4 Ocak 2016 Pazartesi

Le Congrès Ordinaire du CHP en 16-17 Janvier 2016


Le plus grand parti de l’opposition en Turquie, le CHP (Parti Républicain du Peuple) organisera un congrès ordinaire entre le 16 et 17 janvier en Ankara. Le congrès donnera lieu à une compétition présidentielle entre le chef actuel du parti Monsieur Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu et trois autres candidats.

Avant présenter les candidats, il faut mieux à se concentrer sur la dernière situation du partie. Le CHP, le parti d’opposition pro-européenne social-démocrate, toujours garde sa deuxième place dans les élections et les sondages dans le pays. Mais le problème qui dérange les membres et les partisans est que le parti est encore trop loin de l’AKP (% 50 pour l’AKP et 25 % pour le CHP dans l’élection précédent). Le parti, avec son chef Monsieur Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a réussi d’augmenter ses voix de 19 % en 2002 à 25 % en 2015. Par contre, cette augmentation est très faible et lente et pas suffisante pour les partisans qui veulent voir leur parti gouvernant la Turquie. Il y a une atmosphère pessimiste dans le parti et ses partisans depuis plusieurs années. Le parti maintenant a aussi des problèmes à convaincre les intellectuels.


Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu

Le chef actuel du parti, Monsieur Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (68), toujours le favori pour le congrès, avait été élu président du parti en 2010 après un scandale. Surnommé « le Ghandi Turc » par Le Monde, Kılıçdaroğlu était la vedette de l’ascension de la gauche turque avec ses luttes contre les corruptions de l’AKP (Parti de la justice et du développement). Ayant carrière de bureaucratie, il est connu comme « Monsieur le propre » dans le pays. Cependant après avoir perdu plusieurs d’élection contre l’AKP, maintenant il est plus faible en face des critiques. En effet, il possede des projets efficaces pour l’avenir de la Turquie concernant l’économie mais il a toujours des difficultés pour parvenir aux électeurs conservateurs. Kılıçdaroğlu a défendu son siège contre Muharrem İnce avec 740 votes contre 415 en Septembre 2014. Il peut être plus difficile cette fois mais il peut encore garder son contrôle sur le parti. Mais toujours il doit gagner une élection contre l’AKP pour devenir un chef indiscutable. Apres les élections générale de 7 juin, il a eu la chance de renverser le gouvernement de l’AKP avec une coalition entre le MHP et le HDP. Mais il n’a pas pu convaincre les deux autres partis et l’AKP a obtenu une autre victoire dans l’élection précedent de 1 novembre.    

Muharrem İnce

Le deuxième candidat est le député fameux de Yalova, Monsieur Muharrem İnce (52). İnce est comme Robespierre du CHP avec ses discours flamboyants qu’il tient  au parlement et qui a interloqué plusieurs fois Monsieur le Président Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Monsieur Ahmet Davutoğlu (le Premier Ministre)  et ses ministres. İnce est plus nationaliste, Kémaliste et républicain contre Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu qui est modéré et social-démocrate, et il propose des tactiques politiques plus sévères contre l’Islamisme politique et le sécessionnisme Kurde. Il a déjà un support assez fort dans le parti. Il peut augmenter les voix de parti plus facilement comme il est plus médiatique et il a déjà réussi à politiser les jeunes et les gens apolitiques. Mais le danger avec lui est qu’il peut plus polariser la société concernant les différents identités ethniques (turc-kurde) et styles de vies (séculaire-islamiste).   


Umut Oran

Monsieur Umut Oran (54) est le plus libéral candidat dans le CHP. Venant d’un background de businessman, il est aussi le vice-président de l’International Socialiste depuis décembre 2014. Il a des projets concrets et il peut parler deux langes européens (l’anglais et le français). Mais il n’est pas très connu dans le peuple et le libéralisme est une idéologie trop impuissant en Turquie.  


