24 Ekim 2010 Pazar

The Emergence of Socialist Movements in Turkey (1960-1980)

Socialist movements in Turkey and especially different development models which became very influential in the 1960’s in the intellectual and political arena, are generally left outside of the curriculum of Turkish Politics lessons throughout the Turkish history due to the reservations and sensitivities of the “official ideology” against the threat of communism. Especially after the traumatic 12 September 1980 military coup, an important richness and part of Turkish intellectual life was tried to be erased and pushed outside of the predetermined boundaries of the regime. This attitude was strengthened by the fall of Soviet Russia and the global invalidation of communism in the political and intellectual life in the 1990’s. However, with continuing problems of the global capitalism as well as the relatively free environment of the regime due to democratization reforms, we may claim that there is a renewed interest in different development models and in Socialism as an ideology. Especially in the unproductive, fruitless discussions and studies in Turkey which solely focus on democratization through European Union membership and the distance between the Turkish state and religion, 1960’s alternative development models offer us a comfortable ground for making studies and producing original theories.
This assignment is an attempt to analyze different development models offered by three important socialist movements in Turkey, namely, Turkish Labor Party (TIP), Yön Movement and Milli Demokratik Devrim (MDD) thesis, which became very influential especially in the 1960’s. It will be argued that no matter how these movements tried to distance themselves from the official Kemalist ideology, Turkish Socialisms have always developed under the shadow of Kemalism as elitist movements having difficulties in creating social bonds. Kemalist emphasis given to military and the independence of the country in addition to the constraints felt by Turkish intellectuals about the solidarity of the nation, were also perceptible in the formation of theories of Turkish leftists. In order to reach these points, I am going to begin with a short summary of the emergence of socialist movements in Turkey by starting from the late Ottoman period. I will later focus shortly on the Kemalist modernization project and the Kadro and Ülkü movements in order to understand how leftist-Kemalist ideology and heritage was first born. Thirdly, I will move on to analyze these three development models; TIP, Yön and MDD, within the structure of global political developments and the 27 May 1960 military intervention. Later, I am going to compare and contrast these development models and their criticisms towards each other. I will lastly make a summary of what I have already acquired from previous parts and conclude the paper with my own comments.
Turkish modernization can be said to begin with the 19th century Ottoman period. With the sense of backwardness and desperateness against the West, in addition to pressures of democratization coming from Europe, the Ottoman state made many reforms including Administrative Reforms (Tanzimat Fermanı) of 1839, Islahat Fermanı of 1856 which were followed by the First (1877-1878) and the Second (1908-1918) Constitutional Periods. These reforms began in the military and bureaucratic fields and later jumped into the political field. Starting from the mid 19th century, Ottoman intellectuals began to follow closely the political developments taking place in Europe including all ideologies and development models. Especially oppositional Ottoman intellectuals showed a great deal of interest to 1848 Revolution, First Socialist International in 1864 and the Paris Commune experience of 1871[1]. Although Ottoman intellectuals did not have strict ideas about the essence of Socialism, they were admiring the revolutionary spirit of the French partisans. For instance, Reşat Bey in the “İbret” journal was defending French communards by saying that they did not take anything money from the French Bank[2]. As we can understand from this example what made young Ottoman intellectuals in admiration of French communards was their revolutionary spirit which they want to create and have against the Sultan and their deficits of implementing communism (!). The first labor union in Ottoman state was established in 1895 by Tophane workers in the name of Osmanlı Amele Cemiyeti. In the year 1907, first revolutionary book in Ottoman language was published. The book was a collection of the summarized works by Karl Marx, Engels, Saint Simon, Proudhon, Owen, Fourier, Louis Blanc, Etienne Cabet and Babeuf. The year 1908 witnessed the first strike made by railroad workers in Ottoman state in the European territories of the state. The repressive attitude of the Union and Progress Party prevented further developments but still first Ottoman socialist journal “İştirak” was published in 1910 by Hüseyin Hilmi and his friends.
Hüseyin Hilmi is an interesting character in Ottoman Socialism since he was the founder and the first leader of the first Ottoman socialist party “Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası”. İştirak was the official publication of the party and Hilmi himself was the ideologue of the movement. Hilmi and his close friends had a strange understanding of Socialism since they claimed that Socialism was in conformity with the Islamic principles[3]. “İştirakçı Hilmi” and his friends were also the biggest opponents of Union and Progress Party and they were aiming to improve the conditions of the small Ottoman proletariat. In 1913, OSF was closed down and Hilmi and some of his friends were sent to exile. When they returned in 1918, they established this time “Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası” a year later. In addition to their lousy situation in the Marxist theory, party members and especially Hilmi were making populism and using nationalist arguments frequently. They did not have any contact with the international communist movement. Hilmi was later found dead suspiciously and his party was abolished.
Another important figure in the early Turkish socialist movement was Mustafa Suphi. Mustafa Suphi was the founder of Turkish Communist Party (TKP) who studied politics in French and later got arrested by Tsarist Russian soldiers in the First World War as an Ottoman officer. Suphi met with the socialist thought in the prison and after the glorious Bolshevik Revolution, became a member of the Leninist Bolshevik Party. Suphi became the leader of Turkish delegation and was sent to Turkey to help the National Struggle which was initiated by Mustafa Kemal and to establish TKP. TKP was established on 14 July 1919 by Mustafa Suphi, Maksut Ekşi, Ali Rıza Keskin, Osman Topçuoğlu, Mustafa Börklüce, Murat Sarı and Kadir Erzurumlu in Moscow. During the National Struggle, the cooperation and good relations between Mustafa Kemal and Lenin allowed Suphi and his friends to get organized, make propaganda and establish a party. However, after a short period of time, although Suphi and his collaborators were helping the National Struggle actively[4], their ideas and links to Soviet Russia caused their death in 1921. TKP was important since they made a huge contribution intellectually to the development of socialist thought in Turkey especially compared to Hüseyin Hilmi and his strange ideas. TKP was forced into illegality during most of its history and faced a large number of mass-detentions; attracted many Turkish intellectuals, among them the poet Nazım Hikmet. “the 1950s its activities were mainly limited to those conducted from abroad; started Bizim Radyo (Our Radio) broadcasting from Budapest in 1958; revived in the early 1970s, adopting a new program; started the radio station TKP'nin Sesi (Voice of the TKP) broadcasting from Leipzig; published the central committee organ Atılım from 1974; hundreds of its members were arrested after the military coup of 12 September 1980”[5].
Another important figure of early Turkish Socialism was Şefik Hüsnü Değmer. Şefik Hüsnü was studied in France and became a student of famous French socialist Jean Jaures[6]. After returning from France, Değmer and his close friends established “Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası” in 1919. They began to publish the journal “Aydınlık”. After the death of Mustafa Suphi and the banning of his party, Değmer joined TKP and became the leading figure of the party starting from the late 1920’s. Şefik Hüsnü was hopeful about Kemalism to complete the bourgeois revolution and industrialize the country[7]. Yeşil Ordu (Green Army) was also an interesting event in the early socialist movements in Turkey. Yeşil Ordu was founded by Enver Paşa and his friends after the fall of Union and Progress Party government upon the loss of First World War. Although Enver Paşa was a devoted Pan-Turkist, Soviet Russia aimed to support him in the case of Mustafa Kemal’s defeat against imperial powers as a back up force. Enver Paşa and his friends joined to Eastern Nations Congress (Doğu Halkları Kurultayı) in Baku in 1920. Yeşil Ordu was a pragmatist project of both Enver Paşa and Soviet leaders against a common threat and did not have a clear ideology[8]. Later, Yeşil Ordu was abolished and Enver Paşa returned to his Pan-Turkish ideals which soon led to his death.
Although there are many important figures in the early Turkish Socialism such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, the main point I want to make is that socialist thought in the late Ottoman and early Turkish Republic periods, was very backward, eclectic and within the limits of the National Struggle’s ideals. Early Turkish communists were frequently using anti-imperialist arguments in the same parallel with Kemalists. Especially the precise attitude of Lenin to support all anti-imperialist struggles including Mustafa Kemal and the danger of being a colony, caused Turkish communists to act very softly against Mustafa Kemal and adopt a hybrid ideology stuck between Kemalist and communist ideals. Except TKP, all early socialist parties had nearly no links with the international communist movement and they were somehow sympathetic towards Mustafa Kemal. It is also interesting to see that although we have great difficulty in finding socioeconomic classes and especially a worker class to explain structurally Turkish modernization in the Ottoman and early Republican period, after 1908 Revolution, there were really important strikes, demonstrations made by the disorganized Ottoman proletariat[9]. We can also assume the role of 1905 Revolution of Russia in the rise of revolutionary feelings among Union and Progress Party members who had international links both with European countries and Russia.
