Trump has, since he is less likely to give free rein to the whims of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s ambitious crown princes and fork over billions of dollars in advanced weapons to them. Many observers expect that Biden will place far greater emphasis on human rights than his predecessor.  Ironically, this may have the effect of placing some aspects of Turkey’s behavior under the spotlight. At the same time, though, it is likely pressure will be turned up on the Saudis and Emiratis for their aggressive pursuit of the war in Yemen, which has turned into the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, as well as their interventionist policies in Libya and elsewhere.  While some backlash from Turkey is to be expected should the U.S. ratchet up its criticisms of Turkey’s repression and jailing of government critics, Erdoğan’s negative reaction may be limited as long as the enhanced scrutiny of human rights is applied to his Sunni rivals as well and has the salutary effect of curbing their ability to project power in areas of contention with Turkey such as Libya and the Horn of Africa.

Another quality that Biden brings to the table which may compensate to some extent for Turkey’s loss of a valued, if unreliable partner in Donald Trump, is Biden’s interest in multilateral engagement and in reviving alliances that deteriorated under Trump. First and foremost, of course, is NATO, an institution in which Turkey has a vital stake as the member country with the second largest army. Undoubtedly Turkey will figure prominently as Biden ramps up U.S. engagement and seeks to build bridges with an institution that he regards as one of the linchpins of American national security. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, Turkey has assumed a central role in past NATO peacekeeping missions and a reenergized NATO may lay the groundwork for a renewed sense of shared purpose between Turkey and the U.S. that can moderate some of the more bitter disputes of recent years. 

 It is also possible that Biden, as part and parcel of a diplomacy-first approach, may take a special interest in the management, if not resolution of conflicts, such as those in Libya and Syria, where Turkey is itself a protagonist. This prospect does not guarantee that American approaches to diplomacy would invariably be in harmony with Turkey’s interests. However, in line with was previously stated, Turkey might come to appreciate the benefits of the U.S. acting in the capacity of an impartial mediator to the extent that it is willing to apply equal, if not greater pressure against Turkey’s Sunni rivals.

Then there is the issue of Iran, its nuclear program and its regional ambitions.   A Biden Administration may choose to capitalize on Turkey’s unique position as a Sunni power that has relatively cordial ties with Iran, despite their geopolitical antagonisms. Turkey may well offer itself as a go-between the U.S. and Iran as Biden grapples with how to piece together a refurbished version of the landmark JCPOA agreement in 2015 that the Obama Administration brokered with four other great powers and Germany. This agreement, which Trump walked away from, placed severe constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. 

At the same time, the fault lines between Turkey and the U.S. are legion and well known, and they include, among others, the U.S. investigation into Halkbank, a Turkish government-owned bank accused of helping Iran evade sanctions, the potential activation of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense batteries and Turkey’s expanding partnership with Russia more generally, Turkey’s energy ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean, the recent resurgence of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, Erdoğan’s authoritarian approach to governance, and many others. On some of these issues, Biden is constrained by both increasing skepticism of Turkey’s value as an ally in Congress, a sentiment that is increasingly shared by representatives of both major political parties, and by members of his own Democratic Party. For instance, there are many Democratic members of Congress who favored Armenia over Azerbaijan, which was backed and supplied by Turkey, in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.   

Once Biden takes office, any one of these bones of contention could flare up in such a manner that they would overshadow, if not derail nascent cooperation between the Biden Administration and Turkey in other areas. However, by far, the biggest impediment to the return to a more constructive relationship between Turkey and the U.S. is the Kurdish Question and the specter of another Turkish military incursion into northern Syria designed to weaken, if not eliminate the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey sees as offshoots of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The PKK, which has fought an on-and-off-again insurgency against Turkey for decades, is designated by Turkey, the U.S. and Europe as a terrorist group, but the U.S. sees the PKK’s Syrian Kurdish affiliate in a more benign light and supplied it with training and weapons to fight the extremist Islamic State (ISIS).

One reason that Turkey is especially wary of Biden is because as Obama’s Vice President, he was one of the architects of the policy of arming and partnering with the YPG, and he continues to favor cooperation and dialogue with the PYD and YPG. Biden views the Syrian Kurdish groups as legitimate players in the Syrian equation and as useful counterweights to Islamist extremists, whereas Ankara regards the PYD and YPG as expansionist organizations that pose in combination with the PKK, an existential threat to Turkey’s very territorial integrity and independence. 