Mustafa Balbay

Le dernier candidat est Monsieur Mustafa Balbay (56). Il est journaliste et chroniqueur très connu de Cumhuriyet (la République), un journal kémaliste et gauchiste. Il a passé quelques années en prison à cause de l’affaire scandaleuse, Ergenekon, avec la charge d’organiser un coup d’état séculaire contre le gouvernement de l’AKP, mais finalement débarqué. Il est un populiste et assez connu et compétent, mais encore nouveau dans la vie politique.

Probablement, la compétition sera entre Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu et Monsieur İnce. Monsieur Kılıçdaroğlu est toujours le favori car c’est très rare dans la vie politique turque qu’un leader de parti perd son siège dans un congrès. Mais le CHP est le seul parti démocratique de la Turquie concernant la démocratie dans le parti et tout peut se réaliser si les délègués ont décidé à changer le chef.

Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

RPP Will Hold Its Ordinary Congress on 16-17 January 2016


Turkey’s pro-secular main opposition party, CHP (Republican People’s Party – RPP) will hold its ordinary congress on 16-17 January 2016 in Ankara. The congress will witness a leadership race between the current chair of the party, Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and 3 other candidates. In this piece, I will try to analyze the upcoming CHP congress.

We should first look at the latest situation of the party. Although the social democratic party has been increasing its votes steadily since the 2002 elections, due to governing Justice and Development Party’s dominating position in Turkish politics and incredible electoral performances, CHP voters seem to be very desperate in recent years. The large gap between two parties' voting percentages (50 % for AKP and 25 % for CHP) is the primary reason for this pessimistic mood. Consistent but very slow increase in the party’s votes (from 19.39 % in 2002 to 25.30 % in 2015) can be named as the second negative factor. Thirdly, CHP seems to have lost its organic ties with Turkish intelligentsia in recent years. All these factors distance voters from CHP since many people think that the party does not have chance to govern Turkey. In fact, after the elections in June, CHP had a chance to get rid of -13 years of- AKP rule by establishing a coalition government with Turkish nationalist Nationalist Action Party - NAP (MHP) and pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party - PDP (HDP). However, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu’s sincere efforts were not strong enough to bring MHP and HDP together within a 3 party coalition government. The result was the renewal of elections and return to single party government by AKP. Although MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli is often pointed out as the real responsible of this failure, it is also a fact that CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu did not create a comfortable political ground for the take-over of such a coalition government before the elections. Thus, this congress will be open to criticism toward party leadership.


Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu

The party leader, Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (68) looks for a new term as the current chair of the party. Nicknamed as “Gandhi” after India’s legendary leader, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu comes from bureaucratic background and represents the Alevi minority in Turkey as well as secular-minded Sunni groups who are opposing to increasing sectarian politics in Turkey and Middle East. Although the party represents the secular option against the Islamic or nationalist politics, it does not seem to have enough support from the Western world or Russia. It is also strange to see that the party does not give enough importance and place to non-Muslim groups in Turkey including Christian and Jewish minorities. Kılıçdaroğlu has been also acting very conservatively in terms of proposing a new model related to Turkey’s governance. The party does not advocate a model of autonomy or federalism in relation to Kurdish question and takes the issue mostly from the economic perspective. In foreign policy, the party challenges AKP’s pro-Sunni approach and seems closer to Russia-Iran bloc although they offer a balance policy and never consider Turkey’s exit from the Western bloc and NATO. The party is also very determined about Turkey's full membership to European Union; a good foreign policy ideal that does not seem very realistic in recent years. CHP offered some concrete and good economic projects under Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership, but failed to convince voters. His humble and honest image is also often praised by Turkish people. Thus, Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu might increase the party’s votes with a few percent in the next elections. However, it should be added that no one expects a miracle from him after several lost elections.

