Le 37eme Congrès du CHP

Le CHP (Parti Républicain du Peuple), le parti pro-séculaire, social-démocrate et en faveur de l’Union européenne est le plus grand parti de l’opposition en Turquie. Le CHP a organisé son 37eme congrès le week-end dernier à Ankara. Le chef du CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (71 ans) a eu une victoire facile au congrès. Par contre, les autres candidats (Tolga Yarman, İlhan Cihaner et Aytuğ Atıcı) n’ont pas même eu des signatures suffisants (des délégués) pour contester contre Kılıçdaroğlu. Cela a permis de voir le pouvoir de Kılıçdaroğlu dans son parti. En plus, le parti a adopté un nouveau document stratégique, « L’Appel pour la Deuxième Siècle » (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi) pendant le congrès. Dans cet article, je vais essayer d’interpréter les messages politiques de 37eme congrès du CHP.

Le premier point d’analyse est naturellement la domination de Kılıçdaroğlu dans son parti. Le chef actuel et septième du CHP[1] est maintenant le quatrième chef emphytéotique du parti après İsmet İnönü, Deniz Baykal et Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kılıçdaroğlu dirige le CHP depuis 2010 et il a réussi d’augmenter les votes de son parti dans ces dix dernières années. En 2019, le CHP a gagné les trois plus grandes villes en Turquie (Istanbul, Ankara et Izmir) avec 30,07 % des voix dans les élections municipales. Alors on peut dire que Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu n’est pas un chef sans succès ; mais en même temps, le chef de l’AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement) et le Président Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continue à dominer le système politique du pays depuis 2003. Comme le CHP a été créé avant la fondation de la Turquie en 1923 par Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (le fondateur de la Turquie et un grand héros national), d’être le deuxième parti n’est pas suffisant. Alors on pourra dire que c’est un succès limité pour un parti prétentieux.

Deuxièmement, les quatre sous-chefs de Kılıçdaroğlu ; Ünal Çeviköz, Yıldırım Kaya, Tuncay Özkan et Aykut Erdoğdu n’ont pas été élus par les délégués à l'assemblée parlementaire. Çeviköz, Kaya et Özkan n’ont pas eu des votes suffisants et Erdoğdu a perdu sa place à cause du quota de sexe. Par contre, les jeunes politiciens comme Yunus Emre et Gürsel Erol ont été choisi par les délégués avec des votes en surnombre ; pour moi une indication des délégués qui veulent canaliser Kılıçdaroğlu à rajeunir son parti.

Troisièmement, au congrès, le parti a adopté un nouveau document stratégique qui s’appelle, « L’Appel pour le Deuxième Siècle » (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi) qui est composé de 13 articles :[2]

1. Une nouvelle constitution sera préparée par le parti pour reconstruire un système parlementaire fortifié.
2. La paix sociale sera assurée par le parti avec une solution politique au problème kurde, l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes et la lutte contre les organisations terroristes et criminelles.
3. Un système de mérite va être appliqué dans la bureaucratie et les affaires d’état.
4. La loi électorale (Seçim Yasası) sera changée pour donner aux citoyens la possibilité de choisir leurs députés directement. En plus, le quota de sexe sera obligatoire pour tous les partis politiques.
5. La loi de morale politique (Siyasi Ahlak Yasası) va être légiférée pour empêcher la corruption.
6. La loi pour l’adjudication publique (Kamu İhale Kanunu) va être révisée pour augmenter la compétition et la transparence.
7. La cour des comptes (Sayıştay) sera fortifiée. D’autre part, le Conseil d’impôt national (Ulusal Vergi Konseyi) et la Commission de compte absolu (Kesin Hesap Komisyonu) (dans le parlement) sera instituées.
8. Une nouvelle organisation de planification stratégique (Stratejik Planlama Teşkilatı) sera créée pour organiser les pas stratégiques de l’Etat.
9. Le système d’éducation nationale sera remplacé par un nouveau système avec le but d’élever des générations démocratiques. En plus, le Conseil de l’enseignement supérieur (YÖK) sera supprimé.
10. Le droit d’écosystème (Ekosistem Hakkı) va être présenté et le principe de « développement soutenable » ou de « développement durable » sera ajouté à la constitution.
11. L’Assurance de l’appui familial (Aile Destek Sigortası) va être implémentée afin de créer un revenu fondamental pour chaque famille.
12. Une nouvelle balance entre le centre (Ankara) et les gouvernements locaux sera arrangée pour augmenter la productivité.
13. L’Organisation de la paix et de coopération pour le Moyen-Orient (Ortadoğu Barış ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı) sera établie par l’initiative de la Turquie avec la participation de la Syrie, l’Irak et l’Iran.

« L’Appel pour la Deuxième Siècle » est un manifeste important et historique. Mais des bons slogans comme « résoudre le problème kurde » ne sont pas des projets politiques concrètes.  Le plus important est de trouver et annoncer les bonnes méthodes pour réaliser et aussi convaincre le peuple kurde. L’idée de l’Organisation de la paix et de coopération pour le Moyen-Orient est aussi très intéressante mais l’AKP avait aussi des idées similaires, pourtant, la Turquie a été poussé vers une guerre civile en Syrie depuis 2011.

Le support pour le système parlementaire et présidentiel en Turquie (juillet 2020)[3]

D’autre part, le CHP a une position politique claire pour le système politique nécessaire dans le pays. Le parti défend un système parlementaire fortifié. Ça peut être un avantage comme la grande majorité des turcs (60-61 %) d`une façon ou d`un autre soutient un système parlementaire selon les travaux de la compagnie de sondage « Istanbul Ekonomi Araştırma ». Au contraire, seulement 38.4 % des citoyens favorisent un système présidentiel. Mais ici le CHP doit être attentif à ne pas utiliser une rhétorique académique ; les détails techniques entre le système parlementaire et présidentiel peuvent être insignifiants pour les gens ordinaires qui ont des problèmes plus graves comme le chômage, l’inflation et le système politique autoritaire. Alors le parti peut critiquer le régime actuel de la Turquie sur la base d’un système autoritaire ou la prise des décisions se fait par une seule personne.

Le support pour les partis politiques en Turquie (juillet 2020)[4]

Les sondages actuels organisés par Istanbul Ekonomi Araştırma montrent que le CHP a seulement 18.6 % de voix pour le moment. L’AKP d’autre part est encore fort avec 36.3 % d’appui de peuple. Mais comme il y a encore 10-11 % des gens indécis, le parti peut atteindre 23-24 % des voix dans une élection. En plus, il y a beaucoup plus de partis politiques qui s’opposent au régime d’Erdoğan maintenant. Le parti nationaliste et pro-séculaire le Bon Parti (İYİ Parti) a 9.2 % de voix, le parti pro-kurde le HDP (le Parti démocratique des peuples) a 10.4 % de voix, le nouveau parti d’Ali Babacan ─ le Parti de la démocratie et du progrès (Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi ou DEVA Partisi) a 2.4 % de voix et le nouveau parti d’Ahmet Davutoğlu ─ le Parti de Future (Gelecek Partisi) a 0.8 % de voix. Alors le bloc d’opposition peut facilement parvenir à 45-46 %. D’autre part, avec les votes du parti ultranationaliste ─ le MHP (le Parti d’action nationaliste (9.5 %) et les votes du parti islamiste ─ le Parti de Félicité (Saadet Partisi) (1 %), le Président Erdoğan et son parti peut parvenir à 47 %. La décision d’Erdoğan d’islamiser la basilique de Sainte-Sophie peut aussi attirer plus de votes dans la politique droitiste en Turquie (surtout les électeurs des partis d’Ahmet Davutoğlu et de Temel Karamollaoğlu ─ le leader du Parti de Félicité). Alors, le CHP doit choisir un candidat présidentiel sans défaut pour les prochaines élections présidentielle afin d’unifier les sociaux-démocrates, les kurdes, les nationalistes séculaires et les conservateurs qui s’opposent à Erdoğan.