Deft diplomacy by Biden to establish some kind of formula for balancing American relations with Turkey and the Syrian Kurdish groups is extremely unlikely to appease Ankara, for it regards the very prospect of an ongoing relationship between the U.S. and the PYD/YPG in any form as unacceptable. This strategy of ‘threading the needle’ to dance around Turkey’s concerns has been tried in the past with little success and is unlikely to work again. For instance, Ankara never saw the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces, an armed formation which grouped PYD forces with a diverse mix of Arab fighters and those from other non-Kurdish ethnic groups as an acceptable workaround solution.

In short, any initial goodwill and emerging cooperation between Biden and Erdoğan could readily dissolve in the event of a flare-up of tensions over the Kurdish issue. Some analysts speculate that the Turkish government may be looking to take advantage of the transition from Trump to Biden to expand its military operations against the YPG or at the very least, move to cut off its oil shipments in order to deprive it of an economic lifeline. The apparent calculus is that Erdoğan should do as much as he can in the here and now to erode the PYD/YPG’s standing because he will have far greater room for maneuver in the waning days of the Trump Administration than he will when Biden assumes office.            

As for Turkish-Russian relations, as a confident regional power that covets its freedom of action, and has no desire to return to the days of being attached at the hip of the U.S. and the West, as it was during the Cold War, there is little to no prospect that Turkey will forsake energy and security-related cooperation altogether with Moscow. However, through the judicious use of economic, energy and security incentives, the Biden Administration may be able to make itself a more attractive partner in Turkey’s eyes than Moscow. The fact that Ankara has taken delivery of the S-400 missile system yet has not made it fully operational, provides one crucial opening for Biden to convince Ankara that robust cooperation with the U.S. will better serve its needs than a full-fledged embrace of Moscow.       
                                

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: Could you give us some advices about who to read and following order to understand new trends in Turkish-American relations?

Dr. Matthew Weiss: There are more than a few good think-tanks and policy institutes based in the U.S., Europe, and Turkey that regularly offer objective, high-quality analyses of Turkish-American relations. One of these is the Ankara branch of the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, led by Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı. Also, I especially like to follow the Al-Monitor, a news website that specializes in reporting and analysis from and about the Middle East and features a lot of insightful commentary from Turkish correspondents and other experts and observers concerning a wide range of issues. 

Dr. Ozan Örmeci: Thank you Matthew. It was a privilege to interview you.

 

 Interview: Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

Date: 08.12.2020

Doç. Dr. Ozan Örmeci'nin konuk olduğu Gergedan Dergi'nin Podcast Yayını: "Türkiye ve Fransa: İttifak ile Rekabet Arasında"

 

Gergedan Dergi'nin düzenlediği "Türkiye ve Fransa: İttifak ile Rekabet Arasında" konulu podcast yayınına katılan Doç. Dr. Ozan Örmeci, bu yayında Türkiye-Fransa ilişkilerinde yaşanan güncel gelişmeleri değerlendirdi. Aşağıdaki linklerden bu yayına ulaşabilirsiniz.

 

Gergedan Dergi

Soundcloud

La Politique Intérieure de la Turquie : La Crise Economique et La Conjoncture Politique Actuelle

 

L’Introduction

La politique intérieure de la Turquie est toujours problématique malgré le pouvoir de Recep Tayyip Erdoğan et son parti l’AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement). Erdoğan et son parti islamo-conservateur continue encore de gouverner la Turquie depuis 2002/2003 -presque 18 années- sans arrêt.[1] Comme le Président Erdoğan -le candidat du bloc d’Alliance Populaire (Cumhur İttifakı) de l’AKP et le MHP (le Parti d’action nationaliste)- a gagné l’élection présidentielle en 2018 facilement contre Muharrem İnce, le candidat de CHP (le Parti républicain des peuples) et le bloc d’Alliance Nationale (Millet İttifakı) avec le Bon Parti (İYİ Parti) et le Parti de la Félicité (Saadet Partisi), normalement la prochaine élection présidentielle sera organisée en 2023. Mais le Président Erdoğan peut organiser une élection présidentielle anticipée si les effets négatifs de la crise économique peuvent supprimer avant 2023 pour garantir 5 années en plus au palais présidentiel. Dans cet article, je vais résumer les développements politiques important dans la Turquie en 2020 et évaluer la conjoncture politique.

La crise économique : Mythe ou Réalité ?

