Dr. Klaus Jürgens is a German journalist and political analyst from Britain who closely watches and extensively writes about Turkish Foreign Policy and Türkiye’s relations with the Western countries. Jürgens regularly appears on TRT World and shares his analyses and opinions with the Turkish public and international audiences.
You can follow his works and interviews from his Twitter account: https://twitter.com/KlausJurgens
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Ozan Örmeci: Mr. Klaus Jürgens, thank you for the
opportunity. Could you please tell us more about your professional career and
your interest in Turkish Politics and Turkish Foreign Policy as academic fields?
Klaus Jürgens: My interest in all things; Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Politics in general started via a
deviation, so to speak. I had been active in German and European
non-governmental organisations, respectively, including being the chairperson
of a European wide youth and student movement platform fully financed by the
European Commission in Brussels. This involvement, paired with attending
training courses for youth leaders at the site of the Council of Europe in
Strasbourg, were the catalyst for my wish to one day either get involved in ‘adult’
politics myself, or alternatively lecture and write about politics. Always
considering European enlargement as a positive development and having had the
pleasure of knowing many people with Turkish background, it became clear after
1999 that especially one country caught my researcher’s eye: the Republic of
Türkiye (Turkey). To make this point even more frank, I was never a supporter of a ‘Superstate
Europe’, but preferred a multicultural, multifaith, socially inclusive Europe
and Türkiye absolutely has her place in that ‘House Europe’ as many of my
generation referred to as the post-Maastricht European Union.
The logic continuation was eventually starting to lecture about EU Law
for Business Administration and designing Türkiye’s first ever university
course syllabus teaching about Türkiye’s Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
(SME) in cross-border ventures focusing on relations with Austria, Germany, and
the United Kingdom. Certainly, having obtained a post-graduate degree from
London School of Economics (LSE) in the domain of Government facilitated this venture
to a great extent. And where business goes first, foreign and international
relations, respectively, often follow in their footsteps hence a link between
cross-border strategic partnerships in both dimensions became my focus, by now
for well over the past two decades.
More recently, running my own media representation company in London and working as a political analyst, plus communications strategist focusing on Türkiye. Then, the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communications accepted me as a panellist related to various topics; for example the UN Reform or relations with NATO both in Türkiye and abroad, most recently in Stockholm. Besides, honoured to regularly being featured on TRT World television both in Istanbul and from time to time in London, too. What’s more, contributing to NEX24 online news platform in Germany and TRT Germany in Berlin. New academic analysis soon to be published in Insight Türkiye about the nation’s foreign policies featuring a close look at EU accession, UK bilateral relations, and the United Nations reform.
Ozan Örmeci: Türkiye is often criticized in the Western press
and academia due to its alleged authoritarian transformation. It is a fact that
the degree of civil liberties and political freedoms are decreased in recent
years. However, there could be some outside factors strengthening this trend
rather than President Erdoğan and his government’s preferences. In that sense,
how do you consider Türkiye’s current political regime? What we can -as Turkish
citizens- do to improve the quality of democracy in our country?
Klaus Jürgens: Having witnessed
Türkiye’s stellar rise from a country belittled by so-called allies and friends
to a proud yet never selfish nation employing a 360-degree foreign policy is a success story. I often ask myself, how come that studied men and
women living abroad and active in the domains of politics, business, and media
continue to portray modern Türkiye as an authoritarian state?
You asked about what you as Turkish citizens can do and said with all due
respect and modesty, reforming a nation and embarking on the path towards
full-fledged democracy must be considered as work in progress, there is no
finite version of democracy as countries, people, attitudes change over time.
My suggestion: figuratively speaking, continue on your path to keep
reaching for the stars with your feet solidly on the ground. In other words, your nation reformed itself from A to Z since early in 2003, individual
freedoms were introduced, military tutelage abolished, the PKK issue addressed,
infrastructure projects were implemented in all four corners of the country,
world class health service became the order of the day, and that further list
would fill quite some book chapters by itself.