Muharrem İnce

Kılıçdaroğlu’s most pretentious rival is Mr. Muharrem İnce (52). Coming from teacher background, Mr. İnce is an interesting figure in Turkish politics. His extraordinary oratory skills can be compared only to Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of course, being his secular version. It should not be forgotten that Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu was able to secure his seat against Mr. İnce with 740 votes to 415 in the extraordinary congress of the party organized in September 2014. This shows that İnce has already a good support within the party and this time he might seriously challenge Kılıçdaroğlu for being 8th chair of the party (after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü, Bülent Ecevit, Deniz Baykal, Hikmet Çetin, Altan Öymen and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu). İnce appeals to right-wing voters as well because of his nationalist opposition to AKP policies. However, this might alienate CHP further from the Kurdish voters if he is elected. Moreover, İnce’s foreign policy approach is also strongly anti-imperialistic and he might challenge many of the policy initiatives coming from Washington and Brussels. It is already known that he is a strong opponent of anti-Iran and anti-Russia policies implemented by the AKP government and its Western allies. His secularism understanding is also very harsh and resembles to single-party years in Turkey. However, in a world where ISIS seems to be the greatest danger for the human civilization, his rigid secular rhetoric might appeal to Western decision-makers as well. İnce might increase the party’s votes rapidly and reach around 30 % easily, because he might appeal to nationalist voters as well and he could politicize young people with his enthusiastic style. İnce is also the youngest candidate among the alternatives.

Umut Oran

There are 2 other candidates for the congress. Mr. Umut Oran (54) seems to be the most liberal and pro-business candidate among the alternatives. Coming from businessman background, Mr. Oran is a self-made millionaire in the textile industry. He has also been the Vice President of Socialist International since December 2014. He speaks French and English. On the paper, he seems like a perfect leader that will lead CHP and Turkey toward a more pro-Western future. However, among the party delegates, he does not seem very popular and powerful. Moreover, his businessman style might not appeal to ordinary voters in Turkey. It is known that Turkey does not have a liberal political tradition and Islamism, secularism (Kemalism), Turkish nationalism and Kurdish secessionism are four main ideological orientations in the country. Thus, Mr. Oran might not be the best leader in practice at least for the moment.

Mustafa Balbay

The last candidate Mr. Mustafa Balbay (56) is a famous journalist and author of many books. Mr. Balbay is the most leftist alternative among the candidates. He writes for left-wing daily Cumhuriyet for many years and spent few years in the prison recently because of false accusations related to a conspiracy to topple down the AKP government with a pro-secular military coup, legal controversies known as Ergenekon and Balyoz cases in Turkey. He has become a symbol of secularism in Turkey and has a good knowledge of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics. However, he is new as an active politician and this might decrease support for his leadership.

It seems like the leadership race will be between Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu and Mr. İnce. Although Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu has an obvious advantage as the party leader who appoints most of the delegates, it should be stated that CHP is the only political party in Turkey that practices intra-party democracy and there can be delegates who are opposing to Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership as well. Thus, the leadership race will be very tight and this time Mr. İnce also has a good chance to win.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

3 Ocak 2016 Pazar

9 Maddede 2016 Yılı Rusya Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgesi


Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'in imzasıyla geçtiğimiz gün ilan edilen 2016 yılı Rusya Ulusal Güvenlik Strateji Belgesi, bazı açılardan önemli bir kırılma noktası niteliği taşıyan önemli bir dokümandır. Son dönemde Ukrayna ve Suriye'de Batı dünyasıyla ciddi anlamda karşı karşıya gelen Rusya, bu ani değişikliği ulusal güvenlik stratejisine de yansıtmış durumdadır. Belgede öne çıkan 9 önemli husus şöyle özetlenebilir:

1. Renkli Devrimler ve Yolsuzluk Rusya İçin Öncelikli Tehditlerdir: Belgeye göre; Turuncu Devrim ve benzeri Batı destekli iktidar değişiklikleri, Rusya ulusal güvenliği, ülkenin toprak bütünlüğü ve istikrarı açısından tehlikeli görülmektedir. Rus Devleti, bu gibi girişimlere Batılı istihbarat servislerinin yön verdiğini düşünmektedir. Ayrıca yolsuzluk da önemli bir sorun olarak işaret edilmekte ve temiz siyaset mesajıyla yönetime yönelik halk desteği arttırılmak istenmektedir.