Premièrement, on doit dire que la crise économique de la Turquie en 2020 n’est pas un mythe ou une exagération. Contrairement aux plusieurs pays européennes, la croissance économique de la Turquie était toujours en hausse et excédent dans les années dernières jusqu’à 2020. Mais en 2020, le Fonds monétaire international (IMF) estime que la Turquie se dégrade approximativement 5 % à cause de la pandémie et des relations conflictuelles avec les pays occidentaux. Dans le deuxième quart, la dégradation était 9,9 % selon TurkStat (l’Institut de Statistiques de la Turquie, l’institution officielle de la Turquie pour les statistiques).[2] En même temps, les statistiques de FMI aussi nous montrent que l’inflation moyenne est presque 12 % (11,9 %). Ces nombres nous disent que le pouvoir d’achat du peuple turc a significativement diminué pendant 2020. Ce n’est pas par hasard que le Ministre du Trésor et des Finances et le beau-fils d’Erdoğan, Berat Albayrak a récemment soumis sa démission et a été remplacé par Lütfi Elvan.[3]

Les statistiques de l’économie de la Turquie en 2020 selon le FMI : la croissance économique (-5 %) et l’inflation moyenne (11,9 %)[4]

Si les effets de la pandémie peuvent être éliminés par le gouvernement, la croissance économique de la Turquie peut repartir facilement en 2021. Cependant les relations conflictuelles avec les pays occidentaux causent encore une barrière pour des capitaux flottants. La Turquie essaye de remplacer des capitaux flottants venant des pays occidentaux avec des nouveaux liens économiques avec les pays orientaux comme la Chine et le Qatar. Par exemple, récemment le Qatar a acheté 10 % des actions de Borsa İstanbul (la Bourse de la Turquie située à Istanbul[5]).[6]

Les appuis actuels des partis politiques

Selon les sondages d’Istanbul Ekonomi publié le 2 novembre 2020, l’AKP est toujours le plus grand parti du pays avec 33,2 % de soutient.[7] Le succès de Président Erdoğan et son parti n’est pas accidentel: Erdoğan a réussi de se mettre en contact avec les gens pieux et pauvres depuis 2003 par résoudre leurs problèmes politiques (l’interdiction du voile etc.). L’AKP est aussi le plus populaire parti politique en Turquie par le nombre de ses membres ; le parti a plus de 10 million de membres et 601.000 nouvelles membres ont été enregistré dans le parti en 2020.[8] Le MHP, le partenaire ultranationaliste de l’AKP, a aussi encore 8,8 % d’appui. Alors, les deux partis peuvent facilement atteindre 42-43 % des votes dans une élection anticipée sous le bloc d’Alliance Populaire (Cumhur İttifakı). Mais le nouveau système présidentiel en Turquie nécessite 50 %+1 des votes pour être élu au premier tour. Le deuxième tour pourrait être risqué pour Erdoğan particulièrement s’il y aura un candidat jeune et populaire contre lui. Alors, le Président Erdoğan et son partenaire Devlet Bahçeli, le chef de MHP, peuvent mettre à l’ordre du jour dans les mois prochains une révision de système d’électorale par diminuer le seuil présidentiel à 45 % ou 40 % au nom de la stabilité politique.

Le sondage d’Istanbul Ekonomi publié en novembre 2020[9]

Selon le dernier sondage d’Istanbul Ekonomi, il y a une chute pour le CHP. Le parti est estimé à avoir 16,5 % des suffrages car le parti ne peut pas enthousiasmer le peuple. Mais le chef de CHP Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu a une stratégie telle qu’il  permet et aussi favorise l’établissement des nouveaux partis politiques en gauche et surtout en droit s’ils opposent au régime d’Erdoğan. On doit se rappeler que Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu et son parti ont aidé le Bon Parti pendant leur processus d’établissement difficile. Maintenant Kılıçdaroğlu construit de bonnes relations avec les parties en droit aussi comme le Parti de Futur d’Ahmet Davutoğlu et le Parti de DEVA (le Parti de la démocratie et du progrès) d’Ali Babacan. Alors, le bloc d’Alliance Nationale (Millet İttifakı) de CHP peut atteindre 33-34 % facilement maintenant avec les votes de Bon Parti (13,5 %), le Parti de DEVA (2,4 %), le Parti de Futur (0,9 %) et le Parti de Bonheur  (0,6 %). En plus, l’avancement de Bon Parti de façon lente mais régulière est une bonne nouvelle pour le bloc d’Alliance Nationale. Mais si l’appui de Bon Parti et de CHP seront proches, le choix de candidat présidentiel pour le bloc peut être plus difficile et conflictuel. Les candidats favoris sont toujours Ekrem İmamoğlu (le maire d’Istanbul) et Mansur Yavaş (le maire d’Ankara). Mais le chef du Bon Parti Meral Akşener peut aussi essayer de dicter son nom comme le candidat présidentiel du bloc. D’autre part, il y a encore 13,1 % du peuple turc qui sont indécis pour l’élection prochaine. Alors les candidats et les partis politiques qui vont convaincre les indécis pourraient avoir beaucoup plus chance dans les années prochaines.