Les politiciens plus populaires en Turquie (juillet 2020)[5]

Je pense que le candidat idéal pour le moment est Ekrem İmamoğlu, le nouveau maire d’Istanbul. İmamoğlu est le troisième politicien plus populaire dans le pays suivant Erdoğan et Süleyman Soylu. Alors les sondages montrent qu’il est le candidat ayant plus de chances. Mansur Yavaş, le nouveau maire d’Ankara peut aussi être un candidat fort pour le bloc d’opposition. Mais le background ultranationaliste de Yavaş (il vient de la tradition de MHP) peut être un problème pour les kurdes et les électeurs du CHP au noyau. Yavaş est le cinquième politicien plus populaire dans la Turquie suivant Erdoğan, Soylu, İmamoğlu et Devlet Bahçeli (le leader de MHP). Une autre possibilité est la candidature de Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu lui-même en choisissant İmamoğlu, Yavaş ou Meral Akşener (le leader de Bon Parti) comme son vice-président. Dans le nouveau système politique de la Turquie, similaire au système politique en Etats-Unis, le vice-président est une personne importante comme il/elle a le pouvoir de remplacer le président et accomplir ses fonctions lors qu’il est absent.

Mansur Yavaş ou Ekrem İmamoğlu ?

Finalement, je dois dire que le 37eme congrès du CHP était plus vibrant et ému que les congres antérieurs. Surtout le nouveau document stratégique, « L’Appel pour la Deuxième Siècle » (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi) a attiré l’attention du peuple et des médias. En plus, Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu a été présenté comme un leader fort (ça peut être un avantage en Turquie). Mais je ne pense pas que ça va être suffisant pour remplacer le régime d’Erdoğan aux prochaines élections présidentielles, qui sont prévus pour 2023. Je pense que le succès du Président Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dans la vie politique en Turquie est un mystère politique que les politologues doivent travailler. C’est étonnant que Monsieur Erdoğan puisse encore protéger son pouvoir et son électorat malgré une économie avec des mauvaises conditions et surtout que la Turquie a beaucoup de problèmes diplomatiques avec les Etats-Unis, l’Union européenne, les pays d’Europe comme la France, la Grèce et ses pays voisins comme l’Arménie, la Syrie, l’Irak, l’Iran, la Russie et le Chypre. En plus, Erdoğan a montré son intelligence politique encore une fois en rachetant son projet de l’islamisation de la basilique Sainte-Sophie au congrès du CHP pour arrêter la promotion de son adversaire politique. Alors nous allons voir si ça sera la Turquie d’Atatürk ou la Turquie d’Erdoğan qui va remporter les prochaines élections présidentielles.

Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] Les chefs précédents du CHP sont: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938), İsmet İnönü (1938-1972), Bülent Ecevit (1972-1980), Deniz Baykal (1992-1995, 1995-1999, 2000-2010), Hikmet Çetin (1995-1995) et Altan Öymen (1999-2000).
[2] https://www.gazeteruzgarli.com/chp-kurultayinin-sonuc-bildirgesi-kabul-edildi/.
[3] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/turkiyenin-mevcut-yonetim-sistemine-kamuoyunun-bakisi.
[4] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip.
[5] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip.

37th Congress of Turkey's Main Opposition Party CHP

Introduction

Turkey’s main opposition party, pro-European Union and social democratic CHP (Republican People’s Party) organized its 37^th congress last week-end in Ankara. While the party’s current and the 7th Chair[1] –since 2010– Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (71) was easily elected once again as the only eligible candidate for the leadership contest (three other candidates Professor Tolga Yarman, İlhan Cihaner, and Aytuğ Atıcı could not become candidate due to insufficient number of signatures by delegates), the party adopted a new manifesto for the future entitled “Manifesto for the Call to the Second Century” (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi). In this piece, I am going to summarize the most important developments concerning CHP’S 37^th Congress and try to assess the party’s chance to become Turkey’s ruling party.

Analysis

The first thing to be said about CHP’s 37^th Congress is that, the Congress reaffirmed Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s power and one-man position within the party. While CHP supporters often criticize Turkey’s ruling AK Parti (Justice and Development Party) for their lack of intraparty democracy and Congresses and leadership elections with only one candidate (that is naturally Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), CHP also followed the same path during its 37^th Congress. However, this might be considered as an advantage in some ways in a country like Turkey; since the party in a sense showed solidarity with this Congress and Turkish people often support strong leaders due to cultural and historical reasons.

The second important and interesting thing about the Congress is that three important people serving as Kılıçdaroğlu’s Deputy Chairs before, Ünal Çeviköz, Yıldırım Kaya, and Tuncay Özkan could not get elected to the Party Assembly by the votes of the delegates. Another Deputy Chair Aykut Erdoğdu also could not get elected due to gender quota (minimum 33 % representation for each gender) implemented by the party.[2] This means that 4 of Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidates were not elected. Especially the party’s fresh blood Yunus Emre and Elazığ representative Gürsel Erol’s performance in the election was striking. This shows that although CHP delegates support Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership, they also want to see their own supported Deputy Chairs around him.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu became CHP’s longest serving Chair after İnönü, Baykal, and Atatürk

Third important thing about the Congress was the newly declared “Manifesto for the Call to the Second Century” (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi). Manifesto consisted of these 13 points:[3]

1. A new democratic constitution will be adopted for transition into a strengthened parliamentary regime.
2. Social peace will be provided with the appropriate solution to Kurdish Problem, the attainment of male-female equality, and the struggle against terrorist and criminal organizations.
3. Meritocracy will be implemented in state affairs.
4. The Electoral Law (Seçim Yasası) will be changed in order to make people able to choose their own supported candidates. Gender quota will be made compulsory for all political parties.
5. Political Ethics Law (Siyasi Ahlak Yasası) will be legislated in order to fight with corruption.
6. Public Procurement Law (Kamu İhale Kanunu) will be regulated in order increase competition and transparency.
7. Turkish Court of Accounts (Sayıştay) will be empowered and National Tax Council (Ulusal Vergi Konseyi) and Final Account Commission (Kesin Hesap Komisyonu) within the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) will be established.
8. Strategic Planning Agency (Stratejik Planlama Teşkilatı) will be established in order to plan and organize strategic steps of the state.
9. Education system will be reorganized. The aim of the education will be to raise democratic generations. For realizing this, Turkish Higher Board of Education (YÖK) will be abolished.
10. Ecosystem Right (Ekosistem Hakkı) will be preserved for future generations. In doing this, “sustainable development” will be made a constitutional principle.
11. Insurance for Family Support system (Aile Destek Sigortası) will be established to provide each family a basic income.
12. A new balance will be established between the center (Ankara) and local authorities in order to increase efficiency in state affairs.
13. Middle East Peace and Cooperation Organization (Ortadoğu Barış ve İşbirliği Teşkilatı) will be founded by Turkey’s initiative with the participation of Syria, Iraq, and Islamic Republic of Iran.