Now, we can move on to analyze shortly the Kemalist modernization project which began to be implemented after the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its effects on the leftist ideology considering Kadro and Ülkü journals. Following a series of miraculous victories in the Turkish Independence War, Mustafa Kemal founded Turkish Republic in 29 October 1923 and tried to destroy the effects of 600 years old Ottoman Empire by his state building project. Mustafa Kemal introduced a broad range of reforms (political, social, legal, economic and cultural) and young republic turned its face towards West. “Unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty belongs to the nation” was one of the foremost principles of the new democratic, secular Turkish Republic and Sultanate and Caliphate were abolished by Atatürk. After the establishment of modern Kemalist Turkey, the country engaged in the process of creating a Turkish nation and a modern state. Although Kemalist discourse was highly anti-imperialist, its aim was to create a Western type democracy to catch up the contemporary civilization. Young Republic made reforms in the fields of culture and cut its ties with the ancient regime suddenly. This sudden and brutal change and the elitist Jacobinist nature of the new modern regime created problems throughout the Turkish history. For instance, Professor Şerif Mardin explains this tension between militantly secular military-bureaucratic regime and pious Anatolian people with center-periphery dichotomy[10]. The elite of the Republic considered itself as the vanguard of modernization and did not hesitate to impose reforms from above in order to "elevate the people to the level of contemporary civilization". Professor Ergun Özbudun also points out the lack of social support that Kemalist Revolution and modernization project had: “Turkish Revolution was not a social revolution; rather, in combined features of a war of national liberation and of a political revolution”[11]. Moreover, Turkish Revolution was not only a political change but rather it aimed to create a new modern “Turkish man” and changed many things in the field of culture. Nur Yalman defines Turkish Revolution as follows: “The gradualist solution of Japan or India in which elements of tradition were interwoven into elements of political, social and economic reforms was in Turkey, at a certain point rejected. It had been tried for nearly 100 years in the Ottoman Empire but had been found wanting. In the 1920’s and 1930’s what would now be called a cultural revolution of unprecedented proportions was unleashed”[12]. So, many reforms made by the Kemalist government to cut the new regime’s ties with the corrupt ancient regime which is seen as the scapegoat of all problems.
Although Kemalism is not accepted as a total ideology, but only “a technique for discovering the truth and dissolving illusions”[13] like that of French Ideologues, we see that in the 1930’s there were many attempts to formulate Kemalism as a concrete, substantial ideology. The most important one among these “competing Kemalisms” was the Kadro movement that takes its name from the monthly Kadro journal which was published between January 1932 and December 1934 by a group of intellectuals of the early Republican period. Although the journal was politely forced to cease publication in December 1934 by the state and only thirty-six issues very limited in number were published, the movement left a deep impact on the thinking patterns of Turkish intellectuals, the character of Turkish modernity and on the interpretation of Kemalism as an ideology. Regular contributors of the magazine; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, except Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, were ex-communists who had links with Turkish Communist Party (TKP) in the past and this increased both attentions and reactions on the movement. Kadro movement was somehow an earlier elitist and highly nationalist neo-Marxist movement similar to the Dependency School of the 1960’s considering its advocacy for a statist economy and import substitution industrialization policies, which left inerasable marks on the nature of Turkish intellectuals and their interpretation of the Kemalism as a leftist ideological source and whose effects are still vigorous in many Turkish intellectuals’ and citizens’ perception of Kemalism. Kadro appeared at a time when statist economic development model and authoritarianism was very popular among the world especially after the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. Clashes within the Republican People’s Party, especially between the liberal “İş Bank group” led by Celal Bayar and bureaucratic group led by İsmet İnönü[14], created a convenient environment for Kadro to make publication freely.
At the beginning, everything was going well for the Kadro movement. The journal became a respected publication and gained sympathy among the state elites. Atatürk was very happy with Kadro’s attitude and even sent a congratulation message on 1933 for the foundation of the magazine[15]. Communist and liberal elements of the country were criticizing the movement harshly[16] but the movement’s prestige in general was very high. Kadro’s approach to Socialism and Marxism is a very controversial and complex issue. As I stated earlier, four core members of the Kadro movement were ex-communists who had passed a few years of their lives in USSR. After making peace with the regime, Kadro writers’ every step was observed carefully by the state[17]. It was obvious that Kadroists did not have chance to make socialist propaganda in their publications. We do not have clear evidence to decide on whether Kadroists gave up from Socialism deliberately or they had to give up Socialism to live safely, comfortably in the Kemalist regime. However, considering Kadroists’ later lives and writings (especially that of Şevket Süreyya in Yön movement), we can say that Kadro movement created its own third way voluntarily and deviated from Marxism deliberately by making an ideological shift. They emphasized that the inequalities between developed and less developed countries are bigger and more important than the gap between classes in societies. In addition, they asserted that in less industrialized, less developed countries like Turkey, class differences are not clear and a statist, command economy can prevent inequalities between classes[18] before they emerge.
Kadroists used historical materialism method for explaining the economic and social development of humanity. Aydemir and Tökin obviously profited a lot from Marxism in explaining the development of history. One different thing is that Kadro preferred to make a distinction between western and eastern civilizations and claimed that eastern nations have not yet passed to the capitalist stage. Thus, they believed that class conflicts can be prevented before they emerge through a statist economy in non-capitalist countries like Turkey. Aydemir also differentiated historical materialism from dialectical materialism. Aydemir argued that Marx took the start of capitalism as the Industrial Revolution but there are many important events that prepared European countries to be able to make Industrial Revolution like colonialism and imperialism[19]. In Aydemir’s thought, European nations have begun to make accumulation of capital starting from the late 15th century (Age of Exploration) and the contradictions of world order that creates the weakness of east against west, emerged at that point. Aydemir recognizes classes and accepts Marxist understanding of class struggles but still he thinks for countries like Turkey it is possible to create a classless state. Mustafa Türkeş calls this as “being selective in applying historical materialism” to Turkey. In fact, Kadroists recognized classes in Turkey but never used it in the most important place and thought that this can be prevented by command economy. In this way, it was possible for them not to be considered as a threat by the solidarist Kemalist regime. However, in some articles they used class differentiations. For instance, Tör explained classes in Turkish villages as follows; “Big landowners, rural entrepreneurs, small landowning farmers, share-croppers, farm workers, land peasants and slaves”[20].
Kadroists did not want to emphasize class differences in Turkey because of RPP’s Durkheimian solidarity understanding. However, they used historical materialism as their method because all other methods, world views were idealist instead of scientific for them. Kadroists successfully predicted that 20th century would be the age of national independence movements. They wanted Turkey to be the leader of the independent bloc. They believed that Turkish Revolution is a unique phenomenon that can undertake the responsibility of being the leader of third world independence movements if they achieve to create a theory that would be the ideological basis of nationalist independence movements. Aydemir clearly expressed his belief in the pioneering status of Turkish Revolution. Kadro movement was heavily affected from Socialism but was not socialist. Kadro movement’s position is very valuable for Turkish social sciences, considering their being the pioneer of the neo-Marxist thought decades before Dependency and World System Theory thinkers. Alongside with being closer to neo-Marxist movements like Dependency School and World System Theory, Kadro movement led to the formation of Kemalism as an ideology more specifically to the emergence of Kemalist leftist movement which became a very strong ideology after 27 May 1960 military intervention and theorized in the form of National Democratic Revolution (Milli Demokratik Devrim) with some leftist groups.
Ülkü movement was also important in understanding the nature of so called leftist, authoritarian Kemalist movements. Ülkü version of Kemalism “became the official ideology of the Turkish Republic during the mid-1930’s”[21]. Ülkü movement was established by the general secretary of RPP, Recep Peker and some intellectuals including Necib Ali Küçüka, Nusret Köymen, Mehmet Saffet, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Kazım Nami Duru, Ahmet Nesimi, Ferit Celal Güven and Aydoslu Sait which were also prominent figures of RPP and the People’s Houses (Halkevleri) project. Ülkü had a strongly solidarist, radically secularist, anti-liberal and authoritarian understanding. Like the Kadro movement, they appeared at a time when Keynesian economic understanding was on the rise against the failing liberal doctrine. According to Ertan Aydın, although there are claims about Ülkü as a fascist movement, “Ülkü group was much closer to French solidarism”[22]. Ülkü group aimed to initiate a cultural and social regeneration project in order to enlighten uneducated Anatolian people who are not intellectually mature enough to decide for themselves (democracy for the people not democracy of the people). Although Kadro was aware of class differences, Ülkü did not make any class analysis and totally committed to solidarity principle. French Solidarism, which heavily affected Kemalist modernization project and the nature of Turkish leftist movements, was for Emile Durkheim “signifying a construct of a secular morality that had to curb a person’s natural instincts and give to everyone a sense of responsibility and duty, and a set of common values”[23]. In addition to solidarity, Ülkü movement and especially Recep Peker advocated an authoritarian corporatism whose aim was to prevent the emergence of class conflicts. Although it is clear that Ülkü cannot be accepted as a leftist movement by rejecting classes, its ideas about heavy étatism and a village-led economic development (Nusret Köymen) through land reform were caused Ülkü to be accepted as a part of Turkish leftist movements. When we analyze Turkish leftist movements in the single-party period, except the underground TKP activities, we can say that their admiration and weakness against Kemalism starting from the late Ottoman period, was highly intensified and socialist thought was added into the Kemalist discourse as one of the competing Kemalist ideologies.