2. Kimyasal ve Biyolojik Silah Tehditleri: Belgeye göre; son dönemde ABD'nin de desteğiyle Rusya'nın komşusu olan devletlerin biyolojik ve kimyasal silah kapasiteleri tehlikeli bir şekilde gelişmektedir. Bu durum, Rusya için öncelikli tehditlerden birisidir.

3. NATO Genişlemesi Sınırı Aştı: Rus Devleti, yeni ulusal güvenlik stratejisinde NATO genişlemesini öncelikli bir tehdit olarak gördüğünü beyan etmektedir. Bu durum, Rusya'nın Ukrayna ve Gürcistan gibi ülkelerin Batı yönelimli politikalarına devam etmeleri durumunda Rus tehdidiyle karşılaşacaklarını gösteren bir uyarı olarak okunmalıdır. Buna karşın, Rusya'nın hassasiyetlerine saygı duyulması durumunda, NATO, ABD ve AB ile iyi ilişkiler kurulmak istendiği belirtilmektedir.

4. Ukrayna'daki Darbe Yönetimi Düşman Rusya İmajı Yaratıyor: Belgeye göre; Rusya, Ukrayna'daki iktidar değişikliğini bir 'darbe' olarak görmekte ve bu durumun Ukrayna'daki aşırı milliyetçi çevreleri güçlendirdiğini ve bu ülkeyi iç savaşa sürüklediğini düşünmektedir.

5. Nükleere Hayır İçin İki Şart: Yine bu belgede; Rusya'nın nükleer gücünü azaltmaya hazır olduğu, ancak bunun sadece karşılıklı anlaşmalar ve çok taraflı görüşmeler durumunda yapılabileceğinin altı çizilmektedir.

6. Bilgi Savaşı: Belgede vurgulanan bir diğer husus, Rusya'nın maruz kaldığı enformatik (bilgi) savaşıdır. İnternetin yaygınlaşması ile birlikte, habercilik ile istihbarat servislerinin internet üzerinden yürüttükleri propaganda faaliyetleri ilintili hale gelmiştir. Bu nedenle, bu konuda çeşitli önlemler alınmalıdır.

7. Askeri Güç Kullanımı: Yeni strateji belgesinde, Rusya’nın askeri güce başvurmasının yegane gerekçesi olarak diğer yöntemlerin ulusal çıkarları korumaya yeterli olmaması durumu belirtilmektedir. Elbette, bu çok geniş ve her şekilde yorumlanabilecek bir ifadedir. Zira günümüz dünyasında devletler arası ilişkilerde ulusal çıkarları maksimize eden mutlak kazanç durumları pek nadiren söz konusu olmaktadır.

8. Ekonomik İstikrar Tehlikesi: Belgede Rusya’nın son dönemde yaşadığı ekonomik zorluklar samimiyetle kabul edilmiş ve bu durumun yolsuzluk gibi pratiklerle daha da ağırlaştığı belirtilmiştir. Ayrıca küresel ekonomik krizin ve Rusya’ya yönelik siyasi motifli yaptırımların buna neden olduğu ifade edilmiştir.

9. Ekonomiyi İyileştirme Planları: Rus hükümetinin, artan ekonomik sorunlar karşısında gerekli önlemleri almaya hazırlandığı ifade edilen belgede, hükümetin bazı toplumsal ve ekonomik politikaları hayata geçireceği belirtilmiştir. Bu politikaların kapsamında; enflasyonu düşürmek, mali sistemi güçlendirmek ve rublenin istikrarlı hareket etmesini sağlamak öncelikli olarak sayılmaktadır. Ayrıca Rusya'nın, Çin, Hindistan, Latin Amerika ve Afrika ülkeleriyle ilişkilerini güçlendirmek istediği de bu bölümde söylenmektedir.