The Turkish people are a proud nation and for so many decades after the Second World War, all this pride was taken away first by self-styled ‘elites’ in the country, and then by tutelage-inspired foreign actors including the United States of America. Modern Türkiye is no longer hostage to the fake Westernization project of those past fake elites.
Ozan Örmeci: Germany is the most important partner of Türkiye
in Europe. Economic and social relations are very intense and well developed
and political relations seem less problematic compared to Turkish-French or
Turkish-Greek relations. What is your opinion about the perception of Türkiye
in Germany? What could be the ideal model of relationship between Türkiye and
Germany as well as Türkiye and the European Union?
Klaus Jürgens: Unfortunately, and
over the past decade even German mainstream media reverted to Türkiye-bashing.
The good news is, however, that neither the business community nor the ‘ordinary’
men and women on the street buy into that ill-fated hate speech. Same as in
other countries from the moment onwards that modern Türkiye declared a
360-degree foreign policy based on expertise and political clout some circles
started to panic; paraphrased, who is afraid of a democratic and successful
Türkiye highly respected on the global stage?
The difference between your examples France and Greece is that over there
even elected office holders seem to wake up in the morning and search for which
negative statement they can make today about Türkiye. In Germany too, there are
anti-Türkiye undercurrents fuelled by FETÖ and PKK cells on the ground, but
seldom would leading politicians (at least not of the current government) speak
up against Türkiye in that biased manner found elsewhere.
Another good news: step by step, the number of Türkiye-bashers in Europe
is dwindling – think ever improving bilateral relations between Rome and
Ankara or consider London and Ankara.
You asked for a kind of model – well here are my thoughts: as modern
Türkiye and by now for many decades turned herself from a provider of much
needed post-Second World War labour forces in Europe, mostly Germany, but even as far as
Australia, into a leading globally recognized economic powerhouse; thus, reversing trends one hundred percent, any successful bilateral relations
should be based on an ‘seeing eye to eye’- approach. Much needs to be done, but
I still think that more mutually beneficial German-Turkish relations are the
only viable blueprint for long-lasting future of EU-Türkiye relations.
Berlin should actually pave the way for closer Türkiye-EU relations and agreeing on the EU-wide visa-liberalization should be one such urgent, step plus the modernization of the Customs Union.
Ozan Örmeci: Germany’s new coalition government and Prime
Minister Olaf Scholz found themselves in the midst of a war and political
crisis due to Russian invasion of Ukraine. This led to some serious political
consequences in Germany such as expanding military expenses substantially and trying
to cut all relations with Moscow. Do you think German government could achieve
its energy dependency without Russian support in the coming years?
Klaus Jürgens: Foreign observers of
modern German politics often struggle to coming to terms with Berlin’s delicate
balancing act with regards to contacts with Moscow. In order to understand
today’s hesitations to cut all links and ties with Russia due to the war
situation in Ukraine, one must travel back in time. On the one hand, German
political elites were split between favouring a clear transatlantic course,
that is putting good relations with Washington well ahead of any attempts of
achieving the same towards Moscow, whilst on the other hand a very outspoken
‘Moscow faction’ became ever more relevant in decision-making. It would be too
easy to allocate the former position to conservative circles and leaving the
latter earmarked for the Left. As example, post-war Social Democracy in Germany
was divided on exactly that same ideological fault lines. Never accepting two
Germanys, as a fact, it nevertheless became obvious that any attempts at
establishing more humanitarian relations between East Berlin and Bonn needed to
go via Moscow, with similar considerations applied to contacts with other
satellites of the past Soviet Empire.
Before being elected to higher offices, both former Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder and current Chancellor Olaf Scholz were actively involved in what was
labelled All European Youth and Student Cooperation, with frequent young party
member’s delegation visiting East Berlin, Moscow, Prague, and/or Budapest. The order
of the day was not automatically agreeing to whatever demands originated from
the side of Washington and trying to allow Germany finding her own foreign
policy-making formula, including becoming a bridge between West and East.
The 1976 general elections with Helmut Schmidt as the victor were interpreted as
indicator of the transatlantic circles coming out on top, but as the SPD was a
political party often likened to a super-tanker impossible to change direction
in a minute, previous more Moscow inclined tendencies had never been put aside.