Now, before passing to analyze three movements, I want to talk about the 27 May 1960 military intervention. 27 May 1960 military intervention was made against the political elite’s abuse of political power by state elites. Democrat Party’s anti-democratic deeds like the establishment of investigation committees (tahkikat komisyonları or tahkikat encümeni)[24] and the emergence of Fatherland Front (Vatan Cephesi) which clearly led to social fragmentation in the country, in addition to DP’s oppressive policies against the media and universities, led to 27 May coup which was carried out by junior rank military officers[25] and spoiled the hierarchical chain within the Turkish military. It was clear that Turkish military’s young and enthusiastic Kemalist officers were not willingly to give up Turkish Army’s role of being the pioneer of modernization even after the establishment of a multi-party democracy and they were disturbed of Democrat Party’s inflationist policies[26] in addition to rising dependency of their country on USA. Turkish military continued to be an influential actor having a patrimonial role and felt the necessity and responsibility to intervene when things are not going well for the country. Indeed, the 1960 military intervention essentially marked a turning point in Turkish political history. Although, the foundations of the regime remained the same, the way politics was carried out was changed. The intervention, as Türkkaya Ataöv claims, was “a revolution that shook but did not change Turkey’s political body”[27]. At the beginning, the coup aimed at putting an end to the increasingly oppressive and reactionary Menderes government. However, it soon became a movement that changed the social and political atmosphere of the country especially after the adoption of the liberal 1961 constitution.
Although 27 May coup was aimed to restrict political elite’s power by some state institutions (e.g. National Security Council, Constitutional Court, Senate), 1961 constitution is often accepted as the most liberal constitution of Turkey considering its providence for extensive basic rights and liberties for individuals as well as democratic actors including trade unions and other non-governmental organizations. 1961 constitution also established the State Planning Agency (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) to revive the statist development model that was harmed during the 1950’s under the rule of Democrat Party[28]. Following the coup of 27 May 1960, the decade was a period of rapid change in many aspects. The 1961 constitution had a liberal and democratic content, which had never been seen in Turkey. Under the new constitution the citizens enjoyed a remarkable degree of freedom. A wider spectrum of political activity was tolerated. The new regime was to assume a social, democratic and secular character[29]. “Out of the new constitution’s 157 basic articles, 19 were devoted to social and economic rights and duties”[30]. The constitution contained guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association and publication as well as other democratic freedoms. Citizens enjoyed more civil rights. The universities were granted greater autonomy; students were given the freedom to organize their own associations. Trade unions were given the right to strike and engage in collective bargaining and thus 27 May coup was considered as a revolution by many intellectuals[31]. Against the fascist dictatorial rule of Menderes, nearly all socialist figures in the country including even TKP supported the coup[32]. Moreover, for Behice Boran the coup gave the Turkish socialist movement an important opportunity to organize itself, disseminate its ideas and bring out its publications freely within a legal framework[33]. However, Mehmet Ali Aybar for instance was against the coup[34].
This new political atmosphere after the coup was also reflected in the Turkish press and literature. The publication of works sympathetic to leftist and progressive ideas flourished. The politicization of the intelligentsia, students, and even workers accelerated. After the military intervention of 1960 Socialism appeared as one of the major ideological and political currents of thought and attracted many people. Indeed, in the newly liberalized atmosphere that followed the intervention and the new constitution, one of the most interesting developments was the growth of radical leftist groups in Turkey similar with the growing oppositional leftist and anti-militarist movements in all capitalist countries. There were important international developments like the Vietnam War, Israeli aggression in the Middle East and the general anti-Americanism trend in the whole world. Keynesian economics was also in favor against the liberal economic theory[35]. The involvement of these political groups (intelligentsia, students, unions, civil society organizations) in domestic politics increased considerably as they were able to propagate their ideas and distribute their publications more freely. 27 May coup was followed by the dismissal of 14 junior rank officers who carried out the coup because of their anti-democratic ideas[36]. The coup was followed by two coup attempts made by Talat Aydemir to establish a Kemalist, authoritarian rule by the military[37]. It should also be noted that Socialism in the 1960’s was understood and introduced “as an ideology and a technique of action designated to achieve rapid modernization”[38] and “social justice.” To reach these goals, it proposed “central planning based on state authority”[39].
In this context, Turkish Labor Party (TIP) was established by 40-50 unionists including İbrahim Güzelce, Kemal Türkler, Kemal Nebioğlu, Şaban Yıldız and Nuri Beşer on 14 February 1961 with a press declaration[40]. Mehmet Ali Aybar at that time in was in the preparation of a socialist party but upon the call of TIP leaders, Aybar joined the party in 1962 as the new party leader[41]. Upon the decision of Aybar and other leading members, the representation of socialist intellectuals in the party cadre was limited to 50 % and the other 50 % was reserved for workers and unionists. TIP presented its ideology as the next step of Kemalism by preventing direct conflict with the official ideology[42]. TIP was also presenting itself as totally committed to parliamentary system as a reformist, European type socialist party. Mehmet Ali Aybar expressed clearly that TIP was against the dictatorship of the proletariat and was committed to democratic principles[43]. Aybar was defining their ideology strangely as “güleryüzlü sosyalizm (genial Socialism)”[44]. The distinguishing feature of the TIP, from its contemporary socialist movements like MDD and Yön, was its insistence on parliamentary methods. From its foundation, the official policy of the party was to take power by parliamentary means within the legal framework. In various sections of the party program, it was stressed that the party would follow democratic ways and respect the constitution. The leader of the party, Aybar, clearly supported the view on the need for the constitutional and parliamentary struggle in order to take power. He claimed that the new constitution was “open to Socialism”.
For the advocates of the TIP, the main task of the Turkish socialists was not a national democratic revolution but a socialist revolution which, of course, would be carried out by democratic means. And proponents of the party gave the leading role in the revolutionary movement to the Turkish working class. They did not accept the view held by Yön and the MDD circle, that the proletariat of the country was politically immature. However, TIP’s linkage to working class was very weak and the party was not able to get rid of its elitist character. The TIP program could be defined as a “non-capitalist path of development”[45]. One of its major concerns was the private sector. It was stated that the private sector would be permitted only as a secondary measure and maintained in a supplementary role to the state sector[46]. As such, statism was one of the main elements of the TIP’s program. The state sector should play a chief and leading role in the development of the national economy. Another important element was planning. The TIP envisaged centralized planning for all sectors in the economy, including the private sector; and the nationalization of all foreign companies, foreign trade, banks, credit houses, insurance companies, several transport enterprises and major means of production and industrial enterprises. Another important aspect of the program was its emphasis on the land problem. The TIP demanded that land ownership should be limited and that large agricultural lands should be distributed to landless and poor peasants. In this way, they emphasized the importance of completing the Kemalist revolution by making the land reform. TIP also had an anti-imperialist character. It proposed a more independent, peaceful foreign policy and friendly relations with Turkey’s neighbors in the same parallel with Atatürk’s “Peace at home, peace in the world” principle. Moreover, TIP was strangely conservative about the Kurdish problem. Although TIP was often accused by Süleyman Demirel and other Justice Party members for encouraging Kurdish secessionism, in fact, TIP considered the Kurdish question as a regional economic backwardness problem and did not have a revolutionary character[47]. TIP also defended Scandinavian type of democracy and offered a new taxation system which would favor the poor.
On 17 November 1963, the TIP participated in the municipality elections. These elections gave the party its first real opportunity to make propaganda and to organize itself throughout the country. Despite all efforts, however, it received only near 40000 votes. However, after 1963 elections especially rural people and workers’ interest in TIP increased[48]. The most important party event was the parliamentary elections held on 10 October 1965. The participation of TIP changed the very character of the 1965 election campaign and the nature of Turkish politics. The party was alone in raising fundamental issues concerning the country’s social and economic future. TIP entered the elections in fifty-one provinces, putting forward 382 candidates, 216 of whom were workers. In these elections, the party received 276,101 votes, or 2.83 percent of the total votes, and won fifteen seats in the parliament. The existence of TIP in the parliament led to huge discussions within the Turkish Grand National Assembly and even the Justice Party deputies lynching efforts to TIP deputy and famous journalist Çetin Altan[49]. It can be also said that the shift of RPP from center to the “left of the center” was realized with due to TIP’s successful opposition[50].
