Turkey: A Difficult Country for Journalists

Which country jails the most journalists? You could easily think of a theocratic regime in Middle East, communist countries or a dictatorial-rule country as the correct answer but in fact according to many different sources[1], Turkey is the country where the maximum number of imprisoned journalists is reached. How can a country making negotiations for becoming a full member of the European Union (for many a political body still having the highest standards of human rights) has become the largest prison for journalists? Let me explain this subject.

Turkish journalists are imprisoned mostly because of political reasons and alleged links with terrorist groups. It works in two different directions. One is related to Ergenekon case, which was recently finalized, where Kemalist-social democratic or Turkish nationalist journalists were imprisoned with the pretext of organizing a military coup against the democratically elected Islamist government led by Justice and Development Party (JDP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The other part is related to extreme left and pro-Kurdish journalists blamed to have links with the illegal PKK terrorist organization. Although at first glance, both coup organizing and terrorist activities seem plausible reasons for imprisoning people even journalists, the problematic legal framework in Turkey and the uncontested power of the government create problems and lead to unjust decisions.[2] According to Freedom House, Turkey is placed at the rank of 120^th in Global Press Freedom Rankings in 2013.[3] This and many other evidences show that there is a problem going on in Turkey. The Secretary-General of Reporters without Borders organization Christophe Deloire claims that “Turkey's counterterrorism laws are archaic and repressive”.[4] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media prepared a report in April 2012 about the status of imprisoned journalists in Turkey.[5] It has some important passages about the legal problems in the country;

As last year, most journalists are in prison based on the following laws:

o The Anti-Terror Law of Turkey (also known as Terörle Mücadele Yasası, TMY), Articles 5 and 7 relating to articles of the Criminal Code on terrorist offences and organizations or assisting members of or making propaganda in connection with such organizations, as well as the lengthening of sentences;

o The Criminal Code of Turkey (also known as Türk Ceza Kanunu, TCK), Article 314 on establishing, commanding or becoming member of an armed organization with the aim of committing certain offences.

 Courts often impose exceptionally long imprisonment sentences. The longest conviction is 166 years and the longest jail sentence sought for a journalist is 3,000 years. Many journalists face double life sentences if convicted, some without possibility for parole.

 Courts do not tend to grant pre-trial release of defendants. There is concern that arrests and long pre-trial detentions without conviction are used as a form of intimidation. Based on available public information, only on seven recent occasions were defendants released pending trial: in February and March 2012 seven journalists were released pending trial, one of them due to poor health.

 Pre-trial detentions remain very long. In some cases journalists held in prison for up to three years are still awaiting trial. Some journalists have been imprisoned for more than five years while their trial is ongoing.

 Journalists often face several trials and are often convicted for several offences. There is one journalist who faces 150 court cases.

 The reform of related laws has not occurred, despite statements made by the authorities about the necessity for such reforms. Not only do the laws need to be reformed, but their implementation as well. Court practices interpreting laws remain widely varied throughout the country.

 Media outlets reporting about sensitive issues (including terrorism or anti-government activities) are often regarded by the authorities as the publishing organs of illegal organizations. Courts often consider reporting about such issues as equal to supporting them.

 Journalists are often imprisoned in F-tipi cezaevi (F-type high security prisons), where they have to serve their time with the most dangerous criminals. It is also not uncommon to punish journalists with solitary confinement for extended time periods.

Turkish people especially oppositional groups towards Justice and Development Party do not seem convinced about the legal decisions of the courts. It is obvious that cases like Ergenekon and Balyoz remind people the show-trials of the Stalin regime in USSR in the past and as far as I’m concerned there is a visible legitimacy and evidence crisis in these cases. For instance, very famous journalists Tuncay Özkan and Mustafa Balbay, known for their pro-secular worldviews are imprisoned on the basis of their diaries and role in the organization of large meetings and no real evidence was presented to the public showing a criminal activity. This kind of problems increase people’s suspicions and decrease the legitimacy of these cases.

Finally, although democracy is for sure preferable to military coup, we should make a clear separation between democracy - which is about a method for choosing governments and liberalism - which is about individual rights and freedoms. In that sense, Turkey is more democratic but much less liberal in the recent years. If I have to make a choice between liberalism and democracy, I would prefer liberalism since it directly influences people’s and journalists’ lives.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

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[1] For instance see; “Turkey – World’s Biggest Prison for Journalists”, Reporters without Borders, Retrieved on 16.08.2013 from http://en.rsf.org/turkey-turkey-world-s-biggest-prison-for-19-12-2012,43816.html. Also see; “Seeking Meaning in Jailed-Journalists Count”, Wall Street Journal, Retrieved on 16.08.2013 from http://blogs.wsj.com/numbersguy/seeking-meaning-in-jailed-journalists-count-1250/

[2] You can find the list of imprisoned journalist in Turkey from here; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_arrested_journalists_in_Turkey#cite_note-1.