Comments

If we have to assess CHP’s latest Congress, the first thing to be said is that while the party’s newly declared “Manifesto for the Call to the Second Century” (İkinci Yüzyıla Çağrı Beyannamesi) is a good-intentioned initiative that contains important political goals, there is still lack of concrete projects and plans especially about the party’s Kurdish policy, economic policy, and foreign policy. While a phrase like “solving the Kurdish problem” is a good populist rhetoric to attain Kurdish voters, the important is to declare and explain in details the methods and policies that will be used by the party. Likewise, the party’s economic and foreign policy also seems rhetorical rather than political. For instance, although the idea of Middle East Peace and Cooperation Organization seems very interesting, the party seems to forget the very reasons why AK Parti government had to come to its current positioning while it was previously advocating “zero problems with neighbors” (komşularla sıfır sorun) policy.

Support for presidential and parliamentary regime in Turkey (July 2020)

However, CHP seems quite strong and consistent in terms of its insistence on parliamentary regime. Recent polls published by Türkiye Raporu (Turkey Report) website (prepared by Istanbul Economics & Research/İstanbul Ekonomi Araştırma company) show that only 38.8 % of Turkish people support the current presidential system, while the 22.7 % of people want to return to old parliamentary system, and another 38.4 % of people prefer a new strengthened parliamentary model.[4] This shows that the party could mobilize 60-61 % of people on the basis of a system-based discussion before the next presidential election. However, I have doubts concerning this policy since many of the people do not exactly know the details and differences between the parliamentary and the presidential system. Thus, an academic and notional discussion about the system could be repellent for ordinary people who suffer from more serious problems such as unemployment, inflation, authoritarianism etc. Rather, the party could challenge the current one-man regime without getting into a political science based system discussions.

Most recent polls show that, although the party was able to win in three biggest cities of Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir) in March 2019 local elections, the current support for the party was only around 18.6 % while the governing AK Parti has still considerable (36.3 %) support.[5] There are still 10-11 % indecisive voters, which could increase CHP’s votes in a presidential election to 23-24 % according to my estimations. Moreover, the pro-secular nationalist Good Party (İYİ Parti) has 9.2 %, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has 10.4 %, Ali Babacan’s newly established Democracy and Leap Party (DEVA Partisi) has 2.4 %, and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s newly established Future Party (Gelecek Partisi) has 0.8 % support. This means that, a CHP-led presidential candidate that could appeal to secular nationalists, Kurds, and Erdoğan opponent conservative voters could get 45-46 % of the votes. On the other hand, AK Parti and President Erdoğan still seem advantageous due to 9.5 % Nationalist Action Party (MHP) votes in addition to 1 % Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) support. This means President Erdoğan could easily reach 47 % of the votes. Moreover, Erdoğan’s popular Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya) policy could attract more voters in the following days. Thus, CHP needs a presidential candidate that would unify all major political inclinations in the country (social democracy/Kemalism, conservatives, secular nationalists, and Kurds) at the next presidential election.

Most popular politicians in Turkey (July 2020)

From my perspective, the ideal candidate is Ekrem İmamoğlu, the new municipal leader of Istanbul. İmamoğlu is the third most popular politician in Turkey after Erdoğan and Süleyman Soylu according to Türkiye Raporu (Turkey Report).[6] Mansur Yavaş, the municipal leader of Ankara could also be a good presidential candidate although he risks losing Kurdish votes due to his ultranationalist background. Yavaş is placed as the fifth most popular politician following Erdoğan, Soylu, İmamoğlu, and Devlet Bahçeli. Another important factor to be mentioned here is the importance of the position of Deputy President (Cumhurbaşkanı Yardımcısı) in the new system, currently Fuat Oktay. Considering this, Kılıçdaroğlu could become a presidential candidate himself and declare İmamoğlu, Yavaş, or Good Party leader Meral Akşener as his Deputy President in order to unify all oppositional parties. In any case, there will be serious political discussions and negotiations both within the government and opposition circles before the next presidential election.

Mansur Yavaş or Ekrem İmamoğlu could be CHP’s next presidential candidate

Conclusion

To sum up, CHP’s 37^th Congress was successful in creating a bit of political excitement, but it was not enough to convince people that a historical governmental change is about to happen soon in the next presidential election. The reason for this is President Erdoğan’s diabolical political mind; Erdoğan was able to attract all media attention both in Turkey and outside with the Hagia Sophia move and somehow overshadowed the CHP congress. Another thing to be questioned here is why the CHP is not reaching higher percentage of votes although many people in Turkey are very unhappy about the current political and economic situation of their country. This shows that, due to religious prejudices against secularism and CHP’s Alevi (a religious minority group in Turkey) electorate, as well as the successful populist right-wing politics in Turkey, the party still could not embrace at least the half of Turkish society. It is also very strange to note that CHP’s Scientific Committee (Bilim Kurulu) could not devise and implement any concrete policy to overcome this difficulty.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] CHP’s earlier Chairs are as follows: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938), İsmet İnönü (1938-1972), Bülent Ecevit (1972-1980), Deniz Baykal (1992-1995, 1995-1999, 2000-2010), Hikmet Çetin (1995-1995), and Altan Öymen (1999-2000).
[2] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/chpde-kurultay-tamamlandi-yeni-parti-meclisi-belli-oldu-5954743/.
[3] https://www.gazeteruzgarli.com/chp-kurultayinin-sonuc-bildirgesi-kabul-edildi/.
[4] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/turkiyenin-mevcut-yonetim-sistemine-kamuoyunun-bakisi.
[5] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip.
[6] https://www.turkiyeraporu.com/sureklitakip.

La Basilique Sainte-Sophie devient une mosquée après 86 ans

L’Histoire de la Sainte-Sophie

La Sainte-Sophie (Ayasofya en turc et Hagia Sophia en anglais) est un temple historique et important pour les musulmans et les chrétiennes à Istanbul. Établi pendant l’empereur Justinien de l’empire Byzantin au sixième siècle, la Sainte-Sophie était d’abord une basilique orthodoxe. Durant l’occupation latine d’Istanbul (1204-1261), la Sainte-Sophie est devenu à une cathédrale catholique pour 60 ans; mais elle a redevenu une église orthodoxe après l’occupation latine. En 1453, pendant le règne de Mehmed II (Mehmed le Conquérant ou Fatih Sultan Mehmet), grâce à la prise d’Istanbul par les Ottomanes, la Sainte-Sophie a été transformé en mosquée.[1] L’empire ottoman a rétabli la Saint-Sophie comme le symbole de la conquête.