Although TIP made a very good start, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deepened and accelerated the political and ideological rifts within the party leadership. Aybar spoke out against the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. His protest against the invasion also gave him the chance to express his understanding of Socialism[51]. He clearly advocated a non-authoritarian, democratic Socialism similar to Euro-communism. Aybar was severely criticized by the other party leaders, like Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, of adopting new theories on Socialism. The disagreements between the party leadership continued in 1968 congress. During the debates on Aybar’s new theory, three factions emerged, the Aybar group, the Aren-Boran group, and the MDD group. This congress marked a turning point in the party’s political life, raising the alarm for an upcoming crisis in the party. These struggles between the factions lead to a decline in the party’s political activity, seen clearly in the 1969 general elections during which the TIP only received 243,631 votes, or 2.58 % of the total votes, and won only two seats in the parliament. Aybar was held responsible for the failure of the party in the 1969 elections. On 15 November 1969, he declared his resignation from the position of party chairman. After the 12 March memorandum, on 20 July 1971, TIP was closed down and most of the party leaders were arrested.
After TIP, I want to focus on the Yön movement and its leader Doğan Avcıoğlu. Yön magazine was established in December 1961 by a group of leftist intellectuals. The first issue of Yön appeared on 20 December 1961 and its publication continued until 30 June 1967. Although there are intellectuals having different formulations of the Socialism (There were Marxists, pro-Soviet thinkers like Sadun Aren, Çetin Altan, Kemalist pro-military socialists like Doğan Avcıoğlu, Mihri Belli, social democrats like Mümtaz Soysal, ex-Kadroists like Şevket Süreyya and liberal leftists like Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Abdi İpekçi) all writers were calling themselves as socialists and writing in the journal. However, the main ideologue of the movement was Doğan Avcıoğlu which later became very famous with his work “Türkiye’nin Düzeni”. The Yön group was mainly comprised of intellectuals, bureaucrats and “patriotic” officers[52]. Yön magazine and movement became a very influential publication in the 1960’s simultaneously with the establishment of the first socialist party in the country “Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TIP)”. Same intellectual group also established “The Society of Socialist Culture (Sosyalist Kültür Derneği)” at those years. TIP leaders such as Behice Boran and Erdoğan Başar opposed to the emergence of Yön and the Society of Socialist Culture. They thought that this would create a split among Turkish socialists[53]. Yön typified the Socialism of the 1960’s in many respects. Yön writers were claiming that they were against communism and Socialism is the “antidote of communism”[54] but their writings were strengthening socialist movements in the country. The dominant ideology of the movement was pro-Kemalist National Democratic Revolution thesis. This was mostly defended by Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mihri Belli in the journal. Avcıoğlu summarized Yön’s ideology as follows:
“-Imperialism is the chief obstacle to the way of social and economic progress in Turkey.
-All efforts to develop the economy with the aid of foreign capital and the stimulation of the Turkish private sector with ultimately fail.
-The development of Turkey along the capitalist path has proved unsuccessful.
-The Turkish capitalist class, which receives about one-third of the national income, and is supported by the state in every way, avoids capital investment. It expends the major part of its share of the income on private consumption.
-Social and economic contradictions are not being resolved but are deepening.
-The dominant classes stand in the way of economic development of the country, social justice, democracy and independence”[55].
Avcıoğlu also stated that there are basically three ways of development: the communist path, the capitalist American path and the statist and the national revolutionary path. He also mentioned that this third model which became very successful in Bulgaria, Romania and Central Asia, is the most appropriate development model for Turkey[56]. Moreover, Avcıoğlu put forward an interesting idea about the relation between authoritarianism and democracy. He claimed that “Atatürk regime was more authoritarian than the Demirel regime but more democratic. There may exist a both a multiparty dictatorship of capital, which is liberal in form but anti-democratic, and an outwardly authoritarian one-party democracy, which relies on the laboring masses. It is not the form that is important but the content”[57]. Avcıoğlu and Soysal also criticized parliamentarian regime for being in the use of bourgeois class. In order to realize National Democratic Revolution, they did not trust in the parliamentarian democracy unlike TIP. Rather, they trusted in non-parliamentary forces by which they meant “left-leaning section of the military and civilian intelligentsia, the trade unions, and the youth organizations”[58]. For the Yön circle, the backward social and economic structures and conditions of the country would not allow the progressive forces to come to power by election. Yön writers called these non-parliamentary forces as “dynamic forces (zinde kuvvetler)”[59] which are able to bring a real Kemalist regime via a military coup or a revolution from above.
Yön writers thought that achieving a classless society is possible by making a National Democratic Revolution. Doğan Avcıoğlu thought that “There are no serious grounds for suggesting that the Kemalist patriotic intelligentsia will not adopt the goals of the national liberation front”[60]. While theorizing this united front, Avcıoğlu avoided himself making class analysis[61]. Doğan Avcıoğlu also differentiated anti-imperialist, Kemalist Turkish Army, which consisted of young men from impoverished and poor families, from the more professional armies of the western countries which are established to protect the interest of the bourgeois class. Moreover, Yön thinkers claimed that only these active, dynamic forces consisted of military, civil and intellectual elites have the revolutionary tradition in Turkey[62]. These ideas became very popular in the military too. Colonel Talat Aydemir affected by the ideas defended in the Yön magazine, tried to make a “Kemalist Revolution” twice in 1962 and 1963 but failed to realize the coup. He was executed after his second trial. Yön was banned for a while after Aydemir’s second attempt to make a military intervention[63].
Yön writers claimed that Turkey had won political independence under Atatürk’s rule but now needs economic independence. They also mentioned the necessity of making a land reform to end the dominant political status of landowners. Avcıoğlu tried to show how land reform project could not be implemented in the single-party era and Democrat Party used this issue to garner votes by taking help from local notables[64]. Moreover, Avcıoğlu clearly mentioned his belief in the necessity of a planned economy and criticized the failure of early étatist economy[65]. Yön movement was also very critical about Marxist groups of their time. Avcıoğlu wrote “We believe that in the near future Turkey will move on to the socialist path of development. But the building of Socialism requires a lengthy period of time. Therefore, instead of waving socialist slogans, it is necessary to work out a formula of a united front capable of attracting all forces capable of casting aside the obstacles on the way to Socialism”[66]. Yön thinkers did not only mention about the proletariat which they thought as a small, newly flourishing class in their theory. They gave equal emphasis to the peasantry that constituted the 75% of the population. Avcıoğlu asserted that “the national liberation movement is possible only on the basis of a union of the working class and the peasants”[67]. Yön writers also exalted Atatürk frequently as the founder of politically independent Turkey. However, they added that the next mission that is up to them, is to create an economically independent Turkey that was not realized by state and political elites after Atatürk’s death. They tried to mix Kemalist and Marxist elements and to formulate a theory very similar to Kadro movement. They thought that Kemalism and Socialism had something very important in common: Statism[68]. There were also many writings praising Kadro movement in Yön magazine[69]. The Yön group advocated a non-parliamentary strategy to seize political power similar to Baathist regimes in the Middle East. Imperialism, feudalism, and the big comprador bourgeoisie were identified as the main obstacles to establishing a “national democracy.” So, for the Yön movement, the main revolutionary task was to construct a national democratic front in which all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces would unite in order to carry out the national democratic revolution. Yön’s ideology was clearly eclectic since they had elements from Kemalism, Marxism, Maoism and social democracy.
Before passing to analyze MDD thesis, we can look for the similarities between the Yön and Kadro movements. Both Yön and Kadro movements tried to show Kemalism as a leftist movement. They were emphasizing Atatürk’s sayings about anti-imperialism and not mentioning about the solidarity aspect of the Kemalist thought. Kadro recognized class differences only outside of the country whereas Yön more openly voiced out that although class differences in a newly industrializing country like Turkey are not clear, there are classes and the bourgeois class exploits the proletariat. Especially Kadro’s role is crucial in the formation of Kemalist leftist ideology. Aydemir, as a member of both movements, struggled to make a synthesis of Kemalism and Marxism[70]. Although Atatürk’s deeds and sayings do not necessarily form a strict ideology, these groups were claiming that they understand Atatürk better than other people. Kemalist thought was more of a softened and pragmatic ideology and because of this vacuum, Kadro and Yön writers had chance to mix different elements into Kemalism. They both gave importance not to oppose with the state elites and had a close position to Turkish Military. Yön went even further and made publications to encourage Turkish Army to make a coup. Both movements preferred authoritarian single-party rule and did not believe in democracy. Yön movement was published in a relatively more liberal environment than Kadro. Thus, they were more comfortable to write freely on controversial issues. Kadro chose to ignore some topics in order to survive. Kadro and Yön movements’ attempts to create a Kemalist leftist view unique to Turkey (Turkish Socialism) became very successful and even today we can observe the effects of this revised Kemalist interpretation.
Although, MDD is very close to Yön movement, we should analyze MDD separately since there are some ideological differences between two movements. In the second half of the 1960’s, the strategy of a national democratic revolution became a dominant characteristic of one of the radical left-wing factions, the National Democratic Revolution (MDD) movement. In many respects, the political and ideological approaches of this newly shaped movement overlapped with those of the Yön group. The MDD also believed that in a backward country like Turkey, the main struggle would be against imperialism and feudalism. Since the proletariat was too weak as a class, revolutionary change could only be carried out by a broad national front of all the exploited social classes and groups, including intellectuals, officers and the national bourgeoisie. This revolution directed against landowners and compradors would be of a national and democratic character, not a socialist one. MDD can be said to have an eclectic ideology consisted of Kemalism and Maoism[71]. MDD’s main enemy was comprador bourgeoisie that acts against the national interests of the country[72].