[3] See; “Global Press Freedom Rankings – Freedom of the Press 2013”, Freedom House, Retrieved on 16.08.2013 from http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Global%20and%20regional%20tables.pdf.
[4] Michael Sontheimer, “'Everyone Is Afraid': Erdogan Regime Cows Embattled Media”, Spiegel Online, Retrieved on 16.08.2013 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/media-repression-in-turkey-intimidates-and-imprisons-journalists-a-905164.html.

[5] You can find the report here; http://www.osce.org/fom/89371.

Ergenekon Coup Plot Trial: Regime Change Through Law

The Ergenekon coup plot trial, which is considered as the most important legal battle in recent Turkish history, reached an end yesterday (05.08.2013) after Istanbul’s 13^th High Criminal Court handed down severe punishments, including a life sentence for former Chief of General Staff İlker Başbuğ. The verdict trial, which decided the fate of 275 suspects at the end of the 5 year process, resulted in hundreds of years of imprisonment in total and several aggravated life sentences for a series of the country’s high-ranking army members, famous journalists, politicians, civil society leaders and academics.[1] In addition to Başbuğ, the court sentenced journalist Tuncay Özkan, retired Colonel Dursun Çiçek, lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz, Workers’ Party (İP) leader Doğu Perinçek, retired Colonel Fuat Selvi, Hasan Ataman Yıldırım, retired Generals Hurşit Tolon, Nusret Taşdeler, Hasan Iğsız and Şener Eruygur to aggravated life imprisonment. Retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, Captain Muzaffer Tekin and Council of State shooter Alparslan Arslan got consecutive life sentences in the trial.[2] The court acquitted a total of 21 of the 275 defendants in the trial that had been ongoing since 2008, after the discovery of a weapons arsenal in an İstanbul district.[3] After the news coming from the court, main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu called the court’s decision as “illegitimate”. Nationalist Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli also joined Kılıçdaroğlu in voicing strong criticism against the verdict, which he described as a “murder of law”.[4]

Ergenekon trials has often been analyzed by Turkish journalists and academics in two extreme ways; first as a good effort to destroy Turkey’s so-called the “deep state”, and the other as a way to suppress oppositional voices against the Islamist-oriented ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its authoritarian leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In my point of view, the reality could be at somewhere between these two extremes, that is to say that Ergenekon trial was started as a good effort against Turkey’s ultra-nationalist deep state but soon turned into a witch hunt reminding the McCarthyism[5] days in USA. Gareth Jenkins from Johns Hopkins University Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program[6], wrote in 2011 that “Although the JDP has undoubtedly benefited politically from Ergenekon and Sledgehammer –not least because they have made many of its opponents reluctant to criticize the JDP for fear of being arrested– the government appears to be allowing the cases to proceed rather micromanaging or actively driving them. Exactly who is behind the cases remains a topic of often heated debate, but most critics blame the Fethullah Gülen Movement”.[7] Jenkins pointed out the problems related to evidences in the case and wrote “not only is the evidence in both cases deeply flawed, there are also increasing indications that much of it has been fabricated”.[8] Author Claire Berlinski and academic Dani Rodrik also have already pointed out some inconsistencies and “back to the future” anomalies related to Ergenekon and Balyoz (Sledgehammer) cases.[9] The problem with these cases is that there are no clear evidences for a secret organization and the case looks like a “goulash” soup in which the government tried to put everything. It is no surprise to see that most of the Turkish people do not seem convinced related to correctness of these cases but they still take sides according to their political views (pro-Islamist or pro-secular).