Raporun genel olarak dengeli yazıldığı, ancak Ukrayna konusunda herhangi bir yumuşama durumu algılanmadığı belirtilmelidir. Suriye konusuna hiç girilmemesi ise, IŞİD'le mücadele ve Suriye'deki geçiş dönemi konusunda Rusya’nın işbirliğine açık olduğu şeklinde okunabilir.


Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ 

28 Aralık 2015 Pazartesi

A New Cold War Between Russia and the West?


Recent crisis between Russian Federation and USA/EU in Ukraine and Syria let some academics and journalists to talk boldly and write extensively on the concept of “New Cold War”. In this article, I will try to summarize different authors’ views about the nature of West-Russia relations in recent years.

Motly, Alexander J.  (2014), “The Sources of Russian Conduct”, Foreign Affairs[1]
Alexander J. Motly’s recent article published in Foreign Affairs magazine, “The Sources of Russian Conduct”, is symbolic because the name itself is a reference to George F. Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” article, which was accepted as the starting point of the Cold War period.

In this article, Motly basically claims that, although Russian Federation is not a communist empire like USSR, it is still an anti-Western political entity that has been acting hostile towards Western world and Western values. Moreover, the search for an absolute leader (Putin in this case) in domestic politics, is same as communist years in Moscow. Ever since he appeared in Russian politics in 1999, Vladimir Putin has been building an increasingly personalistic regime. Putin's Russia is corrupt, centralized and carries connotations of hyper-masculinity. Although Putin poses a direct threat to Western interests, he was lucky because the Western governments have been reducing their military spendings and NATO has been in decline for some years. Thus, Putin’s neo-imperial ideology has been gaining popularity around the world in recent years. Looking at this downward trend, the author claims that the Western bloc should develop a long-term policy against Russian expansionism.

Motly thinks that this policy should be -similar to what they did in the past- containment. Ukraine is the first and foremost example of a country that should be saved from Russian expansionism. Thus, Ukrainian government must be financially, militarily and politically helped. Other countries around Russia including Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Moldova, as well as -possibly- Belarus and Kazakhstan should be supported by the West. Motly says; “Central to today’s containment policy is constraining Russia’s ability to use energy as a weapon. Halting the building of the South Stream pipeline, reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, and helping Ukraine reform its energy sector will be key. Last but not least, sanctions—as forms of minimizing Russia’s economic power—must be maintained and possibly intensified.”

He also thinks that the US and Europe must also work on their soft-power appeal. If they claim to stand for democracy, human rights, and “European values”, then they should actively promote them - especially in those places into which Russia seeks to expand. Motly continues; "Moreover, the West should always be ready to provide Putin with a face-saving exit from his aggressive behavior: 'it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia' Kennan wrote, 'that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.' In sum, counterforce plus soft power plus a willingness to compromise make for the best form of containment, whether in 1947 or in 2014."

Alexander Motly is also very optimistic about the future. He thinks that George Kennan’s optimism about the future during the Cold War can also be applied today. He asserts that, thanks to Western sanctions and the general Russian economic stagnation, Putin’s Russia is rapidly decaying. Putin’s regime includes vast corruption, overcentralization, inefficiency, ineffectiveness and bureaucratic empire-building. With containment, this could be accelerated. Finally, in his view, a wise, sustained and steady policy of containment could ensure that, when Putin’s regime is shaken to its foundations, the outcome will be favorable for Russians, their aggrieved neighbors and for the world.