However, there were differences among the MDD movement and Yön regarding the methods of taking power. Both Yön and MDD movements did not believe that a revolution could be made gradually by parliamentary democratic means. However, while Yön mainly advocated a coup led by intellectuals and military officers, adherents of the MDD movement preferred an armed guerrilla struggle. This radical current formed itself first around a journal called Türk Solu (The Turkish Left)[73]. The leading writer of the journal was Mihri Belli, a former member of the Turkish Communist Party and then member of the TIP. He was the leading ideologue of the MDD strategy. Under his leadership, the MDD movement became one of the most significant socialist factions in Turkey. Belli and MDD members made great efforts to spread their ideology within TIP, but especially after the gaining power of Aren-Boran group in TIP, they were separated from the party. There were some other important writers in the MDD movement such as Ahmet Say, Muzaffer Erdost, Vahap Erdoğdu and Muvaffak Şeref.
In the late sixties, student participation in political life considerably increased. Students became the most militant and active element of the socialist movement in Turkey. In the mid-sixties, the leftist students began to organize under the Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu (Federation of Idea Clubs), backed by the TIP. However, in the late sixties, the Federation changed not only its name but also the very character of its political perspective. In the autumn of 1969, the Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu (Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey), shortly known as Dev-Genç, was established, with the MDD strategy as its ideological and political platform. For the members of Dev-Genç, the main revolutionary task became a national democratic revolution. From 1970 onwards, the youth groups around Dev-Genç decided to establish their own independent political organizations under the leadership of their own leaders and initiated an armed guerrilla struggle. Especially after the 12 March memorandum and rising violence against the leftist groups by police and ultra-nationalist militants, student leaders from Dev-Genç established their own illegal parties to start an armed struggle against their enemies.
Student leaders like Deniz Gezmiş and Mahir Çayan became legends, symbols and early martyrs of the radical leftist movement in Turkey. Gezmiş was the leader of socialist revolutionary organization THKO (Türk Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu-Turkish People Liberation Army). TIP was representing the legal, “revisionist” Socialism and was decreasing the revolutionary potential by its parliamentary methods according to social revolutionaries like Deniz Gezmiş. Student groups became even more powerful with the revolutionary winds blowing strongly around the world with the spirit and activism of 1968 generation. Mahir Çayan and his organization, THKP-C, also affected the Turkish radical leftist activism heavily. According to Çayan, who later became an idol of the Turkish revolutionary movement along with Gezmiş, the revolutionary strategy in all colonial and semi-colonial countries had to be the siege of cities by guerillas positioned in the countryside under the ideological leadership of the proletariat. Another group supporting the MDD strategy and led by Doğu Perinçek and Şahin Alpay adopting the same line as Mahir Çayan, stated that “we reject any reformist or parliamentary ways. The power of the workers and peasants can be established only through revolution and can be born only from the muzzle of a gun”[74]. Since these groups’ members were politically socialized within the MDD cadre, their main emphasis was given to anti-imperialist struggle and the elimination of comprador forces within the country.
After analyzing these three movements, now I want to analyze their similarities and differences. First of all, I want to focus on these movements’ ideologies and their look towards class conflicts in the country as leftist movements. TIP clearly recognized class differences and defended the priority and the vanguard role of the proletariat in the economic development and democratization of the country within the democratic system. They did not advocate a proletariat revolution and they seemed to be totally committed to democratic principles. Doğan Avcıoğlu for instance criticized TIP as a European type reformist party which aims to decrease the revolutionary potential and also as a party who believed in the existence of a politically mature proletariat in the country[75]. Although TIP seemed to defend an orthodox Marxist political understanding within the same lines with USSR, Aybar and other TIP members similar to Yön and MDD, adopted the socialist ideology as a developmental program rather than a Marxist stage that should take place before communism after capitalism in the form of proletarian dictatorship. TIP defended a democracy under the leadership of proletariat but never claimed to abolish the system and to ban the private property or private sector. Rather, they asserted that a statist economic development model would be more successful with the help of controlled private sector. Tip recognized Turkey’s backwardness and uniqueness in the unilinear Marxist development scale but thought that this could not be realized by a liberal capitalist economy[76]. TIP leaders had a split on the issue of Soviet intervention to Czechoslovakia in accordance with the Brezhnev Doctrine. Aybar criticized this move whereas Aren-Boran click strongly supported it[77]. They praised Kemalism and did not define as a bourgeois led system. In this way, like Yön and MDD, they conceptualized state as something independent from the sovereignty of a socioeconomic class. However, they still accepted the bourgeois supremacy in the system and severely criticized it. TIP tried to be a part of international socialist movement but they acknowledged the uniqueness of Turkey and did not put forward an international socialist model.
Yön on the other hand, as a socialist movement taking the support of nearly all intellectuals of the epoch, tried to make a synthesis of Kemalist and Socialism like the Kadro movement. They adopted Socialism similar with the TIP as a development model. Avcıoğlu in “Türkiye’nin Düzeni” clearly mentioned his ideas about the backwardness of Turkey in the race of modernity. In his view this was caused by the colonization of Ottoman State and the lack of the emergence of a bourgeois class in the Ottomans and Republican era[78]. Similar to TIP, they defended a mixed economy under the leadership of state sector. They have emphasis to Kemalist étatism principle in order to take the support from the military-bureaucratic elite. Avcıoğlu claimed that especially after Atatürk’s death the main concern of the regime was to create a bourgeois class but since this plan does not work for Turkey, a new statist model must be implemented. Yön thought the Kemalist state something above from social classes and in this sense opposed to Marxist theory[79]. Yön advocated a united front consisted of military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite having the support of masses in order to make a revolution in the form of military coup. While theorizing this united front, Avcıoğlu ignored class differences and opposed to TIP that there is a mature proletariat class in the country. While talking about enemies (hasım güçler), Avcıoğlu pointed out the comprador forces in the country mainly in the bourgeoisie but did not declare a social class directly as enemy[80]. Patriotic bourgeoisie was both useful and necessary for Avcıoğlu’s struggle.
MDD’s ideology was also very similar to Yön movement. In addition to Yön movement, they frequently used Maoist theses in order to strengthen their position is the socialist movement. They advocated a popular revolution by means of coup or armed clash with the guidance of military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite having the support of peasants and workers. MDD considered Turkey as a semi-colony and semi-feudal and thought that there are not developed classes in Turkey like other capitalist countries[81]. Similar with Yön, they defended a mixed economy which would be heavily controlled by the state. Belli and his friends never really considered to establish a political party and in this way thought in parallel with the Yön movement. However, MDD defenders were also TIP members who tried to spread their views within the party[82]. Thus, MDD’s links with the peasantry and the proletariat were very weak and generally MDD members were consisting of university students.
Secondly, I want to talk about the methods of attaining power by these three movements in order to show differences in their strategies. TIP clearly advocated a parliamentary, democratic, gradual change within the system as a reformist socialist party similar to European social democratic parties. Aybar was assuring the journalists frequently that they were sincerely committed to democratic principles and he favored a gradual solution. After the elimination of Aybar group in the party, TIP lost its power and RPP under Bülent Ecevit’s leadership assumed the leadership role of the proletariat and peasantry in the democratic political race. They were addressing to the proletariat and peasantry more than military-bureaucratic elite. However, Yön and MDD were expecting to encourage and boost “progressive” Kemalist forces in the military-bureaucratic elite to make an intervention and establish a regime that would carry on making and completing Kemalist revolutions. They also tried to establish links with the peasantry and proletariat but their priority was given to intelligentsia and military-bureaucratic elite. Groups broke off from MDD especially after the 12 March memorandum, chose the way guerilla warfare in order to make a revolution. These groups were consisted of young university students and their struggle was desperate. TIP considered these movements as “adventurism” and criticized for not being real socialist movements[83].
Thirdly, I want to focus shortly on the structural nature of these movements. TIP was a democratic political party which participated into elections and raced for the governmental power. In the 1965 elections, they won 15 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly which was their biggest achievement. Yön emerged as a intellectual movement taking support from nearly all intellectuals of the epoch. Yön was a journal not only about politics but also about arts and culture. There were important artists writing for the journal including Attila İlhan, Ceyhun Atuf Kansu, Fazıl Hüsnü Dağlarca, Can Yücel, Orhan Kemal, Yaşar Kemal, Kemal Tahir etc. The Society of Socialist Culture (Sosyalist Kültür Derneği) was also a part of the Yön movement as a civil society organization. MDD was a fraction in the TIP mostly consisted of university students and few ideological leaders. MDD’s main power was coming from the thought clubs organized in universities. MDD later chose the way of armed struggle and revolutionary MDD youth established different para-military organizations to make a revolution.