Whether it is full of contradictions or not, Ergenekon and Balyoz cases represent a major shift for the Turkish state and symbolize a clear victory of Erdoğan and Gülen’s Islamist visions over Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s pro-western and pro-secular orientation. It is no coincidence that these trials started after Turkey’s problems with USA after the refusal of 1 March memorandum in 2003, a bill for the deployment of American troops in Turkey before the Second Gulf War.[10] The reluctance of Turkish Armed Forces, a NATO ally for USA, about the 1 March memorandum was probably perceived as a betrayal by the USA and from that point the role of Kurds and moderate Islamist groups in Turkey clearly increased in the plans of Americans. This event was also coincided with the increasing liberal democratic consciousness in Turkey against the negative effects of the military coups because of terrible past experiences (27 May 1960, 12 March 1971, 12 September 1980 and 28 February 1997). Erdoğan and AKP used this opportunity very cleverly to establish a new regime based on Islamist rhetoric and majoritarian interpretation of democracy. It would probably be shocking for an international observer to hear that the leader of the past coup (General Kenan Evren who made the coup on 12 September 1980) is still welcomed and shown high respect by the AKP government, while in Ergenekon and Balyoz cases generals are convicted for a coup that did not take place. This shows clearly that for Erdoğan and political Islamists in Turkey coups are bad only if they are against them but a pro-Islamic coup like 12 September could be easily welcomed. Thus, from this perspective Ergenekon and Balyoz cases do not really give hope to real democrats in Turkey and are considered as a way for Islamists to take power and change the regime without using violence.

It seems like Turkey has even more difficult days ahead because of rising polarization in the country especially after the protest wave that started with the Gezi Park events.[11] Another potential problem for the country is the emergence of a second independent or autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria after Turkey’s “epic fail” foreign policy vis-à-vis Syrian crisis. Hot days are coming for Turkey…

Assist. Prof. Ozan ÖRMECİ

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[1] “17 sentenced to life in Turkey’s Ergenekon coup plot trial, including ex-military chief”, Hürriyet Daily News, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/17-sentenced-to-life-in-turkeys-ergenekon-coup-plot-trial-including-ex-military-chief.aspx?pageID=238&nID=52034&NewsCatID=339.

[2] “Long sentences for Ergenekon suspects, life for ex-army chief”, Today’s Zaman, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://www.todayszaman.com/news-322781-long-sentences-for-ergenekon-suspects-life-for-ex-army-chief.html.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “Ergenekon trial rulings ‘illegitimate,’ says main opposition leader”, Hürriyet Daily News, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ergenekon-trial-rulings-illegitimate-says-main-opposition-leader.aspx?pageID=238&nID=52071&NewsCatID=338.

[5] McCarthyism is the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, or treason without proper regard for evidence. It also means “the practice of making unfair allegations or using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism”. The term has its origins in the period in the United States known as the Second Red Scare, lasting roughly from 1950 to 1956 and characterized by heightened fears of communist influence on American institutions and espionage by Soviet agents. Originally coined to criticize the anti-communist pursuits of Republican U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, “McCarthyism” soon took on a broader meaning, describing the excesses of similar efforts. The term is also now used more generally to describe reckless, unsubstantiated accusations, as well as demagogic attacks on the character or patriotism of political adversaries. See; “McCarthyism”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCarthyism.

[6] See; http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/staff/staff_web/jenkins.htm. Retrieved on 06.08.2013.

[7] Gareth Jenkins, “Ergenekon, Sledgehammer, and the Politics of Turkish Justice: Conspiracies and Coincidences”, MERIA Journal, Volume 15, Number 02 (June 2011), Retrieved on 08.08.2013 fromhttp://www.gloria-center.org/2011/08/ergenekon-sledgehammer-and-the-politics-of-turkish-justice-conspiracies-and-coincidences/.

[8] Ibid.

[9] See; “Interview with American Author Claire Berlinski”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/interview-with-american-author-claire-berlinski/.

[10] Karen Kaya, “The Turkish-American Crisis: An Analysis of 1 March 2003”, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/The-Turkish-American-Crisis.pdf.

[11] Ozan Örmeci, “Turkish Spring: Occupy Gezi”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 06.08.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/turkish-spring-occupy-gezi/.