Jusqu’à 1934, même dans les premières années de la Turquie moderne, la Saint-Sophie a été conservée comme une mosquée. Mais en 1934, le fondateur de la Turquie moderne et laïque, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk a pris la décision de transformer la Sainte-Sophie en un musée. La motivation d’Atatürk en faisant cette transformation était d’agrandir la légitimité internationale du nouveau pays selon Serhat Güvenç, professeur de relations internationales à l’Université de Kadir Has à Istanbul.[2] Güvenç aussi souligne que la Turquie devenait un membre de la Société des Nations en 1932 et commençait à améliorer ses relations avec des autres pays. D’autre part, Jean Marcou, Professeur à Sciences Po Grenoble et un expert français concentré sur l’histoire politique turque, indique que la transformation de Saint-Sophie en musée était un ingrédient des reformes modernistes d’Atatürk pour la sécularisation de la société et la laïcisation de l’État comme l’interdiction du fez, le changement d’alphabet et l’égalité entre hommes et femmes.[3] Alors, pour Marcou, « redonner à Sainte-Sophie son statut de mosquée permettrait d’effacer un peu de l’héritage d’Atatürk » aussi.[4]

Transformation en mosquée après 86 ans

Transformer Sainte-Sophie en mosquée a toujours été  une idée populiste électorale des politiciens conservateurs. Süleyman Demirel, Necmettin Erbakan et Turgut Özal avaient déjà exprimé leurs intentions d’ouvrir Sainte-Sophie à la prière ; mais ils n’ont jamais pris la décision pour ne pas être en contradiction avec Atatürk, encore un héros national et une figure politique vivante en Turquie. 

Le président actuel de la Turquie Recep Tayyip Erdoğan a adopté une stratégie différente pour changer le statut de Saint-Sophie. Erdoğan a attendu la décision de conseil d’État turc avant de réagir. Lorsque la semaine dernière, le conseil d’État a annulé le statut de musée de Sainte-Sophie, Erdoğan a immédiatement pris la décision -par un décret présidentiel- de transférer la gestion de Sainte-Sophie, jusque-là gérée par le ministère de la culture et du tourisme, à la direction des affaires religieuses, et de rouvrir l’édifice à la prière.[5] Alors Erdoğan était attentif en partageant la responsabilité politique avec le pouvoir judiciaire mais en temps il a utilisé cette transformation pour la politique intérieure. Erdoğan a aussi critiqué Atatürk en disant que la décision en 1934 « n’était pas légale et était une trahison envers l’histoire »[6]. Suite à cette décision Sainte-Sophie sera ouverte aux prières musulmanes dès le 24 juillet (la semaine prochaine) mais les touristes pourront toujours la visiter en dehors des heures de prières.[7]

Les réactions

Les réactions à l’islamisation de Sainte-Sophie en Turquie est largement positive. La majorité du peuple turc supporte cette décision. Un sondage organisé par GENAR montre que 69.5 % du peuple turc est favorable.[8] Pour les turcs c’est une question de liberté religieuse et de souveraineté nationale. Mais les partis d’opposition et leurs leaders ont critiqué la stratégie d’Erdoğan et les conséquences possibles au lieu de critiquer la décision elle-même. Par exemple, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, le leader du Parti républicain du people (le CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)  a dit que ce n’est qu’une tromperie d’attendre la décision de conseil d’État même si le Président Erdoğan a déjà le pouvoir de changer le statut de Saint-Sophie.[9] Ali Babacan, le leader de Parti pour la démocratie et le progrès (le Parti de DEVA-Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi) a souligné les risques de protéger Sainte-Sophie quand elle sera ouverte à la prière.[10] Sainte-Sophie est sur la liste du Patrimoine mondial de l’UNESCO depuis 1985 comme une partie des zones historiques d’Istanbul.[11] Le chef du Parti du Futur (Gelecek Partisi), Ahmet Davutoğlu aussi a indiqué que la Turquie doit être attentive à ne pas provoquer l’islamophobie dans le monde chrétien.[12] D’autre part, le chef du Parti de l’action nationaliste (MHP-Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) Devlet Bahçeli a défendu la décision du conseil d’État et d’Erdoğan en disant que son parti était content de l’islamisation de Sainte-Sophie.[13] Le leader de Bon Parti (İYİ Parti) Meral Akşener a aussi défendu l’ouverture à la prière tout en avertissant Erdoğan et son parti de ne pas transformer ce sujet en une cause politique.[14]

Contrairement aux réactions domestiques, les réactions internationales face à l’islamisation de Sainte-Sophie, surtout celles du monde occidental, ont été très négatives. Josep Borrell, le le chef de la diplomatie de l'Union européenne a annoncé sa déception et son chagrin concernant  cette décision considérant que Sainte-Sophie est un symbole de l’amitié entre les musulmans et les chrétiens et parce que la Turquie est le leader de l’Alliance des Civilisations avec l’Espagne.[15] Ekateríni Sakellaropoúlou, le président de la république grecque a condamné la décision qu’elle considère comme  « une provocation contre la société internationale ».[16] La Russie et les États-Unis aussi ont également critiqué cette décision. De plus, le pape François a dit qu’il était  « chagriné  » par cette décision.[17] Le Conseil œcuménique des Églises (COE) a aussi exprimé « son chagrin et sa consternation » après la décision des autorités turques dans une lettre au président turc Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, publiée sur le site de l’organisation basée à Genève.[18] Il est aussi surprenant de constater que le monde islamique a accueilli cette décision sans grand enthousiasme. C’est normal car les pays du monde islamique ne sont pas complémentent démocratiques (sauf la Tunisie) et la Turquie a eu récemment des problèmes politiques avec des pays arabes comme la Syrie, l’Arabie Saoudite, l’Iraq, l’Égypte et les Émirats arabes unis. 

L’Analyse politique

Premièrement, je pense que la vie politique possède toujours un élément de symbolisme. Alors pour moi le Président de la Turquie Monsieur Recep Tayyip Erdoğan veut unifier le peuple turc en utilisant le pouvoir de la religion (l’Islam) et la souveraineté nationale. Selon les principes de psychologie politique, les nations font durer/maintiennent leurs intégrités avec la résurrection des victoires choisies (comme les éloges /commémorations nationales des guerres historiques et les fêtes nationales) et des traumas choisis (la déportation de 1915 pour les arméniens ou l’invasion de l’Anatolie en 1919 par les grecs pour les turcs). La conquête d’Istanbul en 1453 est une victoire significative dans l’intellect collectif des turcs. Alors l’islamisation de Sainte-Sophie permet à Monsieur Erdoğan d’unifier le peuple turc et aussi son électorat en revitalisant l’esprit de cette conquête. Mais le problème est que pour le monde chrétien, surtout pour le monde orthodoxe, c’est un grand traumatisme. Alors cette décision peut augmenter les sentiments négatifs contre la Turquie dans l’Europe et les pays qui ont des populations orthodoxes comme la Russie, la Grèce etc. 