During the tough years on the opposition banks, the SPD established close
relations with the newly emerged Green Party and eventually managed to continue
on a more Moscow-interested line – soon to be Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and
later today’s office holder Olaf Scholz underlined this perfectly.
The public is equally divided often characterized as "gespaltene
Öffentlichkeit", or divided/split public opinion (https://www.nzz.ch/international/ukraine-krise-warum-viele-deutsche-auf-putins-seite-stehen-ld.1666582?reduced=true). When the Ukraine War started, an absolute majority was in favour of
sanctions and supporting Ukraine. The pro-Ukraine stance has not shifted except
few voices in far-left political circles, but the question of whether to
completely severe all ties with Russia is still a hot and controversial pick.
Can Germany become independent from Russian energy supplies? Technically
speaking 'yes'; figures speak for itself or in other words, from 55 % to zero.
But it remains to be seen whether Russia could get back into the picture in the
medium-term future. Neighbouring Austria is a case in point still relying on
imports despite speaking up against the war in Ukraine. My assumption: price
will be the ultimately decisive factor.
Can Germany in its delicate geopolitical position forever turn a cold
shoulder vis-à-vis Moscow? I would not think so – there will be no world
anytime soon without Moscow to be taken into consideration as an influential
political actor.
Will the German public tolerate an ever-increasing amount for military expenditure faced with a substantial economic post-pandemic crisis? I would not think so and even conservative leaders think that way, let us remember the rift between Donald Trump and Angela Merkel on that issue.
Ozan Örmeci: Political leaders in Germany often serve longer
than one term. In case of strong right-wing leaders such as Kohl and Merkel, it
can take even more than a decade. So, what do you think about the performance
of the current government and Germany’s political future after the 2025 federal
elections?
Klaus Jürgens: My guess is that the "Ampel-Koalition", the traffic light coalition, will actually survive. You
mentioned the long-lasting Conservative leader’s success stories, but let us not
forget that in many fellow European nations left-wing politicians achieved exactly
the same long time in office, François Mitterrand as a key example from France.
The German electorate mostly shies away from experiments at the ballot
box – and ever more so in troubling times. My modest assumption: another
coalition with the Social Democrats in a certain form of leading actor, by all
means in another Grand Coalition as much as the German electorate dislikes this
formula.
My greatest worry is, however, the negative impression the current German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock leaves in the international arena which brings me to a point I make quite often: Professor Christopher Hill back in 2003 argued that foreign policies should have a certain public opinion dimension, will say governments should take public opinion much more into account when devising international relations. The current FM and all her blunders will make the Germen electorate think twice before accepting her again as FM in whatever new coalition government will be formed in 2025.
Ozan Örmeci: Could you please suggest us some gifted people
you follow to better understand Turkish Politics and Turkish Foreign Policy?
Klaus Jürgens: Over the years, I had
the pleasure to meet with many experts and scholars as well as journalists who
chose Türkiye’s foreign relations as their major academic interest. This includes
personalities both from within Türkiye and from abroad:
- Dr. Valeria Giannotta, Rome, Director Türkiye Observatory, CeSPI, and in
charge of commenting about relations between Türkiye and Italy,
- Prof. Paolo von Schirach, Washington, President Global Policy Institute
BAY University, and a frequent guest speaker on Türkiye-US and transatlantic
relations in general,
- Yönet C. Tezel, Stockholm, Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye,
- Ozan Ceyhun, Vienna, Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye,
- Faruk Kaymakcı, Brussels, Ambassador of the Republic of Türkiye to the European Union,
- Dr. Tarek Cherkaoui, Istanbul, Manager TRT World Research Centre,
- Yusuf Erim, Istanbul, Editor at Large TRT World.
Thank you very much for your interest in my reflections, truly appreciated. All success with your upcoming publication(s), too
Ozan Örmeci: Thank you very much for your precious time. We wish you all the best in your studies and we hope to see you soon in the "Turkish-American Relations in the 21st Century" conference to be hold at Istanbul Aydın University.
Date: 27.09.2023
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