Cyprus Dispute in terms of Energy Politics

There is no denying that “energy politics” has become a significant part of the regional and global economy as well as geopolitics and international relations in the last decades. While energy policy is about the manner in which a given entity (often governmental) has decided to address issues of  energy development including energy production, distribution and consumption[1], energy politics refers to macro-political issues between states, international organizations and large energy companies about the security, transportation and the sale and pricing of energy resources. Finding clean, cheap, uninterrupted and diversified energy resources for ensuring the sustainable development has been one of the main principles of the countries in general in the last decades. The core of the industry is for sure the discovery of new energy resources. The energy and its efficient use is one of the indispensable factors that influence the economic and social development in today’s world. Within that framework, the reaching energy and continuously ironing out this need is a matter of security rather than a necessity.[2] Resources namely oil and natural gas come into forefront as the most demanded natural resources in the world. As Kısacık points out; in a rapidly globalized world, this has brought about the linking of supplier countries with the demand centers via several transportation ways above all the pipelines.[3]

Oil and gas exploration activities in deep waters have become much more evident in the second half of the 2000s, and the Greek Cypriots also decided to join this adventure. In this first period, although they have been flirting with many US-based energy companies, they did not achieve starting exploration activities as a result of Turkish pressure.[4] Greek Cyprus later has signed an agreement to delineate the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Egypt and Israel with a view to exploiting any possible natural gas and oil reserves in its zone. A similar agreement has been signed with Lebanon but the Lebanese Parliament has not yet ratified the deal.[5] As the Greek side completed the necessary legal basis for drilling activities, the beginning of those activities has become possible with the inclusion of the Noble Energy Company[6] in this equation. Noble Energy as a growing energy company has become an important actor regarding recent activities in the Mediterranean market. The company wants to enhance its operations from Israel to Cyprus.

The Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus covers more than 70000 km2 and is divided between 13 exploration blocks. The process of the establishment of Cyprus, Israel and Lebanon Exclusive Economic Zones was held in Nicosia in 2010 with separate meetings between each country. Cyprus and Israel as part of their wider cooperation have agreed to start their gas explorations with a common American company, specifically Noble Energy. Cypriot and Israeli governments are discussing to export their natural gas through the shipping of compressed natural gas to Greece and then to the rest of Europe or through a subsea pipelines starting from Israel and then leading to Greece via Cyprus. According to some experts, the shipping of compressed natural gas will be too expensive in addition to the problems of safety that will be caused without Turkey’s support to the project.[7] Moreover, the United Kingdom also has a claim on part of the area resulting from its sovereignty over its two base areas (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) in Cyprus. The treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus specifically excluded any Cypriot claim to the two maritime areas adjacent to the bases.[8]

Exclusive economic zone between Israel and Cyprus as signed in Nicosia

The underlying reason of this eagerness of Greek Cypriots and Israelis is also caused by the huge natural gas reserves of Tamar gas field[9] near Israel which was discovered in 2009. Apart from the 235 billion m3 of gas reserves in that field, Leviathan is one of the biggest natural gas oil fields which have recently been discovered, with its 450 billion m3 of gas reserves also having increased the appetite of Noble Energy toward the region.[10] It is crucial to indicate that 1.3 trillion m3 of gas reserves in these two fields corresponds to more than half of Azerbaijan’s gas reserves.[11] In other words, with further seismic research, the East Mediterranean region can possibly be the second Caspian basin. Moreover, according to U.S. Geological Survey predictions, there would be 3.5 trillion m3 of gas reserves equivalent to 20 billion barrels of oil in the East Mediterranean.[12]

However, there are some problems related to the safe transportation of these resources mostly because of political problems came to be known as Cyprus dispute. To summarize from Wikipedia[13], the Cyprus dispute refers to the result of the ongoing conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, over the Turkish controlled northern part of Cyprus. Initially, with the annexation of the island by the British Empire, the “Cyprus dispute” was identified as the conflict between the people of Cyprus and the British Crown regarding the Cypriots’ demand for self-determination. The dispute however was finally shifted from a colonial dispute to an ethnic dispute between the Turkish and the Greek islanders. The international complications of the dispute stretch far beyond the boundaries of the island of Cyprus itself and involve the guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom alike), along with the United States, the United Nations and the European Union. With Turkey’s intervention into the island (Cyprus Peace Operation)  in 1974 because of a fascist military coup in the island aiming the annexation of Cyprus with Greece and attacks towards Turkish Cypriots starting from 1963, Turkey occupied the northern part of the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, and later upon those territories the Turkish Cypriot community unilaterally declared independence forming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983, a sovereign de facto state that lacks international recognition with the exception of Turkey, with which TRNC enjoys full diplomatic relations.[14] After the two communities and the guarantor countries have committed themselves in finding a peaceful solution over the dispute, the United Nations have since created and maintained a buffer zone (the “Green Line”) to avoid any further inter-communal tensions and hostilities. This zone separates the Greek Cypriot-controlled south from the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north.

