Footsteps of the Dominant Party System in Türkiye

 

The "dominant party system", also referred to as the "hegemonic party system", is a unique example in Political Science, identifying a political system in which a single political party consistently dominates election results over competing opposition groups or parties. In that sense, a dominant party system differs from a one-party system, in which only a single political party is legally allowed to run for office.

The dominant party system could be based on certain socioeconomic and cultural factors, which would not necessarily be a barrier to this system being automatically labelled as "anti-democratic". For instance, due to the terrible memories of the "apartheid" regime in South Africa, South Africans, since their country's transition into democracy, continue to vote for the African National Congress (ANC) despite serious socioeconomic problems in their country. Likewise, the early decades of Indian democracy were marked by the uninterrupted rule of the Indian National Congress (INC), largely due to the charismatic legacy of Mahatma Gandhi and the Nehru family. A perfect example is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, which has dominated Japanese politics for the last seven decades, almost without interruption, due to its consistent success in establishing organic ties with society, the bureaucracy, and the business elite. Another example is Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Islamist-oriented right-wing AK Parti (Justice and Development Party), which has achieved remarkable electoral performances since 2002. So, in this more democratic version of the dominant party system, although there are competitive elections and a relatively democratic political environment, due to some economic and cultural factors (in the case of Türkiye, the suppression of Islamic lifestyle for many decades by the secular state), a party and a leader might dominate the political scene without adhering to anti-democratic and repressive practices. 

However, there is another and less democratic version of the dominant party system, often referred to as the "cartel party system". A "cartel party" is a political organization that uses the resources of the state to maintain its position within the political system, colluding with other parties in a way similar to a cartel. In a cartel party system, the governing party, thanks to its control over the state's political and economic power, transforms the system into an unchangeable regime that constantly reproduces itself in a vicious circle. This political party system is often observed in post-Soviet countries, where the economy is mainly under state control, and thus, the governing party and its leader. This model is closely related with the concept of"rentier state" The Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, and other Turkic States in Central Asia are prime examples of a cartel party system, in which elections primarily serve to increase the legitimacy of the governing party or leader, rather than providing a genuine opportunity for the opposition to attain governing power. Since 2015, and especially after its controversial transition into a hyperpresidential system in 2017, Türkiye has become increasingly closer to this model, with President Erdoğan and his AK Parti utilising all state apparatuses to suppress and weaken the opposition and maintain permanent power. In such a system, the state's control over the media and the politicization of the judiciary also serve as a legitimate mechanism to design the opposition and prevent an unexpected government change through elections. Although we do not know too much about the details of the recent legal battles against the pro-secular CHP (Republican People's Party), many observers in Türkiye claim that these are clear signs of the approaching cartel party regime, in which the government would also control the opposition and turn other political parties into "His Majesty's opposition". 

But it is also worth noting that President Erdoğan, who wants to transform Türkiye's old regime of perpetual military coups, and who is in fact inspired by the tactics used by the country's founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s, has succeeded in giving the impression of solving the country's decades-old problems. For example, on the Kurdish Question, which the opposition is not so keen on, Erdoğan has been very courageous in negotiating with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and ending the terrorism problem, with the guidance of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who supports him unconditionally. Similarly, Erdoğan and his party have been more willing to amend Türkiye's 1982 constitution, which was drafted after the 1980 military coup, and to adopt a new "civilian" constitution. On these issues, the opposition, interestingly enough, is not particularly reformist or enthusiastic, but rather acts like a continuation of the old military-controlled regime. This is one of the reasons why Erdoğan still enjoys strong support from large segments of society opposed to the old regime, especially the Kurds. 

In that sense, if President Erdoğan and his regime could achieve to make a new civilian constitution, tame the opposition, provide extensive control over the formerly self-ordained military, and most importantly, solve the Kurdish Question, this would represent an entirely new case in Political Science, with an authoritarian-leaning civilian regime becoming more successful in solving the structural problems of the country. To do this, Erdoğan's regime is aiming to make a leadership change in the main opposition party, the CHP, by replacing Özgür Özel with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The result will be seen in early September through a court decision. Another critical issue would be the steps that Erdoğan will take in the coming weeks to solve the Kurdish Question, which is in fact not an internal problem, but due to significant Kurdish presence in neighboring countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, as well as the U.S., Israeli, Russian, and European involvement in this issue, a regional or even a global matter. President Erdoğan, with this immense experience and highly developed political instincts, might in fact achieve this. However, the country's problematic economic situation would be Erdoğan's most significant weakness in convincing Turkish people and the international audience.   

Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