Deuxièmement, l’économie de la Turquie ne va pas bien (comme dans tous les pays en fait) et le Président veut créer un succès politique et symbolique pour faire oublier la crise a son peuple. C’est vrai que les votes de l’AK Parti (Parti de la justice et de développement) est encore haut ; mais la tendance est négative. En plus, Erdoğan a maintenant deux nouveaux adversaires politiques (son ancien Ministre de l’Économie Ali Babacan et son ancien Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et Premier Ministre Ahmet Davutoğlu) qui le connaissent très bien. Alors, comme un politicien de droit, islamo-conservateur et populiste, Erdoğan veut écrire un nouveau conte politique avant la prochaine élection présidentielle.   

Troisièmement, le Président Erdoğan comprend bien et suive les tendances macro politiques dans le monde et pense qu’aujourd’hui ce n’est pas le monde de Barack Obama. Dans un monde politique dominé par les leaders populistes et nationalistes comme Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu et Jair Bolsonaro, Erdoğan pense que c’est le temps pour le particularisme, nationalisme et populisme.

Finalement, l’islamisation de Sainte-Sophie est aussi une victoire pour Erdoğan lui-même comme il vient d’un background/milieu politique islamiste. Pendant plusieurs décennies, l’État turc a interdit ou limité les libertés religieuses par peur d’un revanchisme contre la République laïque. L’armée turque a réagi comme l’apanage des groupes séculaires en supprimant ou bloquant les islamistes. La peur de l’islamisme radical pour moi est valide et rationnelle ; mais trouver la compatibilité entre le régime politique et les libertés religieuses est une question ouverte à des idées alternatives. Par exemple, l’interdiction du voile (türban) me semble illogique maintenant comme la plupart des femmes en Turquie le porte. La transformation de Sainte-Sophie est aussi n’est pas un grand danger ; le vrai problème va arriver si le Président Erdoğan essaie de réinstaurer  le califat islamique et changer la structure laïque du pays. Ça parait être une fantaisie ou une théorie du complot pour les turcs mais beaucoup de gens qui étudient et connaissent Erdoğan, comme le journaliste Ruşen Çakır, pensent que c’est le but (ultime) de Monsieur Erdoğan.[19] Le journaliste islamiste Abdurrahman Dilipak a même dit que le Président avait le droit de proclamer le califat.[20] Les gens séculaires d’autre part sont complètement opposés au califat et l’islamisation de l’État. Alors la crise de Sainte-Sophie montre qu’il y a encore une Turquie fragmentaire : les islamistes et les nationalistes traditionnelles (la majorité maintenant), les séculaires (les kémalistes, les nationalistes séculaires et les sociaux-démocrates) et les kurdes. Je pense que pour empêcher la rêve islamiste d’Erdoğan, les séculaires et les kurdes doivent faire collaboration.

La Conclusion

La crise de Sainte-Sophie n’est pas le vrai problème de la Turquie. La crise économique et les problèmes entre des différents modes de vie sont des problèmes réels et plus importants. Mais la crise de Sainte-Sophie peut augmenter les sentiments anti-turcs et islamo-phobiques dans le monde chrétien et peut accentuer l’isolation de la Turquie dans la diplomatie. Ma solution est de transformer Sainte-Sophie en un lieu de culte spécial et autoriser les chrétiens à y prier le dimanche  pour quelques heures.   

Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] http://www.istanbul-city.fr/guide-istanbul/sainte-sophie-ayasofya/.

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5vXQPWLvP4.

[3] https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Sainte-Sophie-reve-ottoman-dErdogan-2020-07-02-1201103106.

[4] https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Sainte-Sophie-reve-ottoman-dErdogan-2020-07-02-1201103106.

[5] https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/07/11/erdogan-ordonne-la-reconversion-de-sainte-sophie-en-mosquee_6045898_3210.html.

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkGfaXWMFeM.

[7] https://www.lci.fr/international/sainte-sophie-reconvertie-en-mosquee-a-istanbul-une-ouverture-au-public-en-dehors-des-heures-de-prieres-musulmanes-2159279.html.

[8] https://www.internethaber.com/ayasofyanin-ibadete-acilmasini-turk-halki-ne-kadar-destekliyor-bomba-anket-sonuclari-foto-galerisi-2114223.htm.

[9] http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/227424-kilicdaroglu-ndan-ayasofya-yorumu-sahtekarlik.

[10] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/toplum-yoruldu-nefes-aldirmaliyiz-5925978/.

[11] https://whc.unesco.org/fr/list/356/.

[12] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/davutogludan-dikkat-ceken-ayasofya-yorumu-5927281/.

[13] https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/mhp-lideri-devlet-bahceliden-ayasofya-aciklamasi.

[14] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/iyi-parti-genel-baskani-meral-aksener-grup-toplantisinda-40-5929465/.

[15] https://www.dw.com/tr/uluslararas%C4%B1-toplumun-ayasofya-tepkisi/a-54136620.

[16] https://www.dw.com/tr/uluslararas%C4%B1-toplumun-ayasofya-tepkisi/a-54136620.

[17] https://www.dw.com/tr/papadan-ayasofya-tepkisi-b%C3%BCy%C3%BCk-ac%C4%B1-duyuyorum/a-54145450.

[18] https://www.oikoumene.org/fr/press-centre/news/index/wcc-letter-to-president-erdogan-to-keep-hagia-sophia-as-the-shared-heritage-of-humanity.

[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UescZSLFBPo.

[20] https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/abdurrahman-dilipak-halifelik-yetkisi-erdoganda-225732h.htm.

Hagia Sophia Controversy: The Changing Status of the Historical Sanctuary

Introduction

After a court decision that made the 1934 Presidential decree made by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk void, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that Istanbul’s famous and historical sanctuary and museum Ayasofya (Hagia Sophia)[1] will be used as a public mosque starting from July 24, 2020. Shortly after Turkey’s Council of State (Danıştay) announced its long-awaited decision in favor of the possible status change, President Erdoğan immediately issued a decree and ordered the transfer of the management of the historic site from the Ministry of Culture to the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), paving the way for its conversion.[2]

Hagia Sophia

Hagia Sophia

Built between 532 and 537 and completed in 537 in Istanbul’s Fatih district, during the reign of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Emperor Justinian I, the Hagia Sophia is historically a Greek Orthodox cathedral (church). During the Latin occupation of Istanbul (1204-1261), Hagia Sophia became a Roman Catholic cathedral for almost six decades, but turned into a Greek Orthodox church again in 1261. After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by the Ottoman Sultan Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the cathedral was turned into a mosque and served as mosque for many centuries.

However, after the establishment of modern and secular Republic of Turkey, Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made a decision in 1934 to transform Hagia Sophia into a museum in order to give a peaceful message to the Christian world. A Turkish International Relations Professor Serhat Güvenç from Kadir Has University thinks that Atatürk’s decision was meaningful and understandable; because Turkey was looking for international support and prestige in its early years especially after becoming a member of the League of Nations in 1932.[3] An experienced French observer of Turkish Politics Jean Marcou on the other hand claims that Atatürk’s Hagia Sophia decision should be interpreted within the range of other modernization and secularization reforms including the banning of fez, the adoption of Latin alphabet, and the adoption of the equality between men and women with the Civil Law.[4] Hagia Sophia became the favorite touristic location in Istanbul over the years and has always served as a symbol for intercivilizational peace due to its historical significance both for Christians and Muslims.