Allison, Roy (2014), “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules”, International Affairs[2]
According to Roy Allison from Oxford University, Russia’s Crimea and Ukraine policy poses the greatest threat towards the Europe (West in general) after the Second World War. He thinks that although Western public opinion generally takes the issue from the geopolitical perspective, in fact, it is problematic in terms of international law and diplomacy. Russia, on the other hand, legitimizes its acts on the basis of Kosovo example and its influence based on its military power and its political power coming from its UN Security Council seat. However, Allison thinks that -unlike 2008 Georgia case- this time Russian aggression might lead to a serious confrontation between the West and Russia.
Allison then summarizes Russia’s arguments for Crimean move;
  • The toppling down of Yanukovich government (an elected President) is anti-democratic and this event should be considered as part of Orange Revolution and Arab Spring.
  • Russia has right to protect Russian originated Ukrainians on the basis of human rights.
  • A pro-Western government in Kiev is a direct threat to Moscow’s security in Crimea and Black Sea region.
  • Ukrainian crisis might lead to a serious refugee crisis for Moscow. Thus, Moscow has right to act.
  • Ukrainian people called for Russian intervention and thus, Russia has right to intervene.
  • There was a democratic referendum in Crimea and Crimean people wanted to annex to Russia.
Allison thinks that these arguments are problematic for certain reasons.
  • Ukrainian transition was not only based on street demonstrations but the President Viktor Yanukovich was democratically impeached by the Rada and there was a new democratic election in Ukraine.
  • Russian originated people in Ukraine were never threatened by the Ukranians and the human rights argument used by Russia was false.
  • The new Ukrainian government, from the first day, declared that they will be loyal to international and bilateral agreements and never posed a threat to Russian security in Crimea or Black Sea region.
  • Unlike Kosovo (1999) or Libya (2012), there has never been a serious refugee crisis in Ukraine.
  • Ukranian people cannot invite a foreign country to help them without a resolution passing from the Rada – Ukrainian Parliament. Moreover, Russian aggression was against 1994 Budapest Accords between Russia and Ukraine through which Ukraine gave up from its nuclear weapons in return to Russian guarantee for its territorial integrity.
  • Crimean referendum was made under the influence of Russian tanks and was not democratic.
Monaghan, Andrew (2015), “A ‘New Cold War’? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia”, Chatham House[3]
Andrew Monaghan basically claims that, although there are many similarities between the Cold War tensions and current Russian aggression, this theoretical framework might lead us to wrong conclusions. We are now living in 21st century and 20th century is over. Thus, we should interpret Russian policies from the perspective of current strategic thinking, not from the Cold War's strategic perspective.

According to Monaghan, it is a fact that there are still serious differences between the West and Russia. The Western liberal values are in sharp contrast with Russian statist and conservative values. Furthermore, Russia has close ties with anti-democratic regimes such as North Korea, China, Iran etc. and it does not promote democracy in the world unlike Western governments. Starting from 2007 Munich Conference, Russian leader Vladimir Putin has been increasingly questioning Western liberal and libertarian views and criticizing them severely. However, this might not mean that Russia and the West are in the situation of existential threat to each other. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, the hypothetical “New Cold War” pattern is not supported by some facts. For instance, Russia and EU countries enjoy high degree of economic relations especially EU’s dependency on Russian gas is a serious factor for the continuation of relations. (Western economic sanctions against Russia now changed the situation)

Secondly, there are common threats for opposing camps such as the international terrorism and the nuclear proliferation. ISIS terrorism for instance, is a serious factor that could make two sides cooperating more instead of competing. 

Thirdly, Monaghan thinks that Russia is not implementing expansionism, but rather, trying to secure itself. Since in Russian mind Ukraine is part of the “Russkiy mir”, Russia sees the situation as a threat to its own territories, not as an attack to a foreign country. Thus, Russia is only dealing with its “near abroad”, its own backyard. However, Russian economic investments and foreign policy initiatives in Syria, Iraq, Africa and Latin America show that Russian ambitions are not only limited to its near abroad geography, but Russia wants to become a world power again.

Fourthly, although Russian policy in Ukraine might be problematic, in times where the Western governments have other problems like ISIS, civil war in Syria, instabilities in Iraq, Yemen and Libya, refugee crisis in the Mediterranean and the rapid rise of China, putting Russia at the top spot might not be a rational move.

Fifthly, there might be a methodological problem. Although many social scientists focus on similarities to explain social phenomenons, this might prevent dynamic and flexible thinking as it was stated by French historian Marc Bloch.