In 2004, with a settlement plan for the unification of the island called the Annan Plan (It as prepared by UN Secretary General of the period Kofi Annan and thus was named after him), a new peace plan to revive the divided Cyprus Republic was put into referendum on both sides of the island. The United Kingdom (as a guarantor power) and the United States came out in favor of the plan. Turkey also clearly signaled its support for the plan. The Greek government decided to remain neutral. On 24 April, Turkish Cypriots endorsed the plan by a margin of almost two to one. However, the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan, by a margin of about three to one in a way to prove the difficulty of the problem because of ultra-nationalism.

Referendum Result	Yes	No	Turnout
Turkish Cypriot Community	64.90 %	35.09 %	87 %
Greek Cypriot Community	24.17 %	75.83 %	88 %

On 1 May 2004, a week after the referendum, Cyprus Republic joined the European Union. Under the terms of accession the whole island is considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the terms of the acquis communautaire, the EU’s body of laws, have been suspended in the Northern Cyprus. After the referendum, in June 2004, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus became an “observer member” country in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) under the name of Turkish Cypriot State. Despite initial hopes that a new process to modify the rejected plan would start by Autumn, most of the rest of 2004 was taken up with discussions over a proposal by the European Union to open up direct trade with the Turkish Cypriots and provide €259,000,000 in funds to help them upgrade their infrastructure. Promises given by the European Union were not met and this decreased the credibility of the Union.[15] In addition, Greek Cypriots with the name of Cyprus Republic began to represent the whole island in the EU and started to use this issue in order to block Turkey’s accession to EU.[16] In October 2012, TRNC became an “observer member” country of Economic Cooperation Organization again under the name of Turkish Cypriot State.

After the Presidential election in the south Cyprus in February 2013, a liberal politician who supported the Annan Plan in the past, Nikos Anastasiades (Anastasiadis) became the President of Cyprus Republic.[17] Hopes for the unification of the island further increased since last week pro-settlement social democratic Republican Turkish Party (CTP) has won the elections in TRNC.[18] Turkish Foreign Minister also recently made a statement and by making reference to the “either death or partition” slogan of Turkish nationalists in the past, he said “either solution or partition” showing Turkey’s positive approach for the solution of the problem although Turkish Cypriots faced with the unethical and unequal treatment of European Union in regards to the Cyprus dispute only few years ago.[19]

Cyprus Dispute will be at the top of the agenda for the upcoming days while a peaceful settlement is not impossible to be realized due to the mutual political and monetary gain for both sides concerning the issue in regards to developing energy politics in the region.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

BIBLIOGRAPHY

-          “Azerbaycan’da 100 yıllık doğalgaz var”, Rusya.ru, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.rusya.ru/Content/14759-Azerbaycan_da+100+y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1k+do%C4%9Falgaz+var.

-          “Cyprus Dispute”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_dispute.

-          “Davutoğlu: Ya Çözüm, Ya Taksim”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/davutoglu-ya-cozum-ya-taksim/.

-          “Doğu Akdeniz’de iki rakip proje”, Aydınlık, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/20835-dogu-akdenizde-iki-rakip-proje.html.

-          “Energy Policy”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_policy.

-          “Eroğlu: Kıbrıs Türk halkının geleceği, Rum tarafına endeksli tutulmamalı”, Kıbrıs Postası, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/107308/PageName/KIBRIS_HABERLERI.

-          “Exclusive economic zone”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone#Cyprus.

-          Kısacık, Sina (2012), “An Analysis on the Rivalry between the Global and Regional Powers on the Transportation of Caucasia and Central Asian Hydrocarbon Resources”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/an-analysis-on-the-rivalry-between-the-global-and-regional-powers-on-the-transportation-of-caucasia-and-central-asian-hydrocarbon-resources/.

-          “Miqati Says Cyprus Still Waiting for Lebanon’s Ratification of Maritime Border Agreement”, Naharnet, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/55215.

-          “Noble Energy”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_Energy.

-          Noble Energy web site, http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Home-4.html.

-          Örmeci, Ozan (2013), “Güney Kıbrıs’ta Nikos Anastasiades Dönemine Doğru”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/guney-kibrista-anastiasides-donemine-dogru/.

-          Örmeci, Ozan (2013), “KKTC’de Zafer Sosyal Demokrat CTP’nin”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/kktcde-zafer-sosyal-demokrat-ctpnin/.

-          Özertem, Hasan Selim (2011), “Energy Games in the East Mediterranean”, Turkish Weekly, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3569/.

-          Sanberk, Özdem (2004), “KKTC ve Tutulmayan Sözler”, Radikal, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=135527.