A clip about Hagia Sophia

The turning of Hagia Sophia into mosque again became a political controversy in Turkey first time in the 1950s with the renaissance of Islam during the time of Democrat Party and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. In the 1960s and the 1970s, right-wing leaders including Süleyman Demirel and Necmettin Erbakan also made reference to social demands for such a move, but refrained to act due to sensitivities in the Western world. In 2016, the politicization of the issue increased with public prayers organized by Islamist groups outside of the historic building[5]. During the same year, Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs appointed an imam to Hagia Sophia and a Friday prayer (worship) took place after 80 years.[6] In that sense, one can claim that Hagia Sophia was already open to public prayer in certain days and in certain parts of the building.

The Decision

Before getting into a detailed political analysis, we have to carefully analyze the decision made by the Turkish Council of State.[7] The reason for doing this is that the methodology and reasoning of the law, which can be -many times- quite different from political argumentation.

First of all, the main argument of the complainant of this case (Sürekli Vakıflar, Tarihi Eserlere ve Çevreye Hizmet Derneği) was not about religious freedoms, but of the legality the earlier decision. The plaintiff basically claimed that:

1. 1934 decision was unconstitutional since the decree was not examined by the Council of State[8],
2. Even after the 1934 decree, 1936 registry of deeds records show that the building was licensed as a mosque, not as a museum[9], and
3. Although Hagia Sophia is presented as part of the UNESCO World Heritage, it is not stated in the official list[10].

Among these arguments, especially the third argument seems null since although it is not directly named in the list, the UNESCO World Heritage List makes reference to Hagia Sophia as part of “Historic Areas of Istanbul” in the 1985 decision. In fact, the list makes reference to Hagia Sophia at the entrance paragraph as follows: “Historic Areas of Istanbul: With its strategic location on the Bosphorus peninsula between the Balkans and Anatolia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Istanbul has been associated with major political, religious and artistic events for more than 2,000 years. Its masterpieces include the ancient Hippodrome of Constantine, the 6th-century Hagia Sophia and the 16th-century Süleymaniye Mosque, all now under threat from population pressure, industrial pollution and uncontrolled urbanization.”[11]

The official 1934 decree[12]

The first argument also seems controversial since there is no proof that the Council of State did not examine the legal draft before it turns into a legal decision. Moreover, there is an official decree published by Turkish State in 1934 with the signature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey’s then-President of the Republic. Although there are claims about the authenticity of Atatürk’s signature, since in 1934 President Atatürk was in full health, sane, and in charge of all executive affaires, I do not think there is a problem about legality of the earlier decision concerning the lawmaking technique.

Hagia Sophia’s official record in the Turkish registry of deeds in 1936[13]

The most vindicating argument of the plaintiff is about the record of the registry of deeds and the court also approved this argument. 1936 record in the Turkish registry of deeds prove that Hagia Sophia was registered as a mosque, not as a museum. In that sense, the registry of deeds record paved way for the change in the status of Hagia Sophia by making 1934 decree null and void.

Political Analysis

Although Hagia Sophia controversy or Hagia Sophia case is primarily of a legal and technical matter, due to its political content and strong symbolism, a political science-based analysis is absolutely needed.

The first thing to be said, for sure, is about the symbolism and political message given to the world. I think President Erdoğan’s immediate decision to change the status of Hagia Sophia from museum to mosque carries important political messages. These messages concentrate on Turkey’s absolute sovereignty on its own soil, the strong presence of Islam as part of Turkish identity and Turkey’s political system (although Turkey continues to struggle for staying as a secular state), and Turkey’s increasing search for independence and multi-dimensionalism in its foreign policy. It is a fact that although Turkey has some political and economic problems, the country has boosted its self-confidence and has begun to make more unilateral steps in recent years. This is primarily caused by the reconciliation of pious masses with the state due to strong leadership of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is known as a devout Muslim and a political leader coming from a radical Islamist background. Poor Islamist masses and people coming from political Islam tradition for long decades were kept out of Turkey’s state institutions due to fears of radical Islam taking the control of the secular state and decreasing individual liberties. However, as Turkey’s population and economic problems increased, at one point it became impossible for the state to keep the status quo. In that sense, the peripheral elements (Islamists especially and Kurds in the early Erdoğan period) of the Republic became central political actors and the state was redesigned in accordance with this new sociological reality. The other option was unsustainable since a military coup like that of Egypt in 2013 was proven to be impossible in Turkey multiple times such as the February 28 process in 1997, the e-memorandum crisis in 2007, and  the most recent failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. So, President Erdoğan became the symbol of Turkey’s Islamist transformation and established his cult leadership in the eyes of pious masses. Thus, Hagia Sophia move represents in fact the continuity in Erdoğan’s political career in terms of doing things that were not done before by earlier Prime Ministers and Presidents. Erdoğan did similar bold moves in the past as well such as by resisting to military intervention attempts, defying the United States and Israel in the public (one minute crisis at World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009), conducting peace talks with the PKK, and openly criticizing Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk etc.

The second important thing is about President Erdoğan’s success in following global political trends. While Erdoğan was once -in a world dominated by political leaders such as Barack Obama who represented change and promised peace to American people- ordering negotiations with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and was co-charing the organization of the “Alliance of Civilizations” with the then-Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, President Erdoğan now feels like the political conjuncture is different and nationalism and unilateralism are on the rise. So, Turkey’s recent political adventurism, bold military operations in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and increasing tough stance in the Eastern Mediterranean etc. show that President Erdoğan tries to unify Turkish people by creating some nationalist and Islamist causes. It is a fact that, although President Erdoğan’s decision is not against international law, being part of UNESCO World Heritage List has certain requirements which might be more difficult to realize when Hagia Sophia will be open to public. So, as an important and very successful politician who senses things earlier, President Erdoğan thinks that the zeitgeist of the era is based on nationalism, particularism, and conservatism. In that sense, President Erdoğan is following the steps of other right-wing populist leaders such as Donald Trump (cancelling JCPOA deal, Paris Climate Accord, TTIP and TPP agreements and most recently withdrawing the U.S. from World Health Organization-WHO) and Benjamin Netanyahu (annexing Golan Heights, making plans for annexing West Bank), who are also making unilateral steps.

Thirdly, the Hagia Sophia move represents the dangerous escalation between Turkey and its Western allies in recent years due to many political disagreements. Unfortunately, Turkey has few allies left in the Western world including the United States. Moreover, it is not easy to solve problems between Ankara and Washington (U.S.) and Ankara and Brussels (European Union/EU). While Turkey has severe disagreements with Washington in Syria (about the status and future of Syrian Kurds) and in the Middle East in general (relations with Israel, Iran policy etc.), Turkey’s close relations with Russia also creates problems. Similarly, Turkey’s already frozen EU membership process was recently overshadowed by rising Turkish-Greek tensions in the Aegean and the Mediterranean and Turkish-French hustles in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. The rise of Islamophobia and far right movements in European countries are also problematic developments in terms of Turkish accession to EU and Turkey’s relations with European powers. Thus, with the Hagia Sophia move, President Erdoğan wants to show Western powers that they have to give some concessions to Ankara to keep within the right track and to sustain alliance based relationship.