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] Motly, Alexander J.  (2014), “The Sources of Russian Conduct”, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142366/alexander-j-motyl/the-sources-of-russian-conduct.
[2] Allison, Roy (2014), “Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules”, International Affairs, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-%E2%80%98deniable-intervention%E2%80%99-ukraine-how-and-why-russia-broke-rules.
[3] Monaghan, Andrew (2015), “A ‘New Cold War’? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia”, Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150522ColdWarRussiaMonaghan.pdf.

Stratfor Gelecek On Yıl Öngörüleri


Amerika merkezli özel istihbarat kuruluşu Stratfor’un yayınladığı “Decade Forecast: 2015-2025” adlı rapor[1], 2015-2025 yılları arasında dünya siyasetinde yaşanabilecek bazı gelişmelere ışık tutan bir öngörü niteliği taşımaktadır. Raporda ön plana çıkan 11 önemli konu şöyle sıralanmıştır[2];
  1. Rusya Federasyonu Çökecek: Raporda vurgulanan en flaş husus, gelecek 10 yılda Rusya Federasyonu’nun çökeceği ya da gücünü belli ölçüde kaybedeceği iddiasıdır. Rapora göre; Batı’nın uyguladığı ekonomik yaptırımlar, düşen petrol fiyatları, rublenin değer kaybetmesi, artan askeri harcamalar ve iç siyasette artan anlaşmazlıklar nedeniyle, Rusya Federasyonu, geniş coğrafyasının bazı bölgelerinde merkezi otoritesini kaybedecek ve bu da bir güç boşluğu yaratacaktır. Ancak 1917 Bolşevik Devrimi’nin aksine, bu durum bir devrim şeklinde yaşanmayacak ve özerk bölgelerin güçlenmesi ve bağımsızlığını ilan etmesi şeklinde yavaş yavaş gelişecektir.
  2. ABD, Rusya’nın Nükleer Gücünü Güvence Altına Almak İçin Harekete Geçecek: Raporda ilk vurgulanan konunun devamı niteliğindeki bir diğer önemli iddia, Rusya’nın geniş nükleer kapasitesi nedeniyle bu ülkede yaşanan güç boşluğunun nükleer tehlikelere neden olmasını engellemek amacıyla, ABD’nin bu süreçte harekete geçecek olmasıdır. ABD, bu noktada ya askeri gücüyle bunu yapacak, ya da özerkleşen/bağımsızlık kazanan eski Rus topraklarında istikrarlı hükümetler kurulmasına yardım edecektir.
  3. Almanya, Ekonomik Zorluklarla Karşılaşacak: Son yılların ekonomik anlamda en güçlü ve istikrarlı ülkesi olan Almanya, gelecek 10 yılda AB içerisinde yaşanan krizlerden olumsuz etkilenecek ve düşen ihracat oranları nedeniyle Japonya gibi bir resesyon dönemine girecektir.
  4. Polonya, AB’nin Lider Ülkelerinden Olacak: Almanya’nın düşüşüne karşın, Polonya gelecek 10 yılda ekonomik ve siyasi açılardan büyük ilerlemeler kaydedecek ve AB’nin lider ülkelerinden olacaktır. ABD ile stratejik ortaklığının ve artan nüfusunun da etkisiyle, bu ülke, kısa sürede bölgesel bir güç haline gelecektir.
  5. Dört Avrupa Olacak: Birkaç yıl öncesine kadar durdurulmasına imkansız gözüyle bakılan Avrupa entegrasyonu, AB içerisinde yaşanan milliyetçilik tartışmaları, bölgeselleşme eğilimleri ve artan AB kuşkuculuğu nedeniyle pratikte tek Avrupa’dan ziyade dört Avrupa’ya neden olacaktır. Bunlar; Batı Avrupa, Doğu Avrupa, İskandinavya ve Britanya Adaları olacaktır.