Encore des nouveaux partis politiques ?

En même temps, des personnes de politiques ambitieuses commencent des nouveaux mouvements et partis politiques en Turquie. Par exemple, le candidat présidentiel de CHP en 2018, Muharrem İnce fait un tour de la Turquie en visitant toutes les 81 villes du pays et il est en train de commencer un nouveau parti politique. İnce dit qu’il va essayer d’ajuster le CHP d’abord ; mais il n’a pas d’autre choix, il va établir son parti.[10]

Mustafa Sarıgül et Muharrem İnce

D’autre part, Mustafa Sarıgül, l’ancien maire populaire de Şişli et un social-démocrate assez connu va établir son nouveau parti en décembre sous le nom de Mouvement du Changement de la Turquie (Türkiye Değişim Hareketi-TDP). Sarıgül annonce que son parti ne va pas supporter l’un des deux blocs et sera un parti différent du CHP.[11] Ces deux initiatives peuvent diminuer les votes du CHP encore plus vers 13-14 %. Alors Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu doit essayer de réunir les partis de gauches au sein du CHP ou du moins dans le bloc d’Alliance Nationale. Ces deux partis ne peuvent pas remplacer le CHP ; mais ils ont le potentiel de faire le Bon Parti le parti plus fort d’opposition an attirant les électeurs du CHP.

La Postface

Alors la politique de la Turquie est toujours dynamique et les nouvelles initiatives prouvent que la Turquie possède sa démocratie malgré une tendance négative en Turquie et le monde entier durant les dernières années avec le succès des régimes autoritaires. La crise économique et les pas politiques du gouvernement seront déterminants pour l’élection prochaine. En même temps, surtout le CHP doit faire un progrès pour ne pas perdre sa position comme le deuxième parti et le support des gens opposants au régime d’Erdoğan.

Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

 

[1] L’AKP a gagné l’élection générale en le 3 novembre 2002 et a formé le gouvernement en seul mais Recep Tayyip Erdoğan était devenu le Premier Ministre en 2003 (le 15 mars 2003) à cause de son interdiction politique.

[2] Gokhan ERGOCUN (2020), « Turkish economy narrows 9.9% in Q2 », Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-economy-narrows-99-in-q2/1958336 (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[3] Wejden JLASSI (2020), « Turquie : Décret présidentiel nommant Lutfi Elvan ministre du Trésor et des Finances », Anadolu Ajansı, https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/turquie/turquie-d%C3%A9cret-pr%C3%A9sidentiel-nommant-lutfi-elvan-ministre-du-tr%C3%A9sor-et-des-finances-/2037957 (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[4] International Monetary Fund, « Turkey », https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/energy-diplomacy/world-bank-turkish-economy-to-grow-05-in-2020/28930 (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[5] Borsa İstanbul, https://www.borsaistanbul.com/tr/ (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[6] Emre DEVECI (2020), « Yüzde 10’u Katar’a satılan Borsa İstanbul’un 16,2 milyar TL nakit varlığı var », Sözcü, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/ekonomi/yuzde-10u-katara-satilan-borsa-istanbulun-162-milyar-tl-nakit-varligi-var-6143860/ (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[7] Türkiye Raporu, « Bu Pazar Genel Seçim Olursa Hangi Partiye Oy Verirsiniz ? », https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[8] Doğruluk Payı, « 2020 İtibariyla AK Parti’nin Üye Sayısı Ne Kadar ? », https://www.dogrulukpayi.com/iddia-kontrolu/recep-tayyip-erdogan/ak-parti-sadece-bu-yil-yaptigi-601-bin-yeni-uye-ile-pek-cok-partinin-toplam-uye-sayisini-geride-birakmistir (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[9] Türkiye Raporu, « Bu Pazar Genel Seçim Olursa Hangi Partiye Oy Verirsiniz ? », https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[10] Sözcü (2020), « Muharrem İnce: CHP’yi düzeltemiyorsak partiyi kuracağız », https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/muharrem-ince-chpyi-duzeltemiyorsak-partiyi-kuracagiz-6121541/ (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).

[11] İsmail SAYMAZ (2020), « Sarıgül, TDP’yi Aralık’ta kuruyor », Sözcü, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/ismail-saymaz/sarigul-tdpyi-aralikta-kuruyor-6145647/ (Page consultée le 30 novembre 2020).