Fourthly and lastly, I want to focus on these movements’ perception of Kemalism. Although TIP was emerged as a socialist party for the laborer classes in the country, they did not want to have a direct conflict with the Kemalist ideology. They praised Kemalist and Mustafa Kemal as the savior of Turkish nation and the leader of anti-imperialist struggle. Mustafa Kemal’s quotes and speeches were used by the party to legitimize their views[84]. TIP tried to harmonize Kemalism and democracy with their original socialist thought. They can be considered as conservative for a socialist party looking at their views on the Kurdish problem. They offered policies like land reform and industrialization in order to complete the Kemalist revolution. Aybar was replying Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel’s accusations for provoking class conflicts as follows: “Demirel, sınıf kavgasını önlemek istiyorsa, petrolü kamulaştırsın, imtiyazları geri alsın, topraksız köylüleri toprağa kavuştursun, vergiyi zenginden çok alsın, yoksuldan hiç almasın, işsizliğe çare bulsun, ve işsizlik sigortasını getirsin. Kısacası anayasayı eksiksiz, tastamam, yani ekonomik bakımdan güçsüz olan vatandaşlardan yana uygulasın. Bu ve bu gibi reformlar yapılmazsa, sınıf kavgasını önlemek sözlerinin altında yatan amaç, bugünkü bozuk düzeni ayakta tutmaktır[85]. We can notice from this speech of Aybar that TIP’s main concern was about democratic social rights of the lower classes more than a revolutionary socialist path. Aybar was claiming that even Demirel could have made these reforms and prevent class conflicts. We can say that although TIP’s priority given to lower classes seemed to surpass Kemalist solidarity understanding, TIP was from being a real socialist party. However, we can still say that among these three movements TIP had the most critical perception of Kemalism. Yön on the other hand, was very sympathetic to Kemalism. Yön’s foundation declaration was full of Kemalist ideas and ideals in addition to praises for Atatürk[86]. Although Yön writers did not avoid making class analysis, they advocated a united front with military leadership against comprador forces in the country who cooperate with the enemy and spoil the independence of the country. Avcıoğlu was conceptualizing military-bureaucratic elite as a class above ideologies, all other social classes and criticizing TIP for their supremacy role given to proletariat. Like the Kadro movement, they gave serious attention to praise the Kemalist ideology and underlined the anti-imperialist struggle of the country instead of conflict of social classes within the country[87]. MDD’s attitude towards Kemalist was also similar to Yön movement especially at the beginning. Although they were frequently using Maoist arguments, they were stressing the progressive and heroic role of the Kemalist revolution. They were basically claiming that Kemalist Revolution was an uncompleted bourgeois revolution that should be realized[88]. However, after the emergence of para-military groups, İbrahim Kaypakkaya fraction for instance tried to distance himself from Kemalism as much as possible.
Now, we can analyze the similarities and common tendencies of these three movements. First of all, as I stated before in all these movements we see that their ideologies are heavily eclectic and away from being Marxist. In TIP, in addition to Socialism, we see the importance of social democracy and Kemalism whereas in Yön and MDD, we notice the harmonization of Kemalism, Maoism and some socialist elements. Secondly, as the natural outcome of the first article all these movements conceptualize Turkish case as unique and their ideologies are different from the original doctrines since they aim to mix these theories into the Kemalist discourse and to adapt them to Turkish context which is thought to be different from other cases. They think that Turkey is stayed behind in the modernization race compared to industrialized developed countries. Thirdly, they adopt their views as modernization projects that should be implemented rather than the original Marxist theory which explains all historical-structural struggles throughout the history. What they want is to create a modern country that reached social justice and economic progress. Fourthly, all these movements flourished after the 27 May coup which was a product of Kemalist Turkish military and thus, they had a kind of gratitude to Kemalism. Kemalism was praised by all these groups and they deliberately avoided direct conflict with Kemalist ideology in their writings. Rather, they blamed unsuccessful governors who came after Mustafa Kemal and spoiled the basic principles of the Republic that are in conformity with socialism. They seriously made efforts to find Kemalist elements that can be used to legitimize their views. Fifthly, Yön, MDD and TIP had weak international links and their emphasis was on the internal affaires. They thought socialist revolution of reforms as an internal affair and were not active in international matters. Sixthly, all these movements were supported and backed up by intellectual efforts, journals and political activism.
Finally, in my opinion, one of the most important events that led to the emergence and strengthening of leftist movements in Turkey was the 27 May coup. Without 27 May coup and the 1961 constitution, although socialist movements were on the rise everywhere in the 1960’s, Turkish left might not have been that influential. Because of this, socialist movements in Turkey have always (until 12 March memorandum or 12 September) showed great effort not to oppose with the Kemalist discourse. They rather aimed to legitimize their views by taking help from the large Kemalist discourse which can be pulled to different political ideologies by different aspects. The Jakobinist nature of the Turkish Revolution continued with the 27 May coup since these liberties and rights were not gained as a result of a social movement but rather granted from above by the Turkish military. This elitist nature of the Republic and the distance between people and the state directed some leftist movements such as Yön and MDD to build their strategies on a military coup rather than a revolution and to trust into progressive elements in the military-bureaucratic elite. This elitist nature can be seen not only in the larger body that is the Republic but also in the micro units like TIP, MDD and Yön movements which are based on intellectuals and university youth rather than workers and peasants. Although their struggle was embellished with the class struggle motive, what they have in mind first was to save and modernize the state; the same mentality of late Ottoman intellectuals starting from the Tanzimat period. To sum up, I want to restate that no matter how these movements tried to distance themselves from the official Kemalist ideology, Turkish Socialisms have always developed under the shadow of Kemalism as elitist movements having difficulties in creating social bonds. Kemalist emphasis given to military and the independence of the country in addition to the constraints felt by Turkish intellectuals about the solidarity of the nation, were also perceptible in the formation of theories of Turkish leftists.
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[1] “Kimi 1848 Devrimi’ne, bir sonraki kuşağa dahil olan bazıları da 1871 Paris Komünü’ne tanık olmuştu. 1864’de kurulan 1. Enternasyonal de, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na muhalif aydınların ilgiyle izlediği bir oluşumdu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 15).
[2] “Mal varlığı kuralını icra eylemek şöyle dursun, parasını peşin vermeden kimseden bir habbe aldılar mı? Ve Fransa Bankası’nda milyonlarca akçe mevcut ve idaresi ellerindeyken bir akçesine dokundular mı?” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 18).
[3] “Partide ve yayın organında ilginç bir sosyalizm anlayışı hakimdi. İslamiyet’in, özünde sosyalizmi içerdiğini düşünüyor ve sosyalizmi haklı çıkaracak gerekçeleri İslam dininde arıyorlardı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 26).
[4] “Demek ki içtimai inkılap karşısında Türkiye Komünist Fırkası’na düşen vazifeyi, yağmacı emperyalizmin bütün baskılarına rağmen ayaklanıp varlıklarını ispat eden Anadolu ayaklanmacılarına ve ayaklanmacıları temsil eden Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümetine samimiyetle yardımcı olmak ve Anadolu’daki bu hareketi şarkın diğer mazlum ve medeni millet ve hükümetlerine bir örnek olarak göstermekle özetleyebiliriz” (“Mustafa Suphi, Yaşamı, Yazıları, Yoldaşları”, Sosyalist Yayınlar, 1992, p. 136).
[5] Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi Archives, http://www.iisg.nl/archives/nl/files/t/10771610full.php
[6] “French journalist and leader of the French Socialist Party before World War I. In 1914 he argued for arbitration rather than armed conflict between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. Jaures was assassinated by a fanatical nationalist” (http://www.dictionary.com).
[7] “Özellikle Kemalizm karşısındaki konumu ve Kemalist diktatörlüğün demokratik devrimi gerçekleştirebileceği yolundaki umutları bakımından, MDD’nin asıl fikir babası Şefik Hüsnü’dür” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 248).
[8] “İkinci Komintern kongresinin işaret ettiği üzere burjuva milliyetçiliğinin temsilcileri, -her zaman bunun bilincine varmış olmasalar da- tomurcuk halindeki proleter grubunu bir sınıf teşkilatı kurmanın direk ödevlerinden saptırmak amacıyla, Sovyet Rusya’nın siyasi otoritesinden faydalanarak ve kendilerini işçilerin sınıf güdülerine uydurarak burjuva demokratik heveslerini sosyalist komünist bir kisveye büründürürler” (Mete Tunçay, “Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar”, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978, p. 141).
[9] “1908, işçi eylemlerinin arttığı yıldır. Ağırlıklı olarak Fransız ve Alman sermayeli işletmelerde yaygınlaşan ve başka işletmelere de sıçrayan işçi eylemleri, yabancılara karşı duyulan dinsel bir öfke ile patlamışsa da, özünde sermayeye yönelik bir tepkinin ifadesiydi” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 46).
[10] “The new Republican ideology, by denying the place of Islam as a discourse and its role as a cement of society, increased the distance between the educated and the uneducated” (Şerif Mardin, “Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science”, p. 71).