-          “Tamar Gas Field”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamar_gas_field.

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[1] “Energy Policy”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_policy.

[2] Sina Kısacık (2012), “An Analysis on the Rivalry between the Global and Regional Powers on the Transportation of Caucasia and Central Asian Hydrocarbon Resources”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/an-analysis-on-the-rivalry-between-the-global-and-regional-powers-on-the-transportation-of-caucasia-and-central-asian-hydrocarbon-resources/.

[3] For details see; Sina Kısacık (2012), “An Analysis on the Rivalry between the Global and Regional Powers on the Transportation of Caucasia and Central Asian Hydrocarbon Resources”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/an-analysis-on-the-rivalry-between-the-global-and-regional-powers-on-the-transportation-of-caucasia-and-central-asian-hydrocarbon-resources/.

[4] Hasan Selim Özertem (2011), “Energy Games in the East Mediterranean”, Turkish Weekly, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3569/.

[5] “Miqati Says Cyprus Still Waiting for Lebanon’s Ratification of Maritime Border Agreement”, Naharnet, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/55215.

[6] Noble Energy, Inc. of Houston, Texas, United States is the modern name of Noble Affiliates Inc., by which it was known through the 1990s, and it is now an oil and natural gas exploration and production company with almost US$3 billion in revenue at #660 on the 2007 Fortune 1000 list of the largest American companies. In 1985, Noble Affiliates spun off its subsidiary Noble Drilling Corporation to shareholders, and that company in turn went public by the early 1990s, and then became Noble Corporation, an S&P 500 company. In South America, the company operates in Argentina and Ecuador. In Africa, Noble Energy operates in Equatorial Guinea. And in Eurasia, it operates in the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea and China. Noble is headquartered in the Greenspoint district and in Houston. For details see; “Noble Energy”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noble_Energy. For company’s website see; http://www.nobleenergyinc.com.

[7] “Doğu Akdeniz’de iki rakip proje”, Aydınlık, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/20835-dogu-akdenizde-iki-rakip-proje.html.

[8] “Exclusive economic zone”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone#Cyprus.

[9] The Tamar gas field is a natural gas field in the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Israel. The field is located in Israel’s exclusive economic zone, roughly 80 kilometres (50 mi) west of Haifa in waters 1,700 metres (5,600 ft) deep. While there have been small oil and gas discoveries in Israel over the decades, Tamar was the first large-scale hydrocarbon resource discovered in the country. It was also the first gas discovery made in geological layers dating back to the Oglio-Miocene era in the up-until-then little-explored Levant basin of the Eastern Mediterranean. Since Tamar’s discovery, large gas discoveries have been made in other analogous geological formations of the same age in the region. Since Tamar was the first such discovery, these gas containing formations have become collectively known as Tamar sands. For details see; “Tamar Gas Field”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamar_gas_field.

[10] Hasan Selim Özertem (2011), “Energy Games in the East Mediterranean”, Turkish Weekly, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3569/.

[11] “Azerbaycan’da 100 yıllık doğalgaz var”, Rusya.ru, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.rusya.ru/Content/14759-Azerbaycan_da+100+y%C4%B1ll%C4%B1k+do%C4%9Falgaz+var.

[12] Hasan Selim Özertem (2011), “Energy Games in the East Mediterranean”, Turkish Weekly, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3569/.

[13] See; “Cyprus Dispute”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_dispute.

[14] See; “Cyprus Dispute”, Wikipedia, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyprus_dispute.

[15] “Eroğlu: Kıbrıs Türk halkının geleceği, Rum tarafına endeksli tutulmamalı”, Kıbrıs Postası, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/107308/PageName/KIBRIS_HABERLERI.

[16] Özdem Sanberk (2004), “KKTC ve Tutulmayan Sözler”, Radikal, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=135527.

[17] Ozan Örmeci (2013), “Güney Kıbrıs’ta Nikos Anastasiades Dönemine Doğru”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/guney-kibrista-anastiasides-donemine-dogru/.

[18] Ozan Örmeci (2013), “KKTC’de Zafer Sosyal Demokrat CTP’nin”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/kktcde-zafer-sosyal-demokrat-ctpnin/.

[19] “Davutoğlu: Ya Çözüm, Ya Taksim”, Uluslararası Politika Akademisi, Retrieved on 31.07.2013 from http://politikaakademisi.org/davutoglu-ya-cozum-ya-taksim/.