  6. Türkiye ve ABD Daha Yakın Müttefik Olacaklar: Rapora göre; Türkiye ve ABD, gelecek 10 yılda daha yakın müttefik olacaklardır. Bunun sebebi ise, Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Bölgesi’ndeki Rus ve Ermeni tehdidine karşı ABD desteğine ihtiyaç duyacak olmasıdır. Ayrıca Türkiye’nin sınırlarındaki (Suriye, Irak) krizlerin çözümü konusunda da Türkiye ve ABD birlikte hareket edeceklerdir.
  7. Çin, Yeni Sorunlarla Karşılaşacak: Son 10 yılda ekonomik büyüme ve siyasi istikrar anlamında başarılı bir performans gösteren Çin, gelecek 10 yılda Komünist Parti’ye yönelik tepkiler ve bölgesel eşitsizlikler nedeniyle zor günler geçirecektir. Komünist Parti, bu tepkiler karşısında liberalleşmeyecek ve daha sert yöntemlere başvuracaktır.
  8. Japonya, Asya’nın Yükselen Deniz Gücü Olacak: Çin’in güçlü bir donanma kurması karşısında, tarihsel olarak önemli bir deniz gücü olan Japonya da harekete geçecek ve kısa sürede çok güçlü bir donanma inşa edecektir. ABD’nin azalan askeri gücü nedeniyle, Japonya bunu yapmaya mecbur kalacaktır. Zira güvenlik dışında, -bir ada ülkesi olmanın doğal neticesi olarak- bu ülke, ithalata büyük önem vermekte ve bazı ihtiyaçlarını bu yolla karşılamaktadır.
  9. Güney Çin Denizi’nde Savaş Yaşanmayacak: Rapora göre; son yıllarda en riskli bölgelerden biri olarak gösterilen Güney Çin Denizi’nde sıcak bir çatışma yaşanmayacak, ancak bölgedeki tansiyon devam edecektir. Bölgede Rusya’nın gücü düşerken, Japonya ve Çin’in gücü artacaktır.
  10. 16 Yeni ve Küçük Çin Olacak: Çin’in ekonomik büyüme oranlarının ve verimliliğinin düşmesi, küresel sermayeyi başka bazı ülkelere yönlendirmeye başlayacak ve bunun neticesinde 16 tane yeni küçük “Çin” ortaya çıkacaktır. Bu devletler; Meksika, Nikaragua, Dominik Cumhuriyeti, Peru, Etiyopya, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzanya, Bangladeş, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Laos, Vietnam, Kamboçya, Filipinler ve Endonezya olacaktır. Bu ülkeler, 1,15 milyarlık toplam nüfuslarıyla ekonomik büyüme açısından en dikkat çeken aktörler haline geleceklerdir.
  11. ABD Gücü Azalacak: Rapordaki son ve en önemli tespitlerden birisi de, dünyadaki tek süper-güç konumundaki ABD’nin gelecek 10 yılda gücünün azalacak olmasıdır. Ancak bu durum, ABD’nin dünya liderliğini kaptırdığı ya da krize girdiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Zira ABD, dünyadaki sorunlara fazlasıyla angaje olan politikasını değiştirecek, ancak kendisi güvenlik ve zenginlik içerisinde yaşamaya devam edecektir.
Rapordaki iddiaların flaş, ancak eleştiriye açık olduğu söylenebilir. Özellikle Rusya Federasyonu’nun dağılması ve ABD’nin bu ülkedeki nükleer tehlikelere karşı harekete geçmesi senaryosunun gerçekleşme ihtimali, Rusya’nın son dönemde yaşadığı zorluklara karşın, hiç de kolay gözükmemektedir. Bunun sebebi de, Rus lider Vladimir Putin’e son dönemde artan desteğin de teyit ettiği üzere, Rus halkının duygusal (rasyonel değil) ve aşırı milliyetçi bir yapıda olmasıdır. Rapordaki en isabetli tahminler ise, Türkiye-ABD müttefikliğinin daha da derinleşmesi, Japonya’nın askeri kapasitesinin artması ve AB içerisinde yaşanacak sorunlar olarak gözükmektedir.

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ

[1] Raporun tamamına bu adresten ulaşılabilir; https://www.stratfor.com/sample/forecast/decade-forecast-2015-2025.