[11] Ergun Özbudun, “The nature of the Kemalist political regime”, p. 83
[12] Nur Yalman, “Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey”, p. 141
[13] Metin, Heper, “State Tradition In Turkey”, p. 63
[14] Ertan, Aydın, “The Peculiarities Of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In The 1930’s: The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism, 1933-36”, p. 14
[15] “Hatırlıyorum ki, Kadro intişar ederken maksadının Türk milletine has meslek ve metodun millet ve memlekette teessüs ve inkişafına hizmet olduğunu yazmıştı. Kadro’yu bu maksadında geniş muvaffakiyet temenni ederim” (Mustafa, Türkeş, “Kadro Hareketi”, p. 10).
[16] “Kadro yazarlarının Komünist Partisi üyesi eski arkadaşları, Kadro’yu sosyal faşist olmakla suçlarken, dönemin liberalleri ve özellikle İş Bankası grubu temsilcisi, milletvekili Mahmut Soydan, Milliyet gazetesinde Kadro’ yu komünizm propagandası yapmakla suçlamaktaydı” (Mustafa, Türkeş, “Kadro Hareketi”, p. 129).
[17] “Bu süreç içinde bir yandan Kadro dergisi çıkarılmakta, öte yandan benimsenen ideolojik çizginin programı aydınlatılmaktadır. Şevket Süreyya’nın Murat Belge’ye anlattığına göre, devlet bu konuyla yakından ilgilenmekte ve toplantıları izletmektedir” (Tekeli & İlkin, “Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak”, pp. 143-144).
[18] “Vedat Nedim’e göre, ileri teknikli bir Türk iktisadiyatı ve sınıfsız ve tezatsız bir Türk milleti ancak devletçi bir iktisat siyasetinin eseri olacaktır” (Heper & Canıvar, “Ülkü ve Kadro Dergilerinde Yayınlanmış Bazı Makalelerde Beliren Devletçilik Anlayışı”, p. 10).
[19] “The origins and rapid development of capitalism in Europe, Aydemir and other Kadro writers noted, might be explained by the exploitation of colonies” (Mustafa, Türkeş, “The Ideology of the Kadro Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey”, p. 103).
[20] Mustafa, Türkeş, “The Ideology of the Kadro Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey”, p. 109-110.
[21] Ertan, Aydın, “The Peculiarities Of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In The 1930’s: The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism, 1933-36”, p. 1.
[22] Ertan, Aydın, “The Peculiarities Of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In The 1930’s: The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism, 1933-36”, p. 17.
[23] Ertan, Aydın, “The Peculiarities Of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology In The 1930’s: The Ülkü Version Of Kemalism, 1933-36”, pp. 18-19.
[24] “Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 205.
[25] “27 Mayıs’ın, sonraki darbelerden önemli bir farkı vardı. O fark, bence emir-komuta zinciri içinde bir hareket olmamasıydı. O zamanın genelkurmay başkanına da bir başkaldırmaydı” (Uğur Mumcu, “Aybar ile Söyleşi Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık”, p. 37).
[26] “Kaldı ki, küçük rütbeli subaylar, DP döneminde izlenen iktisadi politikalar sonucunda, alt düzeyde maaşlı memurlar kategorisinde bulunuyorlar ve büyük bir kısmı, subaylık dışında, gizli ek işler yapmak zorunda kalıyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, pp. 210-211).
[27] Jacob M. Landau, “Radical Politics in Turkey”, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 53.
[28] “Türkiye’nin uzun vadeli planlar ve yıllık programlar içinde belirli hedefler yönünde kalkınmasını sağlayacak çalışmalar yapmak üzere kurulan ve büyük yetkilerle donatılan DPT, anayasanın 41. maddesinde ifade edilen bir anlayışın ürünü olarak ortaya çıktı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 209).
[29] Article 2 of the new constitution stated that “the Turkish Republic is a national, secular and social State under the rule of law, based on human rights and the fundamental principles set forth in the Preamble” (İsmet Giritli, “Fifty Years of Turkish Political Development 1919-1969”, İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1969, p. 168).
[30] Jacob M. Landau, “Radical Politics in Turkey”, p. 10.
[31] “27 Mayıs darbesini bir devrim olarak görenlerin ileri sürdüğü kanıtlar içinde, darbeyle yapılan anayasanın ilk kez grevli toplusözleşmeli sendikal haklara yer vermiş olmasıdır” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 214).
[32] “Merkezi yurtdışında bulunan TKP ve sol kamuoyu da, bu harekete katıldı. TKP, bu hareketi, faşizme karşı bir hareket olarak benimsedi” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 205).
[33] Behice Boran, “Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları”, İstanbul: Gün Yayınları, Mayıs 1968, pp. 59-60.
[34] “Biliyorsunuz ben darbelere karşıyım. Tepeden inme hareketlere karşıyım. Yani, bu yoldan demokrasiye gidemeyiz” (Uğur Mumcu, “Aybar ile Söyleşi Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık”, p. 36).
[35] “Aynı dönemde, bütün dünyada, bütün burjuva devletler, krizin etkisiyle, kaynakların kullanılması ve sermaye birikiminin yollarının açılabilmesi için müdahaleci politikalara yönelmişlerdi ve bu politikaların teorisyeni olan Lord Keynes, bu yüzden iktisat biliminin yeni peygamberi kabul ediliyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 229).
[36] “27 Mayıs sabahı radyodan okunan bildiride bir an önce seçimler yapılacağı ve demokratik düzene geçileceği açıklanmıştı. 27 Mayısçılar, bu konuda direnen 14 arkadaşlarını yurt dışına göndermek pahasına da olsa, bu sözlerini tutmuşlardır” (Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 1”, p. 72).
[37] Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 1”, p. 213.
[38] Kemal Karpat, “Socialism”, p. 157.
[39] Kemal Karpat, “Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960” in Social Change and Politics in Turkey, edited by Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973), p. 341.
[40] Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 1”, p. 196.
[41] “1 Şubat 1962’de, TIP kurucuları sendikacılar, kendi aralarında yaptıkları toplantıda, partinin kapılarını sosyalist aydınlara açmaya ve genel başkanlık için Mehmet Ali Aybar’ı göreve çağırmaya karar verdiler” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 259).
[42] “27 Mayıs sonrasının genel aydın eğilimi halinde yükselişe geçmiş bulunan Kemalizm, TİP’in başlıca argümanlarında da önemli bir ağırlık taşıyor ve sosyalizm, temelde, Kemalizm’in ileri bir yorumu olarak sunuluyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 260).
[43] “Mesela TİP, proletarya diktatörlüğüne dayanan bir parti değildi. Ya nasıl bir partiydi? İşçi sınıfının demokratik öncülüğü etrafında birleşen, tüm emekçilerin temsilcisi olduğunu söyleyen, onları iktidara getirmeyi amaçlayan bir partiydi” (Uğur Mumcu, “Aybar ile Söyleşi Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık”, p. 41).
[44] “Türkiye’ye özgü güleryüzlü sosyalizmin belli başlı ilkeleri bunlardır; yani demokrasi ile sosyalizmin, madalyonun iki yüzü gibi olduğu; emekçilerin yönetimde fiilen söz ve karar sahibi oldukları, bu iki ilkenin ancak yatay örgütlenme ile gerçekleşeceği, ulusal bağımsızlığın sosyalizmin vazgeçilmez ilkeleri arasında bulunduğu…” (Uğur Mumcu, “Aybar ile Söyleşi Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık”, p. 193).
[45] Türkiye İşçi Partisi, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi Programı”, (İstanbul: 1964), p. 64.
[46] “Özel sektöre bırakılan endüstri kolları ve ekonomik faaliyet alanları, genel ekonomi planının hedef ve direktiflerine uyarak çalışır ve gelişir. Devlet sektörünün ağır bastığı bir planlı ekonomik düzeyde özel sektör daha uzun yıllar ulusal kalkınmamızda yararlı bir faktör olacağı için korunacak ve teşvik edilecektir” (Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 1”, p. 206).
[47] “Kürt sorunu, TİP tarafından bir bölge kalkınması sorunu olarak konuluyordu ve bu soruna, ulusal menfaatlerimize en uygun, en insanca çözüm yollarını bulmak, ihmal edilmeyecek bir vatan vazifesi nitelendiriliyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 265).
[48] “Nitekim, 63 yerel seçimlerinden sonra yaptığımız köy gezilerinde bunu gayet açık olarak görüyorduk. Eskiden giderdik kahveye. Kim olduğu öğrenilince kahve boşalırdı. Artık öyle olmuyordu. Köye gidiyorduk, hemen ilgileniyorlardı” (Uğur Mumcu, “Aybar ile Söyleşi Sosyalizm ve Bağımsızlık”, p. 41).
[49] Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 2”, p. 179.