Fourthly, President Erdoğan as a politician who tries to survive (read as getting reelected in politics), has to make some critical steps in domestic politics to keep his popularity and support. The emergence of two new right-wing parties in Turkey; former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s Future Party and former Minister of Economy and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan’s Democracy and Leap (DEVA) Party are alarming signals for Erdoğan. So, as the hero of Islamist masses and a man of the people, President Erdoğan wants to reinforce his electoral support and consolidate right-wing conservative votes in the times of an economic crisis. The opening of Hagia Sophia to public prayer is a good gesture and a source of pride and joy for an average Islamist in Turkey, which would certainly increase the support of Erdoğan. It should not be forgotten that Erdoğan has always supported religious freedoms; he made the wearing of headscarf (türban) in public institutions and while making state (public) duties legal, removed the limitations against graduates of Prayer and Preacher Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları) in university exams, and restored many churches in Turkey.[14]

Possible Consequences 

The political consequences of the Hagia Sophia controversy are still unclear. It will certainly negatively affect Turkey’s relations with the Western world (the United States[15], the EU[16], Pope Francis[17] and World Council of Churches also criticized[18] Erdoğan’s decision) and UNESCO[19], but I do not think it will create a direct political consequence. Rather, the image of Turkey as a country getting away from the Western world and secularism will be more widespread among decision-makers and also ordinary people. This might negatively affect Turkish economy as well; primarily the tourism and finance industries. Hagia Sophia controversy could also create a distance between Turkey and the Orthodox world including Russia, Turkey’s both friend and enemy (frenemy) due to strong cooperation in economy, but political competition in Syria, Libya, Nagorno Karabakh etc. It would not be wrong to claim that President Erdoğan’s decision could create sympathy among Muslim nations; but due to lack of democratic regimes in the Islamic world (with the exception of Tunisia), this might not turn into immediate political and economic gains for Ankara.

Conclusion

To sum up, Hagia Sophia controversy will make pious Muslims happy in Turkey for being able to pray in a historical place and also visit the place for free, but it will not help Turkey to develop better relations with the international community and especially the Christian world. It might also help President Erdoğan to keep his popularity among conservative segments; but I think the economic and political governance of the country will still be more important for average Turkish voters in the next Presidential election. So, this decision is a political move that has symbolic significance rather than severe actual political consequences.

Lastly, as an academic in favor of civilizational peace, I might suggest President Erdoğan and Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs to make a special arrangement for this sanctuary; allowing Christians as well for Sunday prayers in order to give a peaceful message to the world. This will make Turkey a stronger country and will help Turkish government to show that they are in favor of religious freedoms, not religious hostilities.

Some cartoons depicting the changing status of the Hagia Sophia;

Source: https://i12.haber7.net//haber/haber7/photos/2020/28/musluman_cografyada_ayasofya_coskusu_filistinli_karikaturistten_anlamli_mesaj_1594428459_3192.jpg, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020

Source: https://cartoonmovement.com/_flysystem/s3/styles/product_detail_image/s3/AYA%20%20SFIA.jpg?itok=mx4dZI7f, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020

Source: https://cdn.yeniakit.com.tr/images/album/ayasofya-camii-karari-islam-dunyasini-sevince-bogdu-filistinli-karikaturistten-carpici-karikatur-afcdf5.jpg, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] For information about the historic building, see; https://muze.gen.tr/muze-detay/ayasofya; https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/03/160318_vert_tra_ayasofya; and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hagia_Sophia.
[2] Isil Sariyuce & Emma Reynolds (2020), “Turkey's Erdogan orders the conversion of Hagia Sophia back into a mosque”, CNN, 10 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/10/europe/hagia-sophia-mosque-turkey-intl/index.html.
[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e5vXQPWLvP4.
[4] Anne-Bénédicte Hoffner & Mélinée Le Priol (2020), “Sainte-Sophie, le rêve ottoman d’Erdogan”, La Croix, 2 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Moyen-Orient/Sainte-Sophie-reve-ottoman-dErdogan-2020-07-02-1201103106.
[5] CNNTürk (2016), “Ayasofya önünde sabah namazı”, 28 May 2016, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/ayasofya-onunde-sabah-namazi?page=1.
[6] Sabah (2016), “Ayasofya’da 80 yıl sonra ilk cuma namazı kılındı”, 21 October 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.sabah.com.tr/video/turkiye/ayasofyada-80-yil-sonra-ilk-cuma-namazi-kilindi.
[7] The full transcript of the court decision can be read from here; http://bianet.org/bianet/diger/227263-danistay-in-ayasofya-kararinin-tam-metni.
[8] Article 52 of the 1924 constitution states that the Council of State (Şûrayı Devlet or Danıştay with modern Turkish) has to examine the law draft before it turns into an act. See; “1924 Anayasası”, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Mahkemesi, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.anayasa.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/onceki-anayasalar/1924-anayasasi/.
[9] Kenan Kıran (2020), “Ayasofya tapuda da cami”, Sabah, 11 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2020/07/11/ayasofya-tapuda-da-cami.
[10] The list can be seen from here; https://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/tr.
[11] The official page can be seen from here; https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/356.
[12] Murat Bardakçı (2018), “Ayasofya Kararnamesi’nin altındaki “K. Atatürk” imzası gerçek mi?”, Habertürk, 14 September 2018, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/murat-bardakci/2141029-ayasofya-kararnamesinin-altindaki-k-ataturk-imzasi-gercek-mi.
[13] Haber7.com (2020), “İşte Ayasofya'nın Tapusu!”, 11 June 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.haber7.com/foto-galeri/63249-iste-ayasofyanin-tapusu.
[14] The most famous example is the Bulgarian St. Stephen Church or the Bulgarian Iron Church in Balat, Istanbul.
[15] Ekathimerini.com (2020), “US State Dep't 'disappointed' in Turkish government decision on Hagia Sophia”, 10 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.ekathimerini.com/254628/article/ekathimerini/news/us-state-dept-disappointed-in-turkish-government-decision-on-hagia-sophia.
[16] Jonathan Stearns (2020), “EU Urges Turkey to ‘Reverse’ Hagia Sophia Reconversion Plan”, Bloomberg, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-13/eu-urges-turkey-to-reverse-hagia-sophia-reconversion-plan.
[17] AlJazeera (2020), “Pope 'deeply pained' over Turkey's move on Hagia Sophia”, 12 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/pope-deeply-pained-turkey-move-hagia-sophia-200712151548612.html.
[18] BBC (2020), “Hagia Sophia: World Council of Churches appeals to Turkey on mosque decision”, 11 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53375739.
[19] SBS News (2020), “UNESCO 'deeply regrets' Turkey's conversion of Hagia Sophia into mosque”, 11 July 2020, Date of Accession: 14.07.2020 from https://www.sbs.com.au/news/unesco-deeply-regrets-turkey-s-conversion-of-hagia-sophia-into-mosque#:~:text=The%20Hagia%20Sophia%20was%20first,%22Historic%20Areas%20of%20Istanbul.%22.