[50] “TİP, geniş işçi ve aydın kesimlerini etkileyen bir solculuk söylemi tutturmayı, canlı ve güncel tartışmalarda çözümü aranan problemleri ele alarak karşılamayı başarmış, daha sonra CHP’nin tabanında yer alan önemli bir kesimi de etkilemeye başlaması üzerine, İsmet İnönü’nün ağzından solculuğunu açıklamak zorunda bırakan etkiyi yaratmıştı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 262).
[51] “M. Ali Aybar Sovyetler Birliği’nin Çekoslovakya’ya müdahalesini, bürokrat ve halktan kopmuş bir yönetimin icraatı olarak değerlendirerek açıkça işgale karşı tavır almıştı” (Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 271).
[52] “The officers who carried out the coup of 27 May 1960 were, ideologically, the direct descendants of the CUP (the Committee of Union and Progress)... Their conception of social change was derived the authoritarian, étatist ideology of the CUP- RPP (Republican People’s Party) elites.” Some of them “believed their historical mission to intervene and save the state from usurpers who relied on the supporters of an ignorant electorate” (Çağlar, Keyder, “Political Economy”, p. 46).
[53] “Several of the TLP leaders, Behice Boran and Erdoğan Başar in particular, opposed the establishment of the SSC. They maintained that the Society would create a split among socialists, both organizationally and ideologically” (Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 87).
[54] “Şevket Süreyya Aydemir explained ‘Socialism is the antidote to communism and therefore is the most effective means of struggle against communism’. Yön, however, noted that the threat of losing its independence is most dangerous for Turkey. As for the threat of communism, this is exploited in order to turn country into a vassal, of imperialism and to sustain the present regime” (Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 88).
[55] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 91.
[56] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, pp. 91-92.
[57] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 93.
[58] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 93.
[59] Ama Yöncüler yine de bu etkileme çabasında tüm kamu alanından çok, daha sınırlı bir gruba, o zamanın terimiyle, zinde kuvvetlere yönelmeye öncelik verdiler” (Tekeli & İlkin, “Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak”, pp. 468-469).
[60] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 98.
[61] “Burada, herhangi bir sınıf ayrımı gözetmeksizin, aydınlardan ve yöneticilerden söz edilmektedir. Bu doğrudan doğruya, Yön çevresinin devrim anlayışına bağlıdır” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 232).
[62] “Öte yandan Türkiye’deki ara tabakaların yani asker-sivil-aydın zümrenin ya da zinde güçlerin tarihten gelen bir devrimci geleneği vardır” (Tekeli & İlkin, “Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak”, p. 469).
[63] “Büyük bir olasılıkla bu kapatma olayında Yön’ün doğrudan ilişkili olmasa bile, savunduğu fikirlerle Albay Talat Aydemir’in önderlik ettiği askeri darbe girişimlerindeki rolü etkili olmuştur” (Hikmet, Özdemir, “Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı Yön Hareketi”, p. 57).
[64] “Toprak reformu aleyhtarlığı, Demokrat Parti’nin doğuşuna yol açan nedenlerden biri olmuştur” (Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Düzeni”, p. 493).
[65] “Devlet, bu dönemde tek başına işletmeler kurmuş ve işletmiştir. İlk Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1933-1937) yürürlüğe konmuş ve uygulanmıştır. Bu plan, bugün anladığımız biçimde bir plan değildir. Yalnızca devletin, dar anlamda sınai yatırımlarını ihtiva etmektedir” (Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Türkiye’nin Düzeni”, p. 449).
[66] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 96.
[67] Igor, Lipovsky, “The Socialist Movement In Turkey”, p. 98.
[68] “Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 227.
[69] “Yön’ün Kadro’yu ön plana çıkarması, basında Yön’ü Kadro ile ilişkilendiren ve bu kanalla da eleştiren yazıların çıkmasına neden olur” (Tekeli & İlkin, “Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak”, p. 473).
[70] “Aydemir daha sonra bu dergide savunacağı Türk Sosyalizmi kavramına meşruiyet sağlamakta Atatürk’le ilişki kurmayı düşündüğü için bir hazırlık yapmaktadır” (Tekeli & İlkin, “Kadrocuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak”, p. 472).
[71] “Maoizmle süslenmiş Kemalizm” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”), p. 244.
[72] “Türkiye’de egemen sınıflar, doğrudan doğruya dışarıya bağımlı komprador burjuvazi olarak tanımlanıyor, bu sınıfın emperyalist sermayenin dolaysız bir uzantısı ve acentası olduğu tespit ediliyor ve buna karşılık da, milli burjuvazi, tümüyle ülkenin bir iç dinamiği olarak kabul ediliyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1, p. 247).
[73] Türk Solu started publication on 17 November 1967 and continued until 14 April 1970. For more information, see Jacob M, Landau, “Radical Politics in Turkey”, pp. 75-79.
[74] Igor Lipovsky, “The Legal Socialist Parties of Turkey”, p. 103.
[75] Çünkü Avcıoğlu, TİP’i hem sosyalizmden ve işçi sınıfı öncülüğünden bahsettiğinde sağdan, hem de, geri bir reformculuğu savunduğu, İngiliz ve Fransız sosyalist partilerinin programlarından da geride kaldığı için, soldan eleştiriyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 268).
[76] “Söylenenler açıktır: Türkiye’nin önündeki hedef, ileri kapitalist ülkelerin düzeyine çıkmaktır; fakat bunu burjuvazi gerçekleştiremez” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 281).
[77] “Aren-Boran kliği, Aybar’a karşı özellikle SSCB’nin Çekoslovakya’yı işgali sonrasında alevlenen tartışmada, Aybar’ın öne sürdüğü Türkiye’ye özgü sosyalizm, güleryüzlü sosyalizm gibi kavramları eleştiri konusu yaparken, sosyalizmin, Marksizm-Leninizm temel tezlerine dayandırdıkları ve Aybar’a karşı başta SSCB olmak üzere sosyalist sistemi savundukları izlenimi vermeye gayret ediyorlardı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, pp. 273-274).
[78] “Ona göre, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, kapitalizmin gelişebilmesinin bütün iç dinamiklerine sahip olduğu halde, sömürgeci ve emperyalist Avrupa ile olan ilişkiler bu geçişin önünü tıkamıştı. Sonuçta Avcıoğlu, çözümün milliyetçi devrimcilik yoluyla mümkün olduğu teziyle çalışmasını tamamlıyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 226).
[79] “Bu iddianın Marksizm açısından en kabul edilemez yanı, mevcut devletin sınıf temelini gizlemesidir. Eğer devlet bir burjuva sınıfı yaratmak istiyorsa, onun sınıfsal dayanağı hangi sınıftır?” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 228).
[80] “Eğer hasım güçlerin kimin açısından hasım olduğu konulmamışsa, devrim sürecindeki mücadeleyi de, devrimci iktidarın sosyal, ekonomik ve sosyal programını tanımlamak olanağı da bulunamayacaktır” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 234).
[81] “MDD’ye göre, Türkiye, yarı-feodal ve yarı-sömürge bir ülkeydi. Önündeki devrimci adım, anti-emperyalist ve anti-feodal içerikte Milli Demokratik Devrim aşamasıydı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 246).
[82] “MDD kurmayı, uzun süre TİP içindeki mücadeleyi, TİP’in ele geçirilmesi çizgisinde tutmuş, ‘TİP’i gözbebeğimiz gibi korumalıyız’, ‘TİP’i adına layık bir örgüt haline getirmeliyiz’ gibi sloganlar, uzun bir dönem geçerli kalmıştır” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 252).
[83] “Gençliğin anti-emperyalist mücadelesini, sosyalist bir mücadele olmamakla eleştirirken, sözde onun solunda duruyor, ama kitlesel boykotla, işgaller ve sokak gösterilerini de, maceracılık olarak damgalayarak, sağcı parlamentarizm yolunu gösteriyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 269).
[84] “TİP’in 10 Şubat 1964’te, İzmir’de yapılan 1. Büyük Kongresi’nde kabul edilen programın başlangıç bölümü, Büyük Millet Meclisi Beyannamesi başlığı altında, Mustafa Kemal’in bu konuşmasından oluşuyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, pp. 260-261).
[85] Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Tip Tarihi 1”, p. 251.
[86] “Birinci madde, Atatürk devrimleriyle amaç edinilen çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmanın, ancak milli istihsal seviyesini yükseltmekte gösterilecek başarıya bağlı olduğunu açıklıyor ve sonraki bölümlerde de, istihsal seviyesinin yükseltilmesinin sağlayacağı sonuçlar özetleniyordu” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 222).
[87] “Halk kütleleri, tutucu güçlerin ideolojik ve ekonomik egemenliği altındadır. İşçi ve köylü, köydeki ufak ağa ile kasaba eşrafından kompradorlar aracılığıyla Wall Street’e ve Washington’a kadar uzanan tutucu çember içindedir” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 235).
[88] “Mustafa Kemal önderliğindeki Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın, yarım kalmış bir burjuva demokratik devrimi olduğunu düşünüyorlar ve perspektiflerini, bunun tamamlanması olarak kesinleştiriyorlardı” (“Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi-1”, p. 247).
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