2020 ABD Başkanlık Seçimleri: Trump Kolay Teslim Olmayacak!

3 Kasım 2020 tarihinde yapılacak olan ABD Başkanlık seçimleri öncesinde, seçimi kimin kazanacağı konusundaki anket ve bilimsel çalışmalar artarak devam ediyor. Bu yazıda, seçim öncesinde yapılan bazı anketleri ve bu doğrultuda kullanılan yöntemleri analiz edeceğim.

The Economist dergisinin Temmuz 2020 itibariyle seçim öngörüsü

Bu konuda ilk olarak şunu belirtmek gerekiyor ki, Haziran ayı içerisinde yapılan anketlerin tamamında Demokrat aday Joe Biden’ın rakibi Cumhuriyetçi Başkan Donald Trump’ın çok önünde yer aldığı görülüyor.[1] Öyle ki, bu anketlerde, toplam oyda, Biden, kendisini en düşük oyda gösteren ankette bile Trump’ın yüzde 7 farkla önünde yer alıyor. Bazı anketlerde ise, bu fark yüzde 11-12’yi bulabiliyor. The Economist dergisinin hazırladığı çalışmaya[2] göre de, Biden’ın Trump’ı geçerek Başkan seçilmesi yüzde 90 ihtimal olarak gösteriliyor. Oxford Economics’in ekonomik verilere dayalı olan çalışması da, Trump’ın tarihi bir yenilgi alacağını iddia ediyor.[3] The Washington Post’un Amerikalı Siyaset Bilimciler Michael Lewis-Beck ve Tom Rice’ın geliştirdikleri bilimsel bir modele[4] dayalı olan çalışması da, diğer çalışmalar gibi, Biden’ın rahat bir zafere koştuğunu ortaya koyuyor.[5]

Gallup’a göre Trump’ın onaylanma oranları

Ancak bu noktada iki unsuru akılda tutmak gerekir. İlki, Trump’ın 2016 yılındaki Başkanlık seçimlerinde de toplam oyda rakibi Hillary Clinton’dan neredeyse 3 milyon daha az oy alarak Başkan seçilmesine[6] olanak sağlayan -ABD’ye özgü- Seçmen Heyeti (Electoral College) sistemi. Öyle ki, bu seçimde de Trump’ın Biden’dan 5 milyon daha az oy alması, ama California (Kaliforniya) ve Texas’ı (Teksas) alarak seçimi kazanması olanaklı gözüküyor.[7] İkincisi ise, ABD’nin Covid-19 (koronavirüs) salgınıyla mücadele zor günler geçirmesi nedeniyle, Başkan Trump’ın savaş zamanı Başkanlarına özgü şekilde halkın büyük çoğunluğunun desteğini almasına imkân sağlayabilecek olan siyasal konjonktür.[8] Amerikalıların bir savaş ya da büyük bir afet sırasında mevcut yönetimlere destek verdikleri ve onları başlattıkları mücadeleyi tamamlamak konusunda cesaretlendirdikleri bilinen bir gerçek. Bu, Başkan George W. Bush’un ilk döneminde tepkilere neden olan Irak Savaşı (2003) sırasında gerçekleşen 2004 Başkanlık seçimlerinde de (George W. Bush vs. John Kerry) doğrulanmıştı. Bunu destekleyen bir diğer veri de, Covid-19 salgınındaki vasat performansına karşın, Trump’ın Mayıs 2020 tarihinde yapılan Gallup anketinde yüzde 49 gibi yüksek bir onaylanma oranına ulaşmayı başarmış olması.[9] Ancak Haziran ayında aynı ankette Trump’ın onaylanma oranının yüzde 38’e düştüğünü de hatırlatmak gerekir.

Helmut Norpoth

Bu doğrultuda, ülkesi ABD’de Stony Brook Üniversitesi’nde ders veren Siyaset Bilimci Helmut Norpoth’un[10] geliştirdiği “The Primary Model” (Önseçim Modeli) yaklaşımını da dikkatle incelemekte fayda var. Siyaset Bilimi’nin en önemli alt branşlarından birisi olan “Seçmen Davranışı” (Voting Behaviour) üzerine uzmanlaşmış bir isim olan Norpoth, önseçimlerin ilk kez uygulanmaya başladığı 1912 yılından itibaren tüm ABD Başkanlık seçimleri öncesinde derlenen verileri kullanarak geliştirdiği bu hipoteziyle[11], Başkan’ı doğru tahmin etmek için iki önemli faktöre odaklanmak gerektiğini iddia ediyor. Bunlardan ilkinin iktidardaki partinin diğer seçimlerde oy kaybedip kaybetmediği (ki bu şekilde partinin ve Başkan’ın oy trendi algılanabiliyor), ikincisi ise önseçimlerde hangi Başkan adayının daha başarılı olduğu şeklinde özetlenebilir. 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 ve 2016 seçimlerinden beş tanesini (altıda beş bilme oranı) doğru öngören bu yaklaşıma göre, hem Cumhuriyetçi Parti’nin son yıllarda düşüş trendinde olmaması, hem de Demokrat Parti önseçimlerinde son derece vasat bir performans gösteren Joe Biden’ın aksine Trump’ın partisinde adeta rakipsiz olması, Trump’ı Başkan seçilmek için daha şanslı kılan faktörler olarak ortaya çıkıyor. Bu modele göre, Başkan Trump’ın Kasım ayındaki seçimleri kazanmasının yüzde 91-95 gibi çok yüksek bir ihtimal olduğunu belirten Norpoth[12], böylelikle tüm ezberleri bozuyor. Bu yaklaşımda, Trump’ın Seçmen Heyeti sisteminde 362 oya ulaşabileceği, Biden’ın ise 176’da kalacağı öngörülüyor. İlginç bir şekilde, hakikaten de, Norpoth’un yaklaşımı, 1912’den itibaren gerçekleşen tam 27 Başkanlık seçiminden 25’inin sonucunu doğruluyor.

Birbirleriyle çelişen bu bilimsel araştırmalar, bize 2020 ABD Başkanlık seçimlerinin son derece rekabetçi ve başabaş geçeceğini ve hiçbir adayın rahat bir zafer kazanamayacağını düşündürüyor.

Doç. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] Bu konuda birkaç anket örneği için:

• https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-general/national/
• https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_biden-6247.html
• https://www.270towin.com/2020-polls-biden-trump/national/

[2] Bakınız; https://projects.economist.com/us-2020-forecast/president.
[3] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-lose-election-joe-biden-2020-economy-coronavirus-a9525131.html.
[4] Bakınız; https://politicalsciencenow.com/the-political-economy-model-2016-us-election-forecasts/.
[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/07/simple-forecast-suggests-democratic-sweep-2020/.
[6] https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html.
[7] https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/how-trump-could-lose-5-million-votes-still-win-2020-n1031601.
[8] https://nypost.com/2020/03/28/how-trumps-war-on-the-coronavirus-could-win-him-re-election/.
[9] Bakınız; https://news.gallup.com/poll/203207/trump-job-approval-weekly.aspx.
[10] Hakkında bilgiler için; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmut_Norpoth.
[11] Detaylar için bakınız; http://primarymodel.com/.
[12] Bakınız; https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-election/donald-trump-chance-of-winning-election-2020-joe-biden-poll-model-a9